
Class Elltl 



Book £. 



Copyright N 



o.T'iS' 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 




^folst/l //', 



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FOXTK YEARS 



WITH 



GENEEAL LEE 



BEING A. SUMMARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS 

TOUCHING THE CAREER OF GENERAL ROBERT E. 

LEE, IN THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES; 




TOGETHER WITH 



AH AUTHOEITATIVE STATEMENT OF THE STRENGTH OP THE 
ARMY WHICH HE COMMANDED IN THE FIELD. 



BY 



V 



"WALTEE H. TATLOE, 

HIS STAFF, AND LATE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMT 
OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 




NEW YORK : 
D. APPLETON AID COMPANY, 

549 & 551 BROADWAY. 

1877. 



"ir 



COPYRIGHT BY 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 

1877. 



•1° 






'k 



TO THE 

EIGHT THOUSAND VETERANS 

(the stteyiying heeoes of the aemt of noetheen yieginia) 
who, in line of battle, 

ON THE 9th DAT OF APEIL, 1865, 

WEEE EEPOETED PBESENT FOE DUTY, 

THE FOLLOWING PAGES AEE EESPECTFTJXLY DEDICATED 

BY 

THE AUTHOR. 



" Those who undertake to write histories do not, I perceive, take that 
trouble on one and the same account, but for many reasons, and those such as 
are very different one from another. For some of them apply themselves to 
this part of learning to show their great skill in composition, and that they 
may therein acquire a reputation for speaking finely. Others of them there are 
who write histories in order to gratify those that happen to be concerned in 
them ; and on that account have spared no pa-ins, but rather gone beyond their 
own abilities in the performance. But others there are who, of necessity and 
by force, are driven to write history, because they were concerned in the facts, 
and so cannot excuse themselves from committing them to writing, for the ad- 
vantage of posterity. Nay, there are not a few who are induced to draw their 
historical facts out of darkness into light, and to produce them for the benefit 
of the public, on account of the great importance of the facts themselves with 
which they have been concerned. Now, of these several reasons for writing 
history, I must profess the last two were my own reasons also.-' — Josephus. 



PREFACE 



It was my peculiar privilege to occupy the position of a 
confidential staff-officer with General Lee during the entire 
period of the War for Southern Independence. From the 
time he assumed the duties of the position of general-in- 
chief of the Army of Virginia ; through the campaign in the 
western portion of the State ; during the time of his com- 
mand in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Florida ; while he was charged with the control of the mili- 
tary operations of all the armies of the South, at Richmond; 
and in all his campaigns, when in command of the Army of 
^Northern Virginia — I had the honor to be at his side. Of 
necessity, therefore, some facts concerning him and the army 
movements which he directed are known to me, which are 
not of public record ; and perhaps some value will attach to 
my statements in regard to those matters of fact which came 
under my immediate observation, and the recollection of 
which is still fresh in my memory. I propose to speak of 
these briefly and with entire candor. The manner of pre- 
senting these memoirs will necessarily be very imperfect. 
It accords neither with my tastes nor the consciousness of 
my unfitness for me to attempt a work of this character ; 
and, moreover, the duties of my daily life are such as do not 



8 PREFACE. 

permit any continuous or steady devotion to such an under- 
taking. 

But the conviction that it is the duty of every one, in 
possession of material information relative to the late sec- 
tional conflict, to do what he can to insure a true under- 
standing of that struggle, silences those personal scruples 
which would deter me, and impels me to give to the public 
the following pages. It will be at once seen that it is not 
my purpose to attempt a review of the military career of 
General Lee, nor a critical history of the army which he 
commanded in the field ; this will devolve upon the future 
historian ; mine is the more humble task of giving a sum- 
mary of the more prominent events in the career of the 
great Confederate leader, together with a comparative state- 
ment of the strength of the Confederate and Federal armies 
that were engaged in the operations in Virginia. Having 
for a long time supervised the preparation of the official 
returns of the Army of Northern Yirginia, and having been 
permitted to make a recent examination of a number of those 
returns, now on file in the archive-office of the War Depart- 
ment at Washington, I am enabled to speak with confidence 
of the numerical strength of the Confederate forces ; my 
information concerning that of the Federal forces is derived 
from official documents emanating from the officers and 
authorities of the United States Government. 

W. H. T. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 



Organization of the Army of Virginia.— General R. E. Lee assigned to the 
Command of the State Troops. — Transfer to the Southern Confed- 



eracy 



page 11 



CHAPTER II. 

General Lee retained in Richmond as Adviser to President Davis.— Disaster to 
the Confederate Forces under General Garnett. — General Lee sent to North- 
west Virginia. — Lamentable Condition of Affairs in that Department . 15 



CHAPTER III. 

Strength and Positions of the Opposing Armies in Northwest Virginia. — General 
Lee determines to take the Offensive. — Ineffectual Attempt to carry the 
Positions held by the Federal Troops. — Responsibility for the Failure . 20 

CHAPTER IV. 

Affairs in Southwestern Virginia. — Want of Harmony between Generals Floyd 
and Wise. — General Lee proceeds to that Section. — Preparations to resist 
General Rosecrans. — Retreat of the Federals 32 



CHAPTER V. 

General Lee repairs to Richmond.— He is ordered to the Department of South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, — His Return thence to Richmond. — He is 
charged with the Control of the Military Operations of all of the Confed- 
erate Armies. — His Duties in that Position. — General Johnston wounded in 
the Battle of Seven Pines. — General Lee in Command of the Army of 
Northern Virginia. — The Seven Days' Battles around Richmond. — Strength 
of the Two Opposing Armies . . . ... . . .87 



CHAPTER VI. 

General Lee manoeuvres to effect the Withdrawal of General McClellan's Army. 
— Jackson engages Pope at Cedar Run, or Slaughter's Mountain. — Removal 
of the Federal Army from James River. — The Second Battle of Manassas. — 
The First Invasion. — Operations in Maryland. — McClellan in Possession of 
Lee's Order of Battle. — Boonesboro, or South Mountain. — Capture of Har- 



10 CONTENTS. 

per's Ferry by Jackson's Forces. — Battle of Sharpsburg. — General Lee re- 
tires to Virginia. — Incidents illustrating the Devotion to Duty and Great 
Self-Control of the Confederate Leader page 57 



CHAPTER VII. 

Battle of Fredericksburg. — Federal Army One Hundred Thousand strong : Con- 
federate Army Seventy-eight Thousand strong. — Battle of Chancellorsville. 
— Federal Army One Hundred and Thirty-two Thousand strong: Confed- 
erate Army Fifty-seven Thousand strong 79 



CHAPTER VHI. 

The Pennsylvania Campaign. — The Battle of Gettysburg. — Strength of the 
Opposing Armies 90 

CHAPTER LX. 

General Lee retires to Virginia. — Affair at Bristoe Station. — The Tete-de-Pont. 
— Mine Run. — General Meade's Advance and Retreat, — Dahlgren's 
Raid 115 



CHAPTER X. 

General Grant in Command of the Federal Army of the Potomac. — His Advance. 
— From the Wilderness to Petersburg. — Strength of the Two Armies . 124 

CHAPTER XI. 

Siege of Petersburg. — General Lee's Views as to the Removal of General John- 
ston from the Command of the Army of Tennessee. — Movements of Sher- 
man's Army. — Inevitable Result of the Persistent Effort to hold Petersburg 
and Richmond 138 



CHAPTER Xn. 

Evacuation of Petersburg. — General Lee's Retreat up James River. — Appo- 
mattox. — Surrender. — General Lee goes to Richmond . . 149 

CHAPTER XIII. 

General Lee indicted by the Grand-Jury at Norfolk. — His Advice to the Young 
Men of Virginia. — His Purpose to write a History of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia. — His Desire to obtain Correct Information of the Strength 
of that Army 155 



CHAPTER XIV. 

The Strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, taken from the Original Re- 
turns now on File in the Archive-Office of the War Department, Washing- 
ton, D. C 162 

Address on the Character of General Robert E. Lee . . . .190 



FOUR TEARS WITH GENERAL LEE 



CHAPTER I. 



Organization of the Army of Virginia. — General R. E. Lee assigned to the 
Command of the State Troops. — Transfer to the Southern Confederacy. 

On the 2d day of May, 1861, in obedience to telegraphic 
orders from Governor Letcher, I repaired to Richmond, and 
was at once assigned to duty at the headquarters of the 
Army of Virginia. General Lee had been assigned to the 
chief command, and Colonel Eobert S. Garnett had been 
announced as the adjutant-general of the active State troops. 

The utmost activity prevailed, and the general-in-chief 
and his indefatigable and most efficient adjutant-general de- 
voted their entire time and energies to the very difficult task 
of organizing, arming, equipping, and putting into the field 
the volunteers, with and without partial organization, who 
responded with so much alacrity to the call of the State au- 
thorities. The first matter of importance was the discussion 
and decision of the question as to the period of service for 
which the troops should be received and mustered in. "While 
the politicians, and indeed the vast majority of the people, 
anticipated but a very short and decisive struggle, General 
Lee took a different view, and stands alone, of all of those 
then known to me whose opinions were entitled to consid- 
eration, as having expressed his most serious apprehensions 
of a prolonged and bloody war : he, in an especial degree, 



12 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

seemed to appreciate the magnitude of the impending con- 
test, and to realize the inevitable suffering, sacrifice, and woe, 
which wonld attend a determined and bitter conflict between 
the two sections of the United States, each animated by a 
traditional devotion to cherished institutions ; each entitled 
by inheritance to those characteristic traits of the Anglo- 
Saxon race, the possession of which precludes the idea of a 
passive resistance or a mild aggression, when liberty and 
honor are involved ; each falsely estimating the powers and 
temper of its adversary, and each confident of success. 

At this period there was a considerable display of bom- 
bastic rhetoric; the purifying process had not yet begun, 
which ultimately proved the metal of men : would-be and 
accustomed leaders, not yet stripped of their pretensions, 
misled the people ; some without judgment discoursed flip- 
pantly about the sixty or ninety days' war that we were to 
have, demanding only so much time to overcome the entire 
Yankee nation. Many who entertained views equally absurd 
were to be found in the North. Doubtless these patriots of 
both sections were content to retire from service at the ex- 
piration of their short terms, convinced that, if the war was 
not ended, it should have been, and would have been, had 
they had the direction of affairs. ISTo wonder, then, that when 
the troops were to be mustered into service there was a de- 
cided sentiment in favor of a twelve months' enlistment. Had 
General Lee's wishes prevailed, they would have been mus- 
tered in for the war. It is not known how far he endeavored 
to have his views adopted, beyond the expression of opinion 
repeatedly made to those who consulted him in his office, in 
my hearing, in favor of the war enlistment. He contended 
that, if the conflict should terminate in twelve months, or 
less, the troops would be at once disbanded and no harm 
would result; but, if it should be prolonged beyond that 
period, then there would be a more urgent need for the 
troops than in the beginning ; and the Government would 
have to deal with the very serious question of the disintegra- 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 13 

tion and disorganization of the army, and the substitution of 
recruits for veterans, in the very face of the enemy. The 
civil authorities, however, were loath to believe that there 
could possibly be any need of troops beyond the period of 
twelve months, and accordingly the men were enlisted for 
that time. The same course had been pursued in the other 
States in their volunteer organizations; and thus was the 
first step taken toward creating the necessity for the law of 
conscription which was subsequently enacted by the Confed- 
erate Congress. 

Under the direction of General Lee, with the aid of the 
extraordinary administrative ability of Colonel Garnett, the 
cordial support of the Governor, and the hearty cooperation 
of a most efficient corps of State officials, the Virginia vol- 
unteers were in a wonderfully short time organized, armed, 
equipped, and sent to the front : so that when the Confed- 
erate authorities assumed control of affairs after the State 
had formally joined the Confederacy, Governor Letcher was 
enabled to turn over to them the " Army of Virginia," vol- 
unteers and provisional, thoroughly organized and ready for 
work, and around which, as a nucleus, was collected what 
afterward became the historic "Army of Northern Virginia." 
The capital of the Confederacy was removed from Mont- 
gomery to Richmond, and the various departments of the 
Government immediately transferred to the latter city ; the 
"War Department carried on the process of organization and 
preparation; the functions of General Lee as general-in- 
chief of the Army of Virginia terminated, and he was 
created one of the five generals provided for by a law of 
Congress, in the Army of the Confederate States. Briga- 
dier-General G. T. Beauregard 1 and General J. E. Johnston, 
already in the field, were assigned to the command of the 
troops in Virginia — the former having the "Army of the 
Potomac " (Confederate States Army) and the latter the forces 

1 General Beauregard was promoted to be General immediately after the 
first battle of Manassas. 



14 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

then collected in the lower Yalley of Virginia ; these two 
armies were subsequently united and won the first battle of 
Manassas under General J. E. Johnston. General A. S. 
Johnston had been assigned to the command of the troops 
raised in the "West and Southwest, and which were concen- 
trating in Kentucky and Tennessee. 



CHAPTEK II. 

General Lee retained in Richmond as Adviser to President Davis. — Disaster to 
the Confederate Forces under General Garnett. — General Lee sent to North- 
west Yirginia. — Lamentable Condition of Affairs in that Department. 

After the transfer of «the Yirginia forces to the Con- 
federate States, and there being then no suitable command 
in the field to which General Lee could be assigned, he was 
retained in Eichmond by the President to give the benefit 
of his counsel and advice in all the important measures in- 
volved in the stupendous undertaking of suddenly transform- 
ing an agricultural people into a nation of soldiers, prepared 
for immediate war. During the month of July, 1861, in 
obedience to the orders of Mr. Davis, he made a personal 
examination of the troops and defenses around Norfolk, and 
also paid a visit of inspection to the Army of the Potomac 
(C. S. A.). At this period the President became very anx- 
ious concerning the condition of affairs in the western por- 
tion of Yirginia. In the northwest the Confederate forces 
under Brigadier-General Robert S. Garnett (who, when re- 
lieved as adjutant-general of the Army of Yirginia, had been 
appointed brigadier-general in the Confederate army, and 
assigned to the command of the troops in this section) had 
suffered defeat, and the brave Garnett himself, while en- 
deavoring to rally his troops at Carricksford, had received a 
mortal wound. Brigadier-General "W. W. Loring had been 
assigned as his successor in the command of this department, 
and having collected the scattered remnants of Garnett's lit- 
tle army, together with such reinforcements as the Govern- 



16 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

ment had been able to send to bis relief, bad taken position 
at Yalley Mountain. In the southwest Brigadier-Generals 
Floyd and Wise were operating under great disadvantages ; 
each having an independent command, and neither being 
disposed to act a part subordinate to the other. It was im- 
possible, under such circumstances, to secure harmonious 
action or any united and spirited effort to resist the enemy. 
There was an evident and imperative need in this quarter 
for the personal presence of some one who could both re- 
store confidence to the troops and compel the respect and 
subordination of commanders. General Lee, of all men the 
most fit for this duty, was also the most available. A bat- 
tle, however, appeared imminent at this juncture between 
the two armies facing each other in the neighborhood of 
Manassas : it was a critical time, and the President suspend- 
ed the execution of his designs as to Western Virginia un- 
til that crisis was passed ; but immediately after the first bat- 
tle of Manassas General Lee was dispatched to the scene of 
operations in that department to reconcile the differences 
between Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Wise, and to aid 
Brigadier-General Loring in the reorganization and recruit- 
ing of the shattered forces of Garnett, so that, with the aid 
of the reinforcements sent, the army there collected might 
be put in such condition as to prevent any. aggressive move- 
ment of the enemy, and, if circumstances justified it, to take 
the offensive. Accompanied by two aides-de-camp — Colonel 
John A. Washington and myself — he proceeded by rail to 
Staunton, and thence on horseback to Yalley Mountain. 
Upon his arrival there he established himself near the head- 
quarters of General Loring, with whom he maintained regu- 
lar and constant communication. He never assumed imme- 
diate personal command of the army, although it was under- 
stood that Brigadier-General Loring was subject to his 
orders. 

It is useless to attempt to recount all the difficulties this 
little army encountered in that most impracticable, inhospi- 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 17 

table, and dismal country; only those who participated in 
that campaign can ever properly estimate the disadvantages 
under which commanders and troops operated. The season 
was a most unfavorable one : for weeks it rained daily and 
in torrents ; the condition of the roads was frightful ; they 
were barely passable. It was very seriously debated whether 
the army could be fed where it was, and it was feared that 
it would have to retire to some point nearer the railroad. 
Time and time again could be seen double teams of horses 
struggling with six or eight barrels of flour, and the axle 
of the wagon scraping and leveling the road-bed; in other 
words, the wagons were hub-deep in mud, and could only be 
moved step by step, and then with the greatest difficulty. 
At the same time, and doubtless as a result of the excessive 
rains, the troops were sorely afflicted with measles and a 
malignant type of fever, which prostrated hundreds of each 
command ; and, being entirely destitute of proper food and 
other supplies indispensable to the successful treatment of 
disease, it is not to be wondered at that medical skill failed 
to arrest the terrible scourge. 

In the subsequent campaigns of the Army of Northern 
Virginia the troops were subjected to great privations and 
to many very severe trials — in hunger often ; their naked- 
ness scarcely concealed ; strength at times almost exhausted — 
but never did I experience the same heart-sinking emotions 
as when contemplating the wan faces and the emaciated forms 
of those hungry, sickly, shivering men of the army at Yal- 
ley Mountain! I well recall the fact that a regiment of 
North Carolina volunteers, under Colonel Lee, that reported 
with one thousand effective men, was in a very short time 
reduced to one-third of its original strength, without ever 
having been under fire. Though not to the same extent, 
the other commands were all seriously reduced by disease; 
and it is no exaggeration to say that one-half of the army 
was ineffective. Moreover, although some of our best and 
bravest men were from that section, there was great disaffec- 
2 



18 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

tion among that portion of the people who had not respond- 
ed to the call of the State for troops. Spies lurked around 
every hill ; our weakness, our embarrassments, and our every 
movement, were promptly reported to the enemy. With 
some honorable exceptions, there was an utter absence of 
sympathy on the part of the inhabitants who had remained 
at home, and, to all intents and purposes, we were in an 
enemy's country. In the language of another who witnessed 
this deplorable hostility : " Northwestern Virginia has 
brought grief and shame to the State and to the South by 
her woful defection ; but by none is that felt more keenly 
than by those sons of that section who have left their homes, 
and in many instances their wives and little ones, to battle 
for the right. They hear jeers and sneers thrown out, even 
at themselves, and endure them with apparent patience, but 
with an inward resolve to testify on the battle-field their 
fidelity to their country's cause." 

How little was this lamentable condition of affairs in that 
department then appreciated by the public mind ! 

From the reputation which General Lee enjoyed, even 
at that date, much was expected of him when he took the 
field. The difficulties of his situation were not properly 
estimated, and the press and people of Yirginia became, at 
first, impatient, then indignant, because the Federal army 
that had defeated the Confederate forces under Garnett and 
Pegram was not immediately assailed by him and driven out 
of the State. 

To those who realized the situation it was an occasion of 
pain and mortification to learn from the journals of the day, 
that occasionally reached them, of the general dissatisfaction 
that found expression in scathing editorials, abounding in 
sneers and abuse, and which was both unjust to those charged 
with the conduct of military operations in that impractica- 
ble region, and well calculated to dishearten the men under 
their command, whose trials were already of no ordinary 
character. 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 19 

~No one felt this public judgment so keenly as did Gen- 
eral Lee ; and yet, on one occasion, when his attention had 
been directed to a fierce newspaper attack, as unjust in its 
conclusions as it was untrue in its statements, and he was 
asked why he silently suffered such unwarranted aspersions, 
he calmly replied that, while it was very hard to bear, it was 
perhaps quite natural that such hasty conclusions should be 
announced, and that it was better not to attempt a justifica- 
tion or defense, but to go steadily on in the discharge of 
duty to the best of our ability, leaving all else to the calmer 
judgment of the future and to a kind Providence. 



CHAPTER HI. 

Strength and Positions of the Opposing Armies in Northwest Virginia.— General 
Lee determines to take the Offensive. — Ineffectual Attempt to carry the 
Positions held by the Federal Troops.— Responsibility for the Failure. 

But, to return to our narrative, despite the embarrass- 
ments heretofore alluded to, the command was finally brought 
to a sufficiently efficient condition to induce the general to 
take the offensive. On the 8th of September, and after full 
conference with Brigadier-General Loring, the order of attack 
was prepared ; it was issued, however, in the name of the 
latter, and prescribed a line of operations which I will now 
attempt to describe. In order to a correct understanding of 
what is to follow, it is proper to make some remarks upon 
the character and prominent f eatures of the immediate local- 
ity which was to be the scene of operations, and of the 
strength and positions of the two armies. 

The advance force of the enemy held the Cheat Mountain 
Pass, where the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike crossed 
the centre-top of Cheat Mountain range, about twelve miles 
east of Huttonsville. Just where the road crossed the moun- 
tain-top heavy defensive works had been constructed. Na- 
ture assisted in no small degree to render the position im- 
pregnable : the descent on both sides was very precipitous, 
and the surface of the earth was covered with a most re- 
markable undergrowth of laurel, so dense and interlocked as 
to be almost impenetrable. The Federals had cleared a con- 
siderable space around their intrenched position, constructed 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 21 

abatis and fosses around their entire work, and, having a gar- 
rison of three thousand men, 1 might well have deemed them- 
selves impregnable. 

They also held a strongly-fortified position at Elk "Water, 
on the road running from Yalley Mountain through Tygart's 
Valley to Huttonsville, at which latter place it intersected 
the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike. The force in Ty- 
gart's Yalley was estimated to be five thousand strong. The 
reserve force was stationed at Huttonsville, and here also 
was their depot for supplies. 

The two roads, mentioned as uniting at Huttonsville, 
were the only practicable routes by which that point could 
be reached from the east ; both, as before explained, were 
protected by works of formidable aspect and difficult ap- 
proach. General Reynolds was in command of the troops 
defending the passes of Cheat Mountain, and had an army 
estimated at from eight to ten thousand men. General Rose- 
crans commanded the entire Federal force operating in West- 
ern Virginia, embracing that under General Reynolds, and 
that operating in the Kanawha Valley, under General Cox. 

One portion of the Confederate army was encamped at 
" Camp Bartow," on the Parkersburg pike, near its crossing of 
the Greenbrier River. The force upon this line was under the 
immediate command of Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson, and 
consisted of the following organizations : First Georgia Regi- 
ment (Colonel Ramsay), Twelfth Georgia (Colonel Edward 
Johnson), Twenty-third Virginia (Colonel William B. Talia- 
ferro), Thirty-first Virginia (Colonel Jackson), Thirty-sev- 
enth Virginia (Colonel Fulkerson), Forty-fourth Virginia 
(Colonel Scott), Third Arkansas (Colonel Rust), Hans- 
brough's and Reger's battalions of Virginia Volunteers, two 
batteries of artillery, and a few companies of cavalry — in all 
about twenty-five hundred effective men. 

1 A requisition for rations for three thousand men was found upon the per- 
son of a staff-officer captured while pursuing the road from Cheat Mountain Pass 
to Huttonsville. 



22 FOUR YEARS WITH GEXERAL LEE. 

The other wing of the army, under General Loring, was 
camped at Valley Mountain, and consisted of a brigade 
(under General D. S. Donelson) of one Xorth Carolina and 
two Tennessee regiments ; a brigade of Tennessee troops 
(under General Anderson) ; a brigade (under Colonel Wil- 
liam Gilham) consisting of the Twenty-first and Forty- 
second Virginia Regiments, and the Irish Battalion (Pro- 
visional Army of Virginia) ; a small command under Colonel 
Burk ; and a battalion of cavalry, under Major TV". H. F. Lee. 

These commands had been greatly reduced by sickness, 
and the total effective of this wing of the army did not ex- 
ceed thirty-five hundred men. 

Being without accurate maps of the country, and having 
no regular engineer-officer available, General Loring had to 
rely upon his scouts and a few citizens of that country, who 
acted in a volunteer capacity as guides, for all information as 
to the roads, and the movements and positions of the enemy. 
One of these citizen volunteers, a professional surveyor, hav- 
ing been informed that General Lee was particularly anxious 
to obtain accurate information of the nature and extent of 
the works of the enemy on the centre-top of Cheat Moun- 
tain, undertook the task of reaching such a point on the 
mountain as would enable him to take a deliberate and care- 
ful survey of the fortified position. He was also to ascer- 
tain and report if it was practicable to lead a body of infan- 
try to the vicinity of that point, by any route which would 
prevent the disclosure of the movement. 

The only route other than the turnpike by which this 
point of the range of mountains could be reached was by 
pursuing a course along and up the precipitous and ragged 
sides of the mountain, through undergrowth and trees, over 
rocks and chasms, and with nothing save the compass or the 
stars to indicate the direction of the summit. The quasi 
engineer-officer made the ascent successfully, and obtained a 
complete view of the enemy's works. On a second recon- 
naissance he was accompanied by Colonel A. Bust, of the 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 23 

Third Arkansas Regiment, who was very enterprising, and 
appeared to be most anxious to make a personal observation. 
Together they made the ascent of the mountain, and again 
complete success crowned their efforts. A full, unobstructed 
view of the entire line of works occupied by the enemy was 
had without discovery. On their return they made their 
report to General Lee, and represented that the works were 
of such a character as to justify the hope of being carried, if 
attacked from the direction of the point reached by them, 
from which they could plainly see all that was going on 
within ; and on which flank the enemy appeared to have be- 
stowed but little attention. The only difficulty was, to reach 
this point with a body of troops without attracting the atten- 
tion of the enemy, so that he might be surprised and the 
more readily captured. Of the successful accomplishment of 
this, however, Colonel Rust was sanguine, and enthusiasti- 
cally asked to be permitted to lead a column in an assault 
upon this position. General Lee decided to give battle. A 
column of infantry twelve hundred strong, consisting of the 
Twenty-third, Thirty-first, and Thirty-seventh Virginia Regi- 
ments, the Third Arkansas Regiment, and Hansbrough's 
Virginia battalion, was selected to assail the works of the 
enemy on Centre-top. Colonels Taliaferro and Fulkerson, 
who were senior in rank to Colonel Rust, magnanimously 
waived the question of rank, and acquiesced in placing them- 
selves at the head of their respective regiments and under 
Colonel Rust's command. 

The order of battle directed General H. R. Jackson to 
advance, with the balance of his command, by the turnpike, 
and to threaten the enemy from this direction — this was 
especially designed to divert attention from Rust's flank- 
movement. 

The third column, under Brigadier-General Anderson, 
was to advance to the third or west top of Cheat Mountain, 
secure possession of the turnpike at that point, and be in 
position both to take the enemy in rear and prevent any 



24 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

escape ; as also to resist any effort that might be made to re- 
enforce Centre-top with any troops that might be in reserve. 
The rest of the army was to move down the valley of 
Tygart's River npon the enemy there stationed ; but, as will 
appear more fully hereafter, the movements of this column 
were made to depend upon the success which should attend 
the assault upon the fortified position on Cheat Mountain. 
The plan of attack was carefully and maturely considered, 
and was communicated to the commanders in the following 
order : 

[Confidential.] 
Headquarters, Valley Mountain, September 8, 1861. 
[Special Order No. 28.] 

1. General H. R. Jackson, commanding Monterey division, 
will detach a column of not more than two thousand men under 
Colonel Rust, to turn the enemy's position at Cheat Mountain 
Pass at daylight on the 12th instant (Thursday). 

During the night preceding the morning of the 12th instant, 
General Jackson having left a suitable guard for his own position 
with the rest of his available force, will take post on the east- 
ern ridge of Cheat Mountain, occupy the enemy in front, and 
cooperate in the assault of his attacking column should circum- 
stances favor. The march of Colonel Rust will be so regulated 
as to attain his position during the same night, and at the dawn 
of the appointed day (Thursday, 12th) he will, if possible, sur- 
prise the enemy in his trenches and carry them. 

2. The " Pass " having been carried, General Jackson, with 
his whole fighting force, will immediately move forward toward 
Huttonsville, prepared against an attack from the enemy, taking 
every precaution against firing upon the portion of the army 
operating west of Cheat Mountain, and ready to cooperate with 
it against the enemy in Tygart's Valley. The supply -wagons 
of the advancing columns will follow, and the reserve will occupy 
Cheat Mountain. 

3. General Anderson's brigade will move down Tygart's 
Valley, following the west slope of Cheat Mountain range, con- 
cealing his movements from the enemy. On reaching Wyman's 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 25 

(or the vicinity) he will refresh his force unobserved, send for- 
ward intelligent officers to make sure of his further course, and 
during the night of the 11th (Wednesday) proceed to the 
Staunton turnpike where it intersects the west top of Cheat 
Mountain, so as to arrive there as soon after daylight on the 
12th (Thursday) as possible. He will make dispositions to hold 
the turnpike, prevent reinforcements reaching Cheat Mountain 
Pass, cut the telegraph-wire, and be prepared, if necessary, to 
aid in the assault of the enemy's position on the middle top of 
Cheat Mountain by General Jackson's division, the result of 
which he must await. He must particularly keep in mind that 
the movement of General Jackson is to surprise the enemy in 
their defenses. He must, therefore, not discover his movement, 
nor advance — before Wednesday night — beyond a point where he 
can conceal his force. Cheat Mountain Pass being carried, he 
will turn down the mountain and press upon the left and rear of 
the enemy in Tygart's Valley, either by the old or new turnpike, 
or the Becky Run road, according to circumstances. 

4. General Donelson's brigade will advance on the right of 
Tygart's Valley River, seizing the paths and avenues leading 
from that side to the river, and driving back the enemy that 
may endeavor to retard the advance of the centre along the 
turnpike, or turn his right. 

5. Such of the artillery as may not be used on the nanks 
will proceed along the Huttonsville turnpike, supported by 
Major Munford's battalion, followed by the rest of Colonel 
Gilham's brigade in reserve. 

6. Colonel Burk's brigade will advance on the left of Ty- 
gart's Valley River, in supporting distance of the centre, and 
clear that side of the valley of the forces of the enemy that 
might obstruct the advance of the artillery. 

7. The cavalry under Major Lee will follow, according to 
the nature of the ground, in rear of the left, Colonel Burk's 
brigade. It will watch the movements of the enemy in that 
quarter ; give notice of, and prevent, if possible, any attempt to 
turn the left of the line, and be prepared to strike when oppor- 
tunity offers. 

8. The wagons of each brigade, properly parked and 



26 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

guarded, under the charge of their respective quartermasters — 
who will personally superintend their movements — will pursue 
the main turnpike, under the general direction of the chief 
quartermaster, in rear of the army and out of cannon-range of 
the enemy. 

9. Commanders on both lines of operations will particu- 
larly see that their corps wear the distinguishing badge, and 
that both officers and men take every precaution not to fire on 
our own troops. This is essentially necessary, as the forces on 
both sides of Cheat Mountain may unite. They will also use 
every exertion to prevent noise and straggling from the ranks, 
correct quietly any confusion that may occur, and cause their 
commands to rapidly execute their movements when in presence 
of the enemy. 

By order of General W. W. Loeing : 

Caetee L. Stevenson, 
Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General. 



On the same day that General Loring issued the order 
of march and attack to his army. General Lee issued the fol- 
lowing : 

Headquarters, Valley Mountain, September 8, 1861. 
[Special Order No. —.J 

The forward movement announced to the Army of the North- 
west in Special Order No. 28, from its headquarters, of this 
date, gives the general commanding the opportunity of exhort- 
ing the troops to keep steadily in view the great principles for 
which they contend, and to manifest to the world their deter- 
mination to maintain them. The eyes of the country are upon 
you. The safety of your homes, and the "lives of all you hold 
dear, depend upon your courage and exertions. Let each man 
resolve to be victorious, and that the right of self-government, 
liberty and peace, shall in him find a defender. The progress 

of this army must be forward. 

R. E. Lee, 

General commanding. 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 27 

Inasmuch as Bust's column had the most difficult part 
to perform, and it was impossible to estimate accurately the 
time which would be consumed in reaching his point of 
attack, he was started in advance of the other columns, and 
it was determined and ordered that they should await the 
signal of his attack, before doing anything more than secur- 
ing positions from which they could readily and quickly 
advance to the work to which they had been respectively 
assigned. All were ordered to take every precaution to pre- 
vent their movements from being discovered, as the success 
of the whole undertaking depended on taking the enemy on 
Centre-top by surprise. Although the several tops of the 
mountain were in a direct line, not very distant from each 
other, it was necessary to make a considerable circuit in 
riding from one to the other ; and as Eust's musketry could 
be more readily and promptly observed than any other sig- 
nal, the general attack was made to depend upon it. 

The several commands, being in every respect prepared 
for the anticipated battle, moved forward at the time men- 
tioned, and in the several directions indicated, in the order 
of march and attack. 

All progressed satisfactorily. Anderson reached and 
occupied the turnpike at its crossing on the third or rear top 
of Cheat Mountain. So unsuspecting was the enemy, and so 
silently was Anderson's movement made, that his men capt- 
ured an engineer-officer of Kosecrans's staff, and others, qui- 
etly and confidently pursuing the road toward their rear. 

General Jackson had his command well in hand, pre- 
pared to engage the enemy in front. 

General Donelson's brigade rested the latter portion of the 
night not far from the camps of his enemy on Tygart's Val- 
ley Biver. 

Morning found everything just as the most confident 
could have hoped, with the exception that the night had been 
a very rainy, disagreeable one, and the men were conse- 
quently quite uncomfortable ; this, however, would soon be 



28 FOUR TEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

forgotten in the excitement of battle and the promise of cer- 
tain victory. All was ready, and Rust's attack was anxiously 
awaited. General Jackson worried the enemy considerably 
by attacking his advanced guard on the first top of the moun- 
tain, only awaiting the signal from Rust to press forward 
earnestly with his entire command. Hours passed, and no 
signal was heard ! What could have happened ? Enough 
time had elapsed to enable the troops to reach Centre-top, 
unless prevented by some unexpected impediment. 

Would Rust never attack ? Alas ! he never did ! 

As was subsequently learned, upon an examination of 
the works of the enemy made after he had succeeded in 
reaching his proper position, he was surprised to find them 
far more formidable than he had supposed. Whether addi- 
tional strength had been given them since his reconnais- 
sance, or whether he was too easily satisfied and not suffi- 
ciently thorough in his observations when he made that 
reconnaissance, is not known. He decided that the works 
were too formidable to justify an assault, and no attack was 
made. Even had he discharged his guns and vigorously en- 
gaged the enemy, without attempting to carry the works by 
storm, it is not unreasonable to believe that the combined 
efforts of the other columns would have been attended with 
success. 

All, however, depended on the enemy's being surprised, 
and simultaneously and swiftly attacked. Much precious 
time had been lost. Donelson's men, uneasy about their 
arms, fearful that their powder had been dampened by the 
rain, commenced a spirited fusillade in order to reload and 
avoid a "flash in the pan." This and Jackson's activity 
aroused the enemy: hurried preparations to resist attack 
were made; scouting-parties of cavalry were sent out to 
scour the surrounding country. One of these detachments 
came very near capturing General Lee, who, accompanied by 
his aide and a few horsemen, on his way to join General 
Donelson, had scarcely emerged from a piece of woods, when 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 29 

quite a troop thundered along the road skirting the woods, 
too near to be comfortable, but galloping rapidly away on 
suddenly observing their proximity to Donelson's column of 
infantry. It was also in a brush between one of these de- 
tachments of the enemy and a portion of Major W. H. F. 
Lee's battalion of cavalry that the pious Christian and gal- 
lant gentleman, Colonel John A. Washington, who had been 
sent with Major Lee to reconnoitre the enemy, was shot dead 
from an ambuscade. 

Detached, discovered, without knowledge of the cause of 
Rust's silence, the other commands were powerless for good. 
Occupied with the necessity of providing for their own safe- 
ty, it only remained to have them recalled to their former 
positions. The enemy made no advance, and, beyond driv- 
ing in their outposts, our troops were not seriously engaged. 

On the next day Colonel Rust personally reported to 
General Lee. The only cause assigned by him for his non- 
action is that heretofore given. Possibly his regimental 
commanders may have agreed with him in esteeming the 
works of the enemy too formidable to be attacked; but 
surely the responsibility attached to him alone. 1 

Some may think that this was a proper matter for inves- 
tigation by a court of inquiry, or for trial by court-martial. 
Neither the one nor the other was ever had, and possibly 

1 "By this time most of the command had come up, and a council of war was 
held as to what we should do, consisting of Colonels Rust, Taliaferro, and Ful- 
kerson, and Lieutenant-Colonels Barton, Jackson, and Hansbrough. It should 
be here stated that none of the officers were fully apprised of the plan of com- 
bined attack, and of the fact that everything depended on the ball being set in 
motion by our command, except Colonel Rust. 

" I shall never forget the appearance of the officers composing this council ; 
Fulkerson looked pale and worn, but intrepid ; Taliaferro stern but indifferent. 
The latter soon broke off the deliberations by saying, ' Well, if we have to fight 
these people, let's do it at once.' Immediately the rear of the column was 
deployed around to the right, while we who had led the file remained on the 
left ; and there we stood anxiously awaiting the word to advance to the assault. 
This word never came." — Extract from letter of Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Hans- 
brough. 



30 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

no public good would have resulted had either been con- 
vened. 

Having failed to dislodge the enemy from his strong- 
hold, the season having advanced too far to attempt any 
movement away from our base of supplies, and there being 
no probability of any serious advance by the enemy, the 
campaign in the northwest was regarded as ended for the 
winter. 

The following letter from General Lee to Governor 
Letcher, but recently made public, serves to confirm what 
has been stated : 

Valley Mountain, September 17, 1861. 
My dear Governor : I received your very kind note of the 
5 th instant just as I was about to accompany General Loring's 
command on an expedition to the enemy's works in front, or I 
would have before thanked you for the interest you take in my 
welfare, and your too flattering expressions of my ability. In- 
deed, you overrate me much, and I feel humbled when I weigh 
myself by your standard. I am, however, very grateful for your 
confidence, and I can answer for my sincerity in the earnest en- 
deavor I make to advance the cause I have so much at heart, 
though conscious of the slow progress I make. I was very san- 
guine of taking the enemy's works on last Thursday morning. 
I had considered the subject well. With great effort the troops 
intended for the surprise had reached their destination, having 
traversed twenty miles of steep, rugged mountain-paths ; and 
the last day through a terrible storm which lasted all night, and 
in which they had to stand drenched to the skin in cold rain. 
Still their spirits were good. When morning broke, I could see 
the enemy's tents on Valley River at the point on the Huttons- 
ville road, just below me. It was a tempting sight. We waited 
for the attack on Cheat Mountain, which was to be the signal. 
Till 10 A. m. the men were cleaning their unserviceable arms. 
But the signal did not come. All chance for a surprise was 
gone. The provisions of the men had been destroyed the pre- 
ceding day by the storm. They had had nothing to eat that 
morning, could not hold out another day, and were obliged to be 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 31 

withdrawn. The party sent to Cheat Mountain to take that in 
rear had also to be withdrawn. The attack to come off from 
the east side failed from the difficulties in the way / the oppor- 
tunity was lost, and our plan discovered. It is a grievous dis- 
appointment to me, I assure you. But for the rain-storm, I 
have no doubt it would have succeeded. This, Governor, is for 
your own eye. Please do not speak of it ; we must try again. 
Our greatest loss is the death of my dear friend Colonel Wash- 
ington. He and my son were reconnoitring the front of the 
enemy. They came unawares upon a concealed party who fired 
upon them within twenty yards, and the colonel fell pierced by 
three balls. My son's horse received three shots, but he escaped 
on the colonel's horse. His zeal for the cause to which he had 
devoted himself carried him, I fear, too far. 

We took some seventy prisoners, and killed some twenty- 
five or thirty of the enemy. Our loss was small besides what I 
have mentioned. Our greatest difficulty is the roads. It has 
been raining in these mountains about six weeks. It is impos- 
sible to get along. It is that which has paralyzed all our 
efforts. With sincere thanks for your good wishes, 
I am, very truly yours, 

R. E. Lee. 
His Excellency Governor John Letcher. 



CHAPTER IV. 

Affairs in Southwestern Virginia. — Want of Harmony between Generals Floyd 
and Wise.— General Lee proceeds to that Section. — Preparations to resist 
General Kosecrans. — Eetreat of the Federals. 

Meanwhile the Federal commander had been active in 
the Kanawha Valley, and, owing to matters of discord be- 
tween Generals Floyd and Wise, it became imperatively 
necessary for General Lee to repair to that quarter, in order 
to restore harmony among onr own people, and to resist the 
further advance of the enemy. Simultaneously General 
Eosecrans moved with a large portion of his army to reen- 
force General Cox ; and General Lee ordered General Lor- 
ing to leave a sufficient force to watch the enemy at Cheat 
Mountain, and move with the rest of his army to the Kana- 
wha Valley. 

General Lee proceeded without delay across the country 
in that direction. 

On the 14th of September General Floyd encamped on 
Big Sewell Mountain, and ordered General Wise to go into 
camp a short distance east of him. On the night of the 16th 
he retreated to Meadow Bluff, directing General Wise to 
cover the movement and follow with his command to that 
point. This order General Wise positively refused to obey ; 
and, selecting a favorable position on Little Sewell Mountain, 
he proceeded to make it good by a line of defensive works. 

Such was the condition of affairs as reported to General 
Lee, who, upon his arrival, found General Floyd with his 
command at Meadow Bluff, and General Wise some ten or 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 33 

more miles in advance, at Little Sewell, with his legion of 
seventeen hundred men, now confronted by Bosecrans's en- 
tire army. 

. Without entering into the merits of the controversy be- 
tween Generals Floyd and Wise, General Lee perceived at 
a glance that Little Sewell was the most favorable point at 
which to make a stand ; that being naturally a strong posi- 
tion, and much more easily defended than Meadow Bluff. 
General Floyd was therefore at once ordered to move for- 
ward to Little Sewell. The bitter feeling which had been 
engendered between the two commanders had imparted it- 
self, in some degree, to the troops, and seriously threatened 
to impair their efficiency. 'No little diplomacy was required, 
therefore, to produce harmony and hearty cooperation, where 
previously had prevailed discord and contention. It will be 
readily understood that the partisans of Floyd at first viewed 
in no pleasant frame of mind the apparent indorsement of 
"Wise's judgment, if not, by a forced construction (to which 
a prejudiced mind is always liable), the approval of his dis- 
obedience and insubordination, implied in General Lee's 
order that Floyd should forsake his chosen position and re- 
turn to that persistently hejd by Wise. 

A junction of the commands of Floyd and Wise hav- 
ing been effected, a line of defense was established, and as 
well fortified as circumstances would admit in that broken 
country. 

The reinforcements from Loring's army soon arrived, 
and the aggregate strength of the troops under General Lee 
was, in round numbers, about eight or nine thousand men. 

Soon after the arrival of General Lee a messenger came 
with an order from the President, relieving General Wise of 
his command, and directing him to repair to Richmond for 
assignment to another field of duty of equal importance and 
dignity. 

I express no opinion in regard to the matters of differ- 
ence between Generals Floyd and Wise, and no conclusion 
3 



34 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

prejudicial to the latter should be drawn from the action of 
the War Department, relieving him of his command. Gen- 
eral Lee, so far as is known to me, never undertook to ascer- 
tain or decide the merits of the controversy between those 
officers ; but, as the good of the service required that one or 
the other should be relieved from duty with that army, an 
order to that effect was issued by direction of the President, 
and with General Lee's concurrence. 

The combined forces of the enemy, under Generals Eose- 
crans and Cox, were estimated to be from twelve to fifteen 
thousand strong. 1 

With such an army, elated by its previous encounters 
with the small force heretofore opposed to it, it was reason- 
ably presumed that the Federal commander would continue 
on the aggressive. General Lee caused every preparation to 
be made to give battle. He was but too recently on the field 
to adopt any other than a defensive policy : he had already 
demonstrated his unwillingness to recede, by the advance 
from Meadow Bluff to Little Sewell Mountain. The enemy 
held a strong position on Big Sewell Mountain, from which, 
as a base, he had already advanced to engage the troops of 
General Wise. There was no reasonable cause to doubt that 
General Bosecrans, who was now in command, would con- 
tinue this advance, and assail the Confederate position. It 
was a matter of great surprise, therefore, when, on the morn- 
ing of the 6th of October, it was discovered that the enemy 
was no longer in our front ; and this surprise was increased 
when, on pursuing the road over which Eosecrans's army 
had retreated, it was evident, from the manner in which pro- 
visions and accoutrements had been tumbled out or left upon 
the route, that the flight had been somewhat precipitate and 
disorderly. 

We had now reached the latter days of October : the 

1 This was a great exaggeration on the part of the Confederates. General 
Rosecrans puts his effective strength at this time at but eight thousand five 
hundred. — " Report on the Conduct of the War," Second Series, vol. iii., p. 10. 



THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 35 

lateness of the season and the condition of the roads pre- 
cluded the idea of earnest aggressive operations, and the cam- 
paign in "Western Yirginia was virtually concluded. 

Judged from its results, it must be confessed that this 
series of operations was a failure. At its conclusion a large 
portion of the State was in possession of the Federals, in- 
cluding the rich valleys of the Ohio and Kanawha Eivers, 
and so remained until the close of the war. Tor this, how- 
ever, General Lee cannot be reasonably held accountable. 
Disaster had befallen the Confederate arms, and the worst 
had been accomplished, before he reached the theatre of 
operations ; the Alleghanies then constituted the dividing 
line between the hostile forces, and in this network of 
mountains, sterile and rendered absolutely impracticable 
by a prolonged season of rain, Nature had provided an in- 
surmountable barrier to operations in the transmontane 
country. 

It was doubtless because of similar embarrassments that 
the Federal general retired, in the face of inferior numbers, 
to a point nearer his base of supplies. 

During the time that General Lee was in this depart- 
ment (his first service in the field under Confederate au- 
spices), he manifested that complete self-abnegation and dis- 
like for parade and ceremony which later in the war became 
characteristic of him. Accompanied originally by* a staff of 
but two persons, and, after the death of Colonel Washington, 
with but one aide-de-camp, with no escort nor body-guard, 
no couriers nor guides, he made the campaign under alto- 
gether unostentatious and really uncomfortable circum- 
stances. One solitary tent constituted his headquarters- 
camp ; this served for the general and his aide ; and when 
visitors were entertained, as actually occurred, the general 
shared his blankets with his aide, turning over those of the 
latter to his guest. His dinner-service was of tin — tin plates, 
tin cups, tin bowls, everything of tin — and consequently in- 
destructible ; and to the annoyance and disgust of the sub- 



36 FOUR YEAES WITH GENERAL LEE. 

ordinates, who sighed for porcelain, could not or would not 
be lost ; indeed, with the help of occasional additions, this tin 
furniture continued to do service for several campaigns ; and 
it was only in the last year of the war, while the army was 
around Petersburg, that a set of china was surreptitiously in- 
troduced into the baggage of the headquarters of the army. 
This displaced for a time the chaste and elaborate plate; 
but on resuming "light marching order" at the time of the 
evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg, the china, which 
had been borrowed by the staff, was returned ; the tins were 
again produced and did service until the surrender of the 
army, when they passed into the hands of individuals who 
now preserve them as mementos of the greatest commander 
in the great war. 



CHAPTEE Y. 

General Lee repairs to Richmond. — He is ordered to the Department of South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. — His Return thence to Richmond. — He is 
charged with the Control of the Military Operations of all of the Confed- 
erate Armies. — His Duties in that Position. — General Johnston wounded in 
the Battle of Seven Pines. — General Lee in Command of the Army of 
Northern Virginia. — The Seven Days' Battles around Richmond. — Strength 
of the Two Opposing Armies. 

Soon after the occurrences in Western Virginia just re- 
lated, General Lee returned to Richmond and resumed his 
position and duties as adviser and counselor to the Presi- 
dent. On the 6th of November, 1861, he proceeded to 
South Carolina for the purpose of directing and supervising 
the construction of a line of defense along the coasts of 
South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He arrived immedi- 
ately after the capture of Port Royal by the Federal navy, 
and established his headquarters at Coosawhatchie, on the 
railroad, about midway between Charleston and Savannah. 
Beyond the prosecution of the work of fortifying the cities 
and principal points on the coast and rivers, nothing of im- 
portance occurred during his three months' stay in this de- 
partment. He was in Charleston at the time of the great 
conflagration, and was compelled to leave the Mills House, 
where he had taken rooms, and which was with great diffi- 
culty saved from destruction, and to take refuge in a private 
house on the " Battery." 

In March, 1862, he returned to Richmond, and was as- 
signed, on the 13th, under the direction of the President, to 
the conduct of the military operations of all the armies of 



38 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

the Confederate States. This position was regarded by some 
as rather anomalous in character, and yet there devolved 
upon the general a great deal of work that did not appear on 
the surface, and was of a kind not to be generally appreci- 
ated. Exercising a constant supervision over the condition 
of affairs at each important point, thoroughly informed as to 
the resources and necessities of the several commanders of 
armies in the field, as well as of the dangers which respec- 
tively threatened them, he was enabled to give them wise 
counsel, to offer them valuable suggestions, and to respond 
to their demands for assistance and support to such extent as 
the limited resources of the Government would permit. It 
was in great measure due to his advice and encouragement 
that General Magruder so stoutly and gallantly held his lines 
on the Peninsula against General McClellan until troops 
could be sent to his relief from General Johnston's army. I 
recollect a telegraphic dispatch received by General Lee 
from General Magruder, in which he stated that a council of 
war which he had convened had unanimously determined 
that his army should retreat ; in reply to which General Lee 
urged him to maintain his lines and to make as bold a front 
as possible, and encouraged him with the prospect of being 
early reenforced. 

ISTo better illustration of the nature and importance of 
the duty performed by General Lee, while in this position, 
can be given than the following letter — one of a number of 
similar import — written by him to General Jackson, the 
" rough " or original draft of which is still in my possession : 

Headquarters, Richmond, Virginia, April 29, 1862. 
Major- General T. J. Jackson, commanding, etc., Swift Bun Gap, Vir- 
ginia. 
General : I have had the honor to receive your letter 
of yesterday's date. From the reports that reach me that are 
entitled to credit, the force of the enemy opposite Fredericks- 
burg is represented as too large to admit of any diminution 
whatever of our army in that vicinity at present, as it might not 






GENERAL LEE IN RICHMOND. 39 

only invite an attack on Richmond, but jeopard the safety of 
the army in the Peninsula. I regret, therefore, that your re- 
quest, to have five thousand men sent from that army to reen- 
force you, cannot be complied with. Can you draw enough 
from the command of General Edward Johnson to warrant you 
in attacking Banks? The last return received from that 
army shows a present force of upward of thirty-five hundred, 
which, it is hoped, has been since increased by recruits and re- 
turned furloughs. As he does not appear to be pressed, it is 
suggested that a portion of his force might be temporarily re- 
moved from its present position, and made available for the 
movement in question. A decisive and successful blow at 
Banks's column would be fraught with the happiest results, and 
I deeply regret my inability to send you the reinforcements you 
ask. If, however, you think the combined forces of Generals 
Ewell and Johnson, with your own, inadequate for the move, 
General Ewell might, with the assistance of General Anderson's 
army near Fredericksburg, strike at McDowell's army between 
that city and Aquia, with much promise of success ; provided 
you feel sufficiently strong alone to hold Banks in check. 

Very truly yours, R. E. Lee. 

The reader will observe that this letter bears the date 
"April 29, 1862." On the 5th or 6th of May General Jack- 
son formed a junction between his own command and that 
of General Edward Johnson ; on the 8th of May be defeated 
Milroy at McDowell. Soon thereafter the command of Gen- 
eral Ewell was united to that already under Jackson, and on 
the 25tb of the same month Banks was defeated and put to 
flight. 

Other incidents might be cited to illustrate this branch of 
the important service rendered at this period by General 
Lee. The line of earthworks around tbe city of Richmond, 
and other preparations for resisting an attack, testified to the 
immense care and labor bestowed upon the defense of the 
capital, so seriously threatened by the army of General 
McClellan. 



40 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

On the last day of May the battle of Seven Pines, or 
Fair Oaks, was delivered, and General Johnston was wound- 
ed. On that afternoon the President and General Lee had 
gone out on the lines, and were present and under a severe 
fire as the troops of General "Whiting went into action. 
Major-General G. W. Smith was next in rank to General 
Johnston, and assumed command of the army after the 
wounding of the latter. The next day, by order of the 
President, General Lee took personal command of the Army 
of Northern Virginia. He proceeded at once to make its 
position secure against attack, and to enhance its efficiency 
and strength, by every means in his power, so as to justify 
aggressive movements. 

The brilliant achievements of the army under General 
Jackson, in the Shenandoah Valley, had so startled and par- 
alyzed the Federal authorities, and had excited such fears for 
the safety of "Washington, as to remove all apprehension of 
any immediate trouble from the enemy heretofore operating 
in the Valley, and to render improbable the junction of the 
army under McDowell with that of McClellan. General 
Lee, quick to observe and profit by the advantage to be de- 
rived from this propitious state of affairs, conceived the plan 
of drawing Jackson's command to his aid, swiftly and secret- 
ly, in order that he might, when thus reenforced, fall with 
all his strength upon the enemy's right flank, and compel 
him to a general engagement. The necessary orders were 
given. General Jackson moved with all possible celerity, 
and when he had reached Ashland, General Lee, having left 
Generals Magruder, Holmes, and Huger, with about twenty- 
eight thousand men, in the defenses of Kichmond, on the 
26th of June moved to the north side of the Chickahominy 
River with the remainder of his army, and took the initia- 
tive in the engagements embraced in the seven days' battles, 
from which resulted the complete discomfiture of the army 
under General McClellan, and its retreat to the protection 
of the fleet operating in James River. 



BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 41 

Without attempting an account of any one of the severe 
engagements embraced in the seven days' battles, so fully 
described in General Lee's official report, I cannot forbear 
mention of a maladroit performance just before their termi- 
nation, but for which I have always thought that McClellan's 
army would have been further driven, even " to the wall," 
and made to surrender — a trifling matter in itself apparent- 
ly, and yet worthy of thoughtful consideration. General 
McOlellan had retreated to Harrison's Landing; his army, 
supply and baggage trains were scattered in much confusion 
in and about Westover plantation ; our army was moving 
down upon him, its progress much retarded by natural and 
artificial obstacles ; General Stuart was in advance, in com- 
mand of the cavalry. In rear of and around Westover there 
is a range of hills or elevated ground, completely command- 
ing the plains below. Stuart, glorious Stuart ! always at 
the front and full of fight, gained these hills. Below him, 
as a panorama, appeared the camps and trains of the enemy, 
within easy range of his artillery. The temptation was too 
strong to be resisted : he commanded some of his guns to 
open fire. The. consternation caused thereby was immediate 
and positive. It frightened the enemy, but it enlightened 
him. 

Those heights in our possession, the enemy's position was 
altogether untenable, and he was at our mercy ; unless they 
could be recaptured his capitulation was inevitable. Half a 
dozen shells from Stuart's battery quickly demonstrated this. 
The enemy, not slow in comprehending his danger, soon ad- 
vanced his infantry in force, to dislodge our cavalry and re- 
possess the heights. This was accomplished : the hills were 
fortified, and became the Federal line of defense, protected 
at either flank by a bold creek which emptied into James 
Eiver, and by the heavy batteries of the fleet anchored oppo- 
site. 1 Had the infantry b^een up, General Lee would have 

1 " The retreat of the army from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Bar was very 
precipitate. The troops upon their arrival there were huddled together in great 



42 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

made sure of this naturally strong line, fortified it well, 
maintained it against assault, and dictated to General Mc- 
Clellan terms of surrender ; and had the attention of the 
enemy not been so precipitately directed to his danger by the 
shots from the little howitzers, it is reasonable to presume 
that the infantry would have been up in time to secure 
the plateau. The following extract from General Stuart's 
manuscript, " Eeports and Notes on the War," ' gives more 
in detail the circumstances just related : 

Headqttabtees Cavalry, July 14, 1862. 
.... I therefore sent down that night a howitzer toward 
Westover, under Captain Pelham, supported by Irving's squad- 
ron, First Virginia Cavalry, with orders to reach the immediate 
vicinity of the river-road below, so as to shell it if the enemy 
attempted to retreat that night. A squadron was left (Georgia 
Legion) near Shirley, and the main body bivouacked contiguous 
to oat-fields — of necessity our sole dependence for forage since 
leaving the White House ; but the regiments were warned that 
the pursuit might be resumed at any moment during the night 

confusion, the entire army being collected within a space of about three miles 
along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupying the height 
which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to 
resist an attack in force by the enemy ; and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby 
preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army there 
from destruction. The enemy did succeed in bringing up some of their artillery, 
and threw some shells into the camp, before any preparations for defense had 
been made. On the 3d of July the heights were taken possession of by our 
troops, and works of defense commenced, and then, and not until then, was our 
army secure in that position." — Extract from the " Report of the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War" (U. S. Congress), Part I, p. 27. 

General Casey testified as follows : " The enemy had come down with some 
artillery upon our army massed together on the river, the heights commanding 
the position not being in our possession. Had the enemy come down and taken 
possession of those heights with a force of twenty or thirty thousand men, they 
would, in my opinion, have taken the whole of our army, except that small 
portion of it that might have got off on the transports. I felt very much alarmed 
for the army until we had got possession of those heights, and fortified them. 
After that it was a strong position." — Ibid., p. 446. 

*On file in the archives of the Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va. 



BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 43 

should Captain Pelham's reconnaissance apprise us of a continu- 
ance of the retreat. 

During the night Captain Pelham wrote to me that the 
enemy had taken position between Shirley and Westover, nearer 
the latter, and described the locality, the nature of Herring 
Creek on the enemy's right, and indicated the advantage to be 
gained by taking possession with artillery of Evelington Heights 
— a plateau commanding completely the enemy's encamp- 
ment. I forwarded this report at once to the commanding 
general through General Jackson, and proceeded to the ground 
with my command, except one regiment — the Ninth Virginia 
Cavalry, Colonel W. H. F. Lee — which was ordered down the 
road by Nance's shop, and thence across toward Charles City 
Court-House, so as to extend my left, and keep a lookout 
toward Forge Bridge, by which route I was liable to be at- 
tacked in flank and rear by Stoneman, should he endeavor a 
junction by land with McClellan. 

I found Evelington Heights easily gained. A squadron in 
possession vacated without much hesitation, retreating up the 
road, the only route by which it could reach Westover, owing 
to the impassability of Herring Creek below Eoland's mill. 
Colonel Martin was sent around farther to the left, and the 
howitzer brought into action in the river-road, to fire upon the 
enemy's camp. Judging from the great commotion and ex- 
citement caused below, it must have had considerable effect. 
We soon had prisoners from various corps and divisions, and 
from their statements, as well as those of citizens, I learned that 
the enemy's main body was there, but much reduced and demor- 
alized. I kept the commanding general apprised of my move- 
ments, and I soon learned from him that Longstreet and Jack- 
son were en route to my support. I held the ground from about 
9 A. m. until 2 P. m., when the enemy had contrived to get one 
battery into position on this side the creek. The fire was, how- 
ever, kept up until a body of infantry was found approaching 
by our right flank. I had no apprehension, however, as I felt 
sure Longstreet was near by ; and, although Pelham reported 
but two rounds of ammunition left, I held out, knowing how im- 
portant it was to hold the ground until Longstreet arrived. 



44 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

The enemy's infantry advanced, and the battery kept up its 
fire. I just then learned that Longstreet had taken the wrong 
road, and was at Nance's shop, six or seven miles off. Pelham 
fired his last round, and the sharp-shooters, strongly posted in 
the skirt of woods bordering the plateau, exhausted every car- 
tridge, and had at last to retire ; not, however, without teaching 
many a foeman the bitter lesson of death. 

My command had been so cut off from sources of supply, and 
so constantly engaged with the enemy, that the abundant supply 
it began with on the 26th of June was entirely exhausted. I kept 
pickets at Bradley's store that night, and remained with my 
command on the west side of the creek near Phillip's farm. 
General Longstreet came up late in the evening ; he had been 
led by his guide out of his proper route. The next day, July 
4th, General Jackson's command drove in the enemy's advance- 
pickets. 

I pointed out the position of the enemy, now occupying, 
apparently in force, the plateau from which I shelled their camp 
the day before, and showed him the route by which the plateau 
could be reached to the left, and submitted my plan for dispos- 
sessing the enemy and attacking his camp. This was subse; 
quently laid before the commanding general. 

The enemy's position had been well reconnoitred by Black- 
ford, of the engineers, the day before, from a close view, and 
further on this day, July 4th, demonstrating that his position 
was strong, difficult to reach, except with rifled cannon, and 
completely flanked by gunboats — all which were powerful ar- 
guments, and no doubt had their due weight with the command- 
ing general against renewing an attack, thus far of unbroken 
success, against a stronghold where the enemy had been reen- 
forced beyond a doubt. . . , 

It is most disingenuous to speak of the retreat of Gen- 
eral McClellan's army as a "change of base" which that 
commander had purposed to make for some time previous 
to General Lee's attack. This has been claimed by certain 
writers, but his repeated dispatches to the authorities at 
"Washington, the last bearing date the 25th of June, in which 



BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 45 

he signifies Ms intention to attack General Lee, completely 
refute the idea that his movements after General Lee's as- 
saults were the carrying out of a preconceived determination 
to change his base of operations to the James Piver. His 
army was well in hand, and greatly outnumbered that of his 
antagonist; he had proposed to assume the offensive and 
bring on a " general engagement " on the very day that he 
was assailed ; 1 after the first attack at Mechanicsville, when 
the purpose of General Lee was fully disclosed, he received 
the assaults of the latter on ground of his own selection ; his 
men were protected to a greater or less extent by hastily- 
constructed but effective works — especially was this the case 
at Gaines's Mill, where Hood's command charged upon and 
captured one of the strongest positions ever assailed by either 
side during the entire war — and he destroyed large quanti- 
ties of stores in his hurried movements to his " new base." 
In all this there is incontestable proof that he was fairly 
beaten and compelled to retreat. In this connection I sub- 
mit the following extracts from the dispatches sent by Gen- 
eral McClellan at that period to the President and the Sec- 
retary of War, and published in full in the " Peport on the 
Conduct of the War," Part L, pages 327-340 : 

May 21, 1862. — . . . I believe there is a great struggle before 
this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish 
to strengthen its force as much as I can ; but, in any event, I 
shall fight it with all the skill and caution and determination 
that I possess. And I trust that the result may either obtain 
for me the permanent confidence of my Government, or that it 
may close my career. 

June 2, 1862.— . . . The result is, that our left is within four 
miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall, to cross 
with the rest of the force, and make a general attack. The 
morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do 
not fear for odds against me. . . . 

June 7, 1862. — . . . I shall be in perfect readiness to move 
1 General McClellan's report. 



46 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

forward to take Richmond the moment that McCall reaches 
here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. . . . 

June 11, 1862. — McCall's troops have commenced arriving 
at White House. . . . Weather good to-day. . . . Give me a 
little good weather, and I shall have progress to report here. 

June 12, 1862. — . . . Have moved headquarters across the 
Chickahominy. Weather now good ; roads and ground rapidly 
drying. 

June 14, 1862. — Weather now very favorable. I shall ad- 
vance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit 
for artillery to move. 

June 18, 1862. — . . . A general engagement may take place 
any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less 
decisive. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as 
soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favor- 
able condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some 
necessary preliminaries. . . . 

June 25, 1862. — The rebel force is stated at two hundred 
thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to 
contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true ; 
but this army will do all in the power of men to hold their posi- 
tion and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority of 
numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it. . . . 
I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I 
have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by over- 
whelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate ; 
but if the result of the action which will probably occur to- 
morrow or within a short time is a disaster, the responsibility 
cannot be thrown on my shoulders. 

June 27, 1862, 10 a. m. — The troops on the other side are 
now well in hand, and the whole army so concentrated that it 
can take advantage of the first mistake made by the enemy. . . . 
White House yet undisturbed. Success of yesterday complete. 

June 27, 1862, 12 if. — My change of position on other side 
just in time. Heavy attack now being made by Jackson and 
two other divisions. Expect attack also on this side. 

June 27, 1862, 3 p. m. — We have been fighting nearly all 
day against greatly superior numbers. We shall endeavor to 



BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 47 

hold our own, and if compelled to fall back, shall do it in good 
order, upon James River if possible. Our men fight like veter- 
ans, and will do all that men can do. If we have to fall back 
on James River, supplies should be passed up to us, under pro- 
tection of the gunboats, as rapidly as possible. 

June 28, 1862, 12.20 a. m. — I now know the full history of 
the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed 
several very strong attacks. On the left bank, our men did all 
that men could do — all that soldiers could accomplish ; but they 
were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I 
brought my last reserves into action. Had I twenty thousand 
or even ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could 
take Richmond ; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be 
glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of 
the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our 
honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I 
have lost this battle because my force was too small. ... I still 
hope to retrieve our fortunes. ... I know that a few thousand 
men more would have changed this battle from a defeat to a 
victory. 

To this Mr. Lincoln replied : 

June 28, 1862. — . . . Save your army at all events. . . . 

From HaxalPs plantation General McClellan telegraphed : 

July 1, 1862. — . . . My men are completely exhausted, and I 
dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. . . . 
I now pray for time. . . . 

Mr. Lincoln to General McClellan : 

July 1, 1862. — ... If you are not strong enough to face the 
enemy, you must find a place of security and wait, rest and 
repair. Maintain your ground, if you can, but save the army at 
all events, even if you fall back to Fortress Monroe. 

General McClellan to President Lincoln : 

Berkeley-Harrison's Bar, July 2, 1862, 5 p. m. 
I have succeeded in getting this army to this place, on the 
banks of James River. . . . 



48 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

I have not yielded an inch of ground unnecessarily, but have 
retired to prevent the superior force of the enemy from cutting 
me off, and to take a different base of operations. 

In the testimony of General McClellan before the Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the War, the following appears : 

Question. Did you suppose the enemy to be your superior 
in strength before the battle of Gaines's Mill ? 

Ansvjer. My recollection is that I did. 

Q. And did you suppose at that time that you would be 
obliged to retreat ? 

A. It was a contingency I thought of. But my impression 
is that, up to the time of the battle of Gaines's Mill, I still hoped 
that we should be able to hold our own. 1 

Colonel B. S. Alexander testified before the committee 
that — 

While at headquarters, receiving his instructions (to proceed 
to James River with an escort to communicate with the gun- 
boats, and order supplies to be brought up the river), he was 
shown a printed order, not then issued, directing the destruction 
of the baggage of officers and men, and the tents, camp-equipage, 
and things of that kind ; appealing to the army to submit to 
this privation, as it would be only temporary — " only for a few 
days." He remonstrated with General McClellan against issu- 
ing such an order ; that it would have a bad effect, would de- 
moralize the army, as it would be telling them, more plainly 
than they could be told in any other way, that they were de- 
feated, and running for their lives. The order was not issued, 
and General McClellan testifies that he has no recollection of 
any such order. 2 

From these extracts, I think it will be clear to the can- 
did reader that the retreat to James River was a compulsory 
one, and due to a defeat then acknowledged by General 
McClellan himself. 

The fighting, however, was not invariably attended with 

1 " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 25. 2 Ibid., Part L, p. 434. 



BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 49 

success to the Confederates ; notably, the defense of Malvern 
Hill by the Federals was in favor of the latter, which result 
was as much due to the mismanagement of the Confederate 
troops as to the naturally strong position occupied by the 
Federals and their gallantry in its defense. 

Considerable delay was occasioned in the pursuit, from the 
fact that the ground was unknown to the Confederate com-, 
manders. On this occasion General Magruder took the 
wroug route, and had to be recalled, thereby losing much 
precious time ; and, when after serious and provoking de- 
lay the lines were formed for attack, there was some misun- 
derstanding of the orders of the commanding general, and, 
instead of a spirited, united advance by the entire line, as 
contemplated, the divisions were moved forward at different 
times, each attacking independently, and each in turn re- 
pulsed. Moreover, owing to the peculiar character of the 
ground, artillery could not be advantageously placed to aid 
the assaulting columns ; whereas the Federal batteries, strong- 
ly posted and most handsomely served, contributed in a very 
great degree to the successful stand made by McClellan's re- 
treating army at Malvern Hill. 

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES DT THE SEVEN 
DATS' BATTLES. 

A statement of the strength of the troops under General 
Johnston, now on file in the Archive-Office of the War De- 
partment, shows that on the 21st of May, 1862, he had pres- 
ent for duty : 

Smith's division : consisting of the brigades of Whiting, Hood, Hamp- 
ton, Hatton, and Pettigrew. 10,592 

Longstreet's division : consisting of the brigades of A. P. Hill, Pickett, 

R. H. Anderson, Wilcox, Colston, and Pryor 13,816 

Magruder's division : consisting of the brigades of McLaws, Kershaw, 

Griffith, Cobb, Toombs, and D. R. Jones 15,680 

D. H. Hill's division : consisting of the brigades of Early, Rodes, Raines, 

Featherston, and " the commands " of Colonels Ward and Crump . . 11,151 

Cavalry brigade 1,289 

Reserve artillery , 1,160 

Total effective of all arms 53,688 

4 



50 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

In addition to the troops above enumerated, there were 
two brigades subject to the orders of General Johnston, then 
stationed in the vicinity of Hanover Junction : one under 
the command of General J. E. Anderson, and the other un- 
der the command of General Branch ; they were subsequently 
incorporated into the division of General A. P. Hill, and 
participated in the battles around Eichmond. I have no 
official data to determine the strength of these two brigades ; 
that under General Branch was attacked by Porter's corps 
of MeClellan's army, on the 27th of May, and suffered se- 
verely. General McClellan claims to have captured seven 
hundred and thirty prisoners and to have killed two hun- 
dred of Branch's command in that engagement. General 
Anderson informs me that the strength of his brigade in the 
seven days' battles was between two thousand and twenty- 
three hundred effective, and agrees with me in estimating 
the strength of the two brigades at that time at four thousand 
effective. 

Subsequent to the date of the return of the army around 
Eichmond heretofore given, but previous to the battle of 
Seven Pines, General Johnston was reenf orced by General 
Huger's division, consisting of three brigades, under Generals 
Mahone, Armistead, and Wright. In the bound volume of 
the " Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern 
Virginia" (vol. i., pp. 371-385), I find that Mahone's 
strength at the commencement of the battles around Eich- 
mond was eighteen hundred ; Wright's, two thousand ; Ar- 
mistead' s, twelve hundred and eight, present for duty. Total 
of Huger's division, five thousand and eight effective. 

If the strength of the five brigades just enumerated be 
added to the return of the 21st of May, we shall have sixty- 
two thousand six hundred and ninety-six as the effective 
strength of the army under General Johnston on the 31st 
of May, 1862. 1 

1 As my purpose is to ascertain the strength of General Lee's army in the 
battles around Richmond, I put. Huger's strength at that time in this estimate. 



BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 51 

Deduct the losses sustained in the battle of Seven Pines, 
as shown by the official reports of casualties, say six thousand 
and eighty-four, 1 and we have fifty-six thousand six hundred 
and twelve as the effective strength of the army when Gen- 
eral Lee assumed the command. 

Previous to the seven days' battles the following re- 
enforcements reached General Lee : 

Ripley's brigade, officially reported as twenty-three hun- 
dred and sixty-six strong. 2 

Holmes's command, embracing the brigades of Ransom, 
Walker, Daniel, and Wise, and a small force of artillery and 
cavalry. In his official report, General Ransom puts five of his 
six regiments at three thousand effective. 3 Allowing the aver- 
age strength of the reported five for the excluded sixth, viz., 
six hundred, and it would give thirty-six hundred as his total 
effective strength. In General Holmes's report 4 he states the 
strength of Walker's brigade as thirty-six hundred ; that of 
Daniel's, as fifteen hundred and seventy ; that of Wise, as seven 
hundred and fifty-two. Besides the infantry, there were six bat- 
teries of artillery (four hundred and forty-three effective), and 
a battalion of cavalry (one hundred and thirty strong). The 
total effective of Holmes's command, including Ransom's bri- 
gade, was, therefore, ten thousand and ninety-five — say ten thou- 
sand men. 

LawtorCs brigade, the last reenforcement received, was 
thirty -five hundred strong, as by the official report of its com- 
mander. 6 

The result would be the same, though the method would be different, if I took 
the strength of the three brigades on the 21st of May and deducted their losses 
previous to the battles around Richmond ; as I have not this information, I 
adopt the other method. 

1 Longstreet's loss was four thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, including 
that sustained by D. H. Hill's division. — " Southern Historical Society Papers," 
vol. i., p. 415. 

G. W. Smith's loss was twelve hundred and thirty-three. — General John- 
ston's " Narrative," p. 140. 

2 " Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia under Gen- 
eral Lee ; published by Authority of the Comfederate Congress," vol. i., p. 234. 

3 Ibid., p. 368. 4 Ibid., p. 151. 5 Ibid., p. 270. 



52 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

The commands just enumerated include all the rein- 
forcements received by General Lee, except the command of 
General Jackson, brought from the Yalley. This consisted 
of two divisions, viz. : Jackson's old division, embracing 
three brigades, commanded respectively by General Win- 
der and Colonels Cunningham and Fulkerson ; and Ewell's 
division, embracing the brigades of Elzey, Trimble, and Sey- 
mour. These two divisions were very much reduced by 
reason of the active campaign in the Yalley. Of Jackson's 
old division, we have the effective strength of one of its three 
brigades, before it marched to join General Lee, viz., that 
under "Winder, which was officially reported eleven hundred 
and thirty-five strong. 1 Taking this as an average, the divis- 
ion had an effective strength of thirty-four hundred and live. 
Of E well's division, one brigade — and that the largest — viz., 
Elzey's, numbered twelve hundred and ninety-three, 2 when 
Jackson's command joined General Lee. Taking that as an 
average, the division numbered thirty-eight hundred and 
seventy-nine effective. Add one thousand men for the regi- 
ment of cavalry, and the artillery which accompanied Gen- 
eral Jackson, and we have eight thousand two hundred and 
eighty-four as the total effective of his command. 

For the purpose of deceiving the enemy, two brigades 
under Whiting — viz., his own and Hood's — were sent to the 
Yalley to join General Jackson just before he moved to re- 
enforce General Lee. For the same reason, General Law- 
ton's brigade, on reaching Yirginia when on the way to join 
General Lee, was in like manner diverted. Having already 
counted these brigades, I do not estimate them in giving the 
strength of General Jackson's command. 

We have now seen that when General Lee assumed the 
command of the Army of Northern Yirginia its strength 
was fifty-six thousand six hundred and twelve ; and that he 
was subsequently reenforced by Eipley's brigade, numbering 

1 " Report of Operations around Richmond," p. 10. 

8 Ibid., " Early's Report," p. 303 ; and Elzey's " Brigade Casualties," p. 142. 



BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 53 

twenty-three hundred and sixty-six men ; Holmes's com- 
mand, ten thousand strong ; Lawton's brigade, thirty-live 
hundred ; and Jackson's two divisions, eight thousand two 
hundred and eighty-four : making the total of reinforce- 
ments received twenty-four thousand one hundred and fifty ; 
which would make eighty thousand seven hundred and sixty- 
two as the effective strength of the army under General Lee, 
in the seven days' battles around Eichmond. 1 

"When General Lee assumed command of the army it was 
organized into divisions and brigades, as follows : 

Long street's division — six brigades, viz. : Pickett's, R. H. 
Anderson's, Wilcox's, Kemper's, Pryor's, and Featherston's. 

A. P. HilVs division — six brigades, viz. : J. R. Anderson's, 
Gregg's, Field's, Pender's, Branch's, and Archer's. 

D. H. HilVs division — four brigades, viz. : Rodes's, G. B. 
Anderson's, Garland's, and Colquitt's. 

Magruder's command — six brigades, viz. : Semmes's, Ker- 
shaw's, Griffith's, Cobb's, Toombs's, and D. R. Jones's. These 
were organized into three divisions of two brigades each, under 
Generals Magruder, McLaws, and D. R. Jones. 

Huger's division — three brigades, viz. : Mahone's, Armis- 
tead's, and Wright's. 

Whiting 's division — two brigades, viz. : his own, under 
Colonel Law, and Hood's. 

In all, there were twenty-seven brigades. 
The army under General Lee in the battles around Rich- 
mond embraced the following commands : 

LongstreeVs division — six brigades, viz. : Pickett's, Ander- 
son's, Wilcox's, Kemper's, Pryor's, and Featherston's. 

A, P. HilVs division — six brigades, viz. : Anderson's, 
Gregg's, Field's, Pender's, Branch's, and Archer's. 

D. H. HilVs division — five brigades, viz. : Rodes's, Gar- 
land's, Anderson's, Colquitt's, and Ripley's. 

1 General Early, in a very exhaustive article on this subject, published in the 
"Southern Historical Society Papers," vol. i., p. 407, puts General Lee's 
strength " under eighty thousand effective." 



54 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

Magruder's command — six brigades, viz. : Semmes's, Ker- 
shaw's, Griffith's, Cobb's, Toombs's, and D. R. Jones's. 

Huger's division — three brigades, viz. : Mahone's, Armis- 
tead's, and Wright's. 

Whiting's division — two brigades, viz. : his own and 
Hood's. 

Jackson's division — three brigades, viz. : Winder's, Cun- 
ningham's, and Fulkerson's. 

EwelVs division — three brigades, viz. : Elzey's, Trimble's, 
and Seymour's. 

Holmes's command — four brigades, viz. : Walker's, Ran- 
som's, Daniel's, and Wise's. 

Lawton's brigade — unattached, under General Jackson's 
command. 

In all, thirty-nine brigades. 

General Lee bad received, then, but twelve brigades ad- 
ditional after he assumed command of the army. These, as 
has already been shown, were Ripley's, Walker's, Ransom's, 
Daniel's, Wise's, Lawton's, and the six bronght by General 
Jackson from the Yalley. 

By reference to the official reports of the division com- 
manders of the operations of their respective commands in 
the battles around Richmond, I find the following concern- 
ing the number of troops employed in those operations : 

General Holmes puts his command, exclusive of Ransom's 
brigade, at six thousand infantry and six batteries of artillery 
numbering four hundred and forty-three men; 1 General Ran- 
som's brigade, as already shown, numbered thirty-six hun- 
dred; 2 thus Holmes's entire command amounted to ten thou- 
sand men. General Magruder reports his strength as thir- 
teen thousand. 3 General Huger's— excluding Ransom's brigade, 
temporarily attached and already estimated — as shown by the 
reports of his brigade commanders, was five thousand. 4 Gen- 

1 "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," vol. i., 
p. 151. 

2 Ibid., p. 368. 3 i bid>) p> 19a 4 Ibid>; ppt 3<7i_385. 



BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 55 

eral A. P. Hill gives his strength as fourteen thousand. 1 Gen- 
eral D. H. Hill puts his at ten thousand. 2 General Law ton 
gives the strength of his brigade as thirty-five hundred. 3 
General Longstreet does not state the strength of his divis- 
ion, but General E. P. Alexander, his chief of artillery, quot- 
ing from the official records of Longstreet's command, puts 
the strength of the division in the seven days' battles at nine 
thousand and fifty-one. 4 General Whiting does not give his 
strength, but the two brigades on the 21st of May, 1862, num- 
bered four thousand three hundred and twenty ; 5 they lost pretty 
heavily at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, and on the 20th of July, 
1862, numbered but thirty-eight hundred and fifty-two ; 6 it is 
fair to estimate them, therefore, on the 26th of June, 1862, at 
four thousand. General Jackson does not give the strength of 
his two divisions, but I have already adduced ^good testimony 
to prove that his command, excluding Whiting and Lawton, did 
not exceed eight thousand two hundred and eighty -four. Allow- 
ing four thousand for the cavalry and the reserve artillery — 
nearly double what it was a month previous — and there results 
a total of all arms of eighty thousand eight hundred and thirty- 
five. This confirms the estimate obtained by my first method. 

It appears from the official returns of the Army of the 
Potomac (as given by Mr. Swinton, in his history of that 
army), that, on the 20th of June, 1862, General McClellan 
had present for duty one hundred and fifteen thousand one 
hundred and two. 7 Mr. Swinton also states that General 
McClellan reached the James Eiver with " between eighty- 
five and ninety thousand men," and that the Federal loss, in 
the seven days' battles, was fifteen thousand two hundred 
and forty-nine ; this would make the army one hundred and 
five thousand strong at the commencement of the battles. 

1 Ibid., p. 1T3. 2 Ibid>> p# m> 3 Ibid#} p . 210. 

4 " Southern Historical Society Papers." 

5 " Return of the Army under General Johnston," Archive-Office, United 
States War Department, see chapter xiv. 

6 " Return of the Army of Northern Virginia," chapter xiv. 

7 For copy of " Return of the Army of the Potomac," see also " Report on 
the Couduct of the War," Part I., p. 337. 



56 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

I presume that the difference of ten thousand between 
this statement and the official returns is explained by the 
fact that no account is taken of General Dix's corps of nine 
thousand two hundred and seventy-seven effective, stationed 
at Fort Monroe, but under General McClellan's command and 
embraced in the returns of his army. The force under Gen- 
eral McClellan, however, appears to shrink as we study this 
question, for the same author says (page 151), " On the north 
side of the Chickahominy thirty thousand Union troops were 
being assailed by seventy thousand Confederates, and twenty- 
five thousand Confederates on the south side held in check 
sixty thousand Union troops." The entire strength of Gen- 
eral McClellan's army, according to this last statement, would 
be but ninety thousand. This is evidently an under-estimate 
of the Federal strength ; and while the Confederate force on 
the south side, as here given, is nearly accurate, that on the 
north side is excessive by at least seventeen thousand. There 
remained on the south side of the Chickahominy, of Lee's 
army, the commands of Holmes, Magruder, and Huger; 
their effective strength on the 26th of June was about twen- 
ty-eight thousand, as shown by the reports of these officers 
of the operations of their commands in the seven days' 
battles. 

The difference between this and eighty-one thousand 
would give fifty-three thousand as the strength of the Con- 
federate force— infantry, artillery, and cavalry— under Gen- 
eral Lee, operating in the flank movement on the north side 
of the Chickahominy. If we adopt as correct the Confed- 
erate loss as given by Mr. Swinton, viz., nineteen thousand, 
it would then appear that when McClellan reached the river 
with " eighty-five or ninety thousand men," * he was being 
pursued by General Lee with but sixty-two thousand. 

1 See General McClellan's testimony, " Report on the Conduct of the War," 
Part I., p. 437. 



CHAPTEE VI. 

General Lee manoeuvres to effect the Withdrawal of General McClellan's Army. 
— Jackson engages Pope at Cedar Run, or Slaughter's Mountain. — Removal 
of the Federal Army from James River. — The Second Battle of Manassas. — 
The First Invasion. — Operations in Maryland. — McClellan in Possession of 
Lee's Order of Battle. — Boonesboro, or South Mountain. — Capture of Har- 
per's Ferry by Jackson's Forces. — Battle of Sharpsburg. — General Lee re- 
tires to Virginia. — Incidents illustrating the Devotion to Duty and Great 
Self-Control of the Confederate Leader. 

Although defeated, the army under General McClellan 
was still a formidable force, and was being constantly 
strengthened. Its proximity to the Confederate capital, and 
its unassailable position, the facility with which it could be 
transferred across James Eiver for operations on the south 
side, the capacity of the North indefinitely to recruit its 
ranks, and of the Government to repair and increase its 
equipment, rendered the situation one of profound solicitude, 
and presented to the Confederate commander the alternative 
of remaining a passive observer of his adversary's movements, 
or of devising a campaign which would compel the with- 
drawal of the hostile army from its position of constant 
menace. 

With a just conception of the inordinate fear which pos- 
sessed the mind of the Federal civil authorities for the safety 
of their capital, he concluded that seriously to threaten that 
city, either by strategic manoeuvres or by a decisive blow 
struck at the army in its front, would be the surest way of 
effecting the removal of ]\f cClellan's army from its position 
on James River. 



58 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

With this view he sent General Jackson in advance with 
his two divisions, followed by that of A. P. Hill, to engage 
General Pope, who commanded the Federal army in North- 
ern Yirginia, intending, as soon as his anticipations of the 
effect of this move were realized, to follow promptly with 
the bulk of his army. 

In vindication of his sagacity, information was soon re- 
ceived of the transfer of troops from McClellan's army on 
James Eiver to "Washington. 

Leaving two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cav- 
alry at Richmond, he now moved with the rest of the army 
to join General Jackson, who had already presented a rebel 
front to the astonished gaze of Major-General John Pope, 
unaccustomed to such a sight, and had commenced at Cedar 
Run, on the 9th of August, that series of brilliant manoeuvres 
and engagements which so dazed the Federal commander, 
and so startled and alarmed the authorities at Washington. 

These movements culminated with a decisive victory for 
the Confederates, under General Lee, over the army under 
General Pope, on the plains of Manassas, on the 30th of 
August. In the series of engagements, "more than seven 
thousand prisoners were taken, in addition to about two 
thousand wounded left in our hands. Thirty pieces of artil- 
lery, upward of twenty thousand stand of small-arms, numer- 
ous colors, and a large amount of stores, besides those taken 
by General Jackson at Manassas Junction, were captured." ' 

Vanquished at Manassas, General Pope next essayed to 
make a stand in the fortified lines about Centreville; but 
another detour by General Jackson, under General Lee's 
orders, caused a further retreat in the direction of Wash- 
ington, and in the early days of September the Federal 
army — now embracing the combined forces of McClellan and 
Pope — was retired within the line of fortifications construct- 
ed on the Yirginia side of the river, for the protection of the 
Federal capital. 

1 Extract from General Lee's " Report," p. 24. 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 59 

Barely three months had elapsed since General Lee took 
the field, and, behold ! the position of the two hostile armies, 
with relation to their respective seats of government, was 
completely reversed ; fortunately for that of the North, a 
wide and impassable river lay between it and the victorious 
army of the South. 

With the battles of Cedar Eun, or Slaughter's Mountain, 
and (second) Manassas, two more victories were recorded for 
Confederate arms, and another Federal general was added to 
the list of the discomfited. 

The career of General Pope was as brief and remarkable, 
when contrasted with his blustering proclamations, as the 
movements of Generals Lee and Jackson, in bringing it to a 
grievous termination, were audacious and brilliant. 

STRENGTH OF THE OPPO&ING ARMIES IN THE BATTLES OF 
CEDAR RUN AND (SECOND) MANASSAS. 

The field-return of the " Department of Northern Vir- 
ginia" of the 20th of July, 1862, shows a total "present 
for duty" in that department of sixty-nine thousand five 
hundred and fifty -nine. Of this number the Army of 
Northern Virginia embraced but fifty-seven thousand three 
hundred and twenty-eight. The remaining twelve thou- 
sand two hundred and thirty-one were serving south of 
James Eiver, and in North Carolina, and were included in 
the departmental returns, because that section of country 
was then comprised within the territorial limits of the de- 
partment under the command of General Lee. This return, 
however, did not include Jackson's command, consisting of his 
own and Ewell's divisions, then near Gordonsville. The move- 
ments of these two divisions doubtless had prevented their 
making the formal returns usually required. Their effective 
strength could not have exceeded eight thousand. 1 Jackson was 

1 This estimate allows this division as much as it had in the seven days' 
battles. 



60 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

reenf oreed by A. P. Hill, early in August, whose division in 
the field-return of the 20th of July, mentioned above, showed, 
as " present for duty," ten thousand six hundred and twenty- 
three ; so that, with this reenf orcement, General Jackson had 
available at the battle of Cedar Bun eighteen thousand six 
hundred and twenty-three men. At that time General Pope 
had available the three corps of Banks, McDowell, and Si- 
gel, numbering forty-three thousand men, according to his 
statement ; 1 but only Banks's corps and one division of Mc- 
Dowell's corps were engaged. 

"When General Lee moved forward to join General Jack- 
son he took with him the divisions of Longstreet, D. R. 
Jones, Hood, and Anderson, leaving in front of Richmond 
the divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws, and two brigades 
under J. G. "Walker. 

A portion of the cavalry under* General Stuart accompa- 
nied General Lee, leaving a brigade under General Hamp- 
ton in front of Richmond. 

The total present for duty of the cavalry arm of the ser- 
vice on the 20th of July was four thousand and thirty-five ; 
probably fifteen hundred remained with Hampton, and 
twenty-five hundred accompanied General Lee. The pres- 
ent for duty in the artillery of the same date was thirty-two 
hundred and fifty-two; of this number certainly not over 
twenty-five hundred accompanied General Lee. 

Besides the troops embraced in the return of the 20th of 
July, there were two brigades (Drayton's and Evans's) re- 
cently arrived from South Carolina, which joined General 
Lee previous to the battle. In a letter dated June 9, 1874, 
Major Henry E. Young, subsequently on the staff of the 
commanding general, but then adjutant-general of Drayton's 
brigade, and also of the division composed of these two bri- 
gades, during its temporary command by General Drayton, 
states that the strength of the two brigades did not exceed 

1 General Pope's " Report," " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part II., 

Supplement, p. 109. 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 61 

four thousand six hundred present for duty. 1 Assuming this 
estimate to be correct, and taking the strength of the other 
commands as given on the return of the 20th of July, we 
have the following as the army under General Lee in the 
series of engagements that terminated with the second battle 
of Manassas : 

Jackson's three divisions, as heretofore given 18,623 

Less casualties in battle of Cedar Knn (Jackson's official report) 1,314: 

17,309 

Longstreet's command — viz. : his own division 8,486 

Hood's " 3,852 

Jones's " 3,713 

16,051 

Anderson's division 6,117 

Drayton's and Evans's brigades 4,600 

Total infantry 44,077 

Cavalry (as estimated above) 2,500 

Artillery " 2,500 

Total of all arms 49,077 



At the opening of the campaign, General Pope had un- 
der his command in the field the three army-corps of Gener- 
als Sigel, Banks, and McDowell, numbering, according to 
the official returns, forty-seven thousand eight hundred and 
seventy-eight effective, as follows : First Army-Corps (Si- 
gel's), eleven thousand four hundred and ninety-eight infan- 
try and artillery; Second Army-Corps (Banks's), fourteen 
thousand five hundred and sixty-seven infantry and artillery ; 
Third Army-Corps (McDowell's), eighteen thousand five 
hundred and seventy-five infantry and artillery ; cavalry, 
eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight ; total, fifty- 
three thousand three hundred and seventy-eight, from which 
deduct detached commands and cavalry unfit for service six 

1 General Sorrel, the adjutant-general of Longstreet's command, puts the 
strength of these brigades at four thousand five hundred when they marched 
from Gordonsville in 1862, just previous to the battle of Manassas. They vreve 
at that time made a part of General Longstreet's command. 



62 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

thousand five hundred, and there remains forty-seven thou- 
sand eight hundred and seventy-eight effective. 1 

Only Banks's corps, and Rickett's division of McDowell's 
corps, were engaged at the battle of Cedar Kun, or Slaughter's 
Mountain. General Pope estimates his loss in that engage- 
ment, in killed, wounded, and missing, at eighteen hundred. 9 

General Pope then received the following reinforcements : 
on the 14th of August, Eeno's corps of Burnside's army ; 
on the 23d of August, Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania 
Reserves ; and on the 26th and 27th of August, the corps of 
Heintzelman and Porter, of the Army of the Potomac. 

In his report, General Pope puts these reinforcements at 
twenty-eight thousand five hundred, as follows : Reno's corps, 
eight thousand ; Reynolds's division, twenty-five hundred ; 
Heintzelman's and Porter's corps, eighteen thousand. 3 This 
would make his aggregate effective strength, previous to the 
second battle of Manassas, seventy-six thousand three hun- 
dred and seventy-eight ; and, deducting the losses at Cedar 
Run, eighteen hundred, we have seventy-four thousand five 
hundred and seventy-eight as his total available force in the 
series of engagements which terminated with his defeat near 
Groveton — (second) Manassas — on the 30th of August. 

In this enumeration no mention is made of Sturgis, Cox, 
or Franklin. A portion of Cox's division was engaged at 
Manassas Junction, on the 27th of August; and Taylor's 
brigade of Franklin's division was defeated by the Confeder- 
ates later on the same day, at the same place. 

1 Official return of the Army of Yirginia of July 31, 1862 ; General Pope's 
"Report," " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part II., Supplement, p. 118. 
It is proper to state that General Pope disputes the correctness of the return 
of Banks's corps. In regard to this he says (p. 117) : " Although I several 
times called General Bank's attention to the discrepancy between this return 
and the force he afterward stated to me he had led to the front, that discrep- 
ancy has never been explained, and I do not yet understand how General 
Banks could have been so greatly mistaken as to the force under his immedi- 
ate command." 

2 Pope's " Report," p. 122. 3 Ibid., pp. 122, 172. 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 63 

Although I have adopted General Pope's figures (with 
the exception of Banks's strength already referred to, where 
I followed the official return of General Banks), I cannot 
reconcile his statement of the reinforcements received with 
the other official data before me. He estimates the troops 
received from the Army of the Potomac, previous to the 
battle, viz., Heintzelman's corps, Porter's corps, and Rey- 
nolds's division, at twenty thousand five hundred ; he also 
puts the combined strength of Sumner's and Franklin's 
corps, which joined him after the battle, at nineteen thou- 
sand. 

He thus makes it appear that all of McClellan's army, 
except Keyes's corps and Dix's corps, numbered but thirty- 
nine thousand five hundred men, although he speaks of that 
army as the " ninety-one thousand veteran troops from Har- 
rison's Landing." The two corps of Keyes and Dix, and the 
cavalry, could hardly account for the difference of fifty-one 
thousand five hundred. 

On the 20th of July, 1862, less than one month before the 
removal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, 
the official return 1 of that army showed present for duty 
one hundred and one thousand six hundred and ninety-one 
men, as follows : 

Engineer brigade, cavalry division, provost-guard, etc 8,735 

Second Corps, General Sumner 16,952 

Third Corps, General Heintzelman 16,2*76 

Fourth Corps, General Keyes 14,490 

Fifth Corps, General Porter 21,077 

Sixth Corps, General Franklin 14,014 

Seventh Corps, General Dix 9,997 

United States Signal Corps 150 

101,691 

General Dix remained at Fortress Monroe. General 
Keyes with his corps covered the embarkation at Yorktown ; 
all the rest were moved to reenf orce General Pope. General 

1 " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 344. 



64 FOUR YEAHS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

McClellan, having dispatched his corps successively at and 
near Fortress Monroe, followed with his staff on the 23d of 
August, and arrived at Aquia Creek the next day. 

It will be seen that the combined strength of the Second 
and Sixth Corps (Sumner's and Franklin's) was thirty thou- 
sand nine hundred and sixty-six previous to the removal 
from the Peninsula to the front of "Washington. When 
these two corps moved out to join General Pope, they num- 
bered twenty-five thousand infantry, 1 although he only puts 
them at nineteen thousand. The combined strength of the 
Third and Fifth Corps (Heintzelman's and Porter's), on the 
20th July, was thirty-seven thousand three hundred and fifty- 
three ; and, assuming that the proportion of infantry in these 
corps was the same as in the Second and Sixth, their strength 
at Manassas should have been near thirty thousand. Por- 
ter's corps alone embraced between twenty and thirty regi- 
ments, and eight batteries of artillery, 3 and two weeks later, 
September 12th, numbered twenty thousand. 3 

McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves numbered on 
the 15th of June, 1862, nine thousand iive hundred and 
fourteen effective ; 4 its losses in the battles around Rich- 
mond were officially reported at three thousand and seventy- 
four, 5 so that it must have numbered about six thousand five 
hundred when it left the Peninsula to join General Pope, 
yet the latter reports this division but twenty-five hundred 
strong when it reached him. 

Mr. Swinton, the author previously quoted, who enjoyed 

1 See General McClellan's dispatches, " Report on the Conduct of the War," 
Part I. " Sumner has about fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or ar- 
tillery, here " (August 28, 1862, p. 461). 

" Franklin has only between ten thousand and eleven thousand ready for 
duty" (August 29, 1862, p. 462). 

2 General McDowell's testimony, "Report on the Conduct of the War," 
Part II., Supplement, p. 175. 

3 " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 89. 

4 Ibid., Part I, p. 345. 

5 From official report of casualties in the Army of the Potomac, " The 
American Conflict," p. 168. 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 65 

unusual facilities for obtaining accurate information in all 
matters pertaining to the Federal army, states in his " Cam- 
paign of the Army of the Potomac " that the force under Gen- 
eral Pope, before he received any reinforcements, was " near 
fifty thousand men." He also states (p. 179) that McDow- 
ell's corps, Sigel's corps, and Beynolds's (McCall's) division 
of Pennsylvania Keserves, on the 28th of August, made to- 
gether " a force of forty thousand men." If we add to this 
Banks's corps, Reno's corps, and the two corps of Heintzel- 
man and Porter, it would appear that on the 28th of August 
General Pope must have had an available force of seventy- 
five or eighty thousand men. 

On the morning of the 30th of August — the decisive day 
— after deducting the losses incurred in the engagements of 
the 27th, 28th, and 29th, General Pope reports his effective 
strength as follows : x McDowell's corps, including Eeynolds's 
division, twelve thousand; Sigel's corps, seven thousand; 
Beno's corps, seven thousand; Heintzelman's corps, seven 
thousand ; Porter's corps, twelve thousand ; Banks's corps, 
five thousand : total, fifty thousand. At no time in his 
operations against General Pope had General Lee so many 
men. 

In addition to the troops enumerated above, the divisions 
of Sturgis and Cox, and the corps of Sumner and Franklin, 
were within an easy march of General Pope, but only joined 
him after his retreat to Centreville. Sturgis's division num- 
bered ten thousand ; Cox's division, seven thousand. 2 I have 
already given the strength of Sumner's and Franklin's corps. 
From first to last there must have been, according to the 
official returns, not less than one hundred and twenty thou- 
sand men in front of Washington to resist General Lee's ad- 
vance. General Pope puts his strength on the 1st of Sep- 
tember at Centreville, after the fighting was over, at sixty- 
three thousand men. His losses in killed and wounded were 

1 General Pope's " Keport," p. 156. 2 Ibid., p. 139. 

5 



66 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

very heavy, but his " missing " must have been enormous to 
account for this difference. 1 

Immediately after the victory of second Manassas, the 
Potomac was crossed, and the army under General Lee 
entered Maryland ; Generals D. H. Hill and McLaws, who 
were left at Richmond, having been meanwhile directed to 
join the main army. 

At Frederick City, information reached General Lee of 
the purpose of President Davis to follow in the rear of 
and join the army. To prevent a step so full of personal 
danger to the President, for the scouting and marauding 
parties of the enemy's cavalry were active in our rear, I was 
dispatched to meet him and dissuade him from carrying out 
such intention ; and I did not rejoin the army until the night 
previous to the battle of Sharpsburg. 

At this time General Lee conceived his plan of operations, 
embracing the capture of Harper's Ferry, and a subsequent 
concentration of the army to join issue in a grand battle 
with General McClellan, who had again vaulted into the 
headquarters-saddle of the Federal army, vacated by Gen- 
eral Pope. 

An order of battle was issued, stating in detail the posi- 
tion and duty assigned to each command of the army. Gen- 
eral Jackson was to undertake the reduction and capture of 
Harper's Ferry, and had assigned to him for this purpose his 
own two divisions, and those of A. P. Hill, Anderson, and 
McLaws. Longstreet's two divisions, under Jones and Hood, 
and D. H. Hill's division, remained to hold in check the 
army under McClellan pending Jackson's operations. 

It was the custom to send copies of such orders, marked 
" confidential," to the commanders of separate corps or di- 

1 " It is proper for me to state here, and I do it with regret and reluctance, 
that at least one-half of this great diminution of our forces was occasioned by- 
skulking and straggling from the army. The troops which were brought into 
action fought with gallantry and determination, but thousands of men straggled 
away from their commands, and were not in any action." — General Pope's " Re- 
port," p. 164. 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 67 

visions only, and to place the address of such separate com- 
mander in the bottom left-hand corner of the sheet contain- 
ing the order. General D. H. Hill was in command of a di- 
vision which had not been attached to nor incorporated with 
either of the two wings of the Army of Northern Virginia. A 
copy of the order was, therefore, in the usual course, sent to 
him. After the evacuation of Frederick City by our forces, 
a copy of General Lee's order was found in a deserted camp 
by a soldier, and was soon in the hands of General ITcClel- 
lan. This copy of the order, it was stated at the time, was 
addressed to " General D. H. Hill, commanding division." 
General Hill has assured me that it could not have been his 
copy, because he still has the original order received by him 
in his possession. It is impossible, therefore, to explain how 
a copy addressed to General D. H. Hill was thus carelessly 
handled and lost. 1 

But what an advantage did this fortuitous event give the 
Federal commander, whose heretofore snail-like movements 
were wonderfully accelerated when he was made aware of 
the fact of the division of our army, and of the small por- 
tion thereof which confronted him ! 2 

The God of battles alone knows what would have occurred 
but for the singular accident mentioned ; it is useless to 
speculate on this point, but certainly the loss of this battle- 
order constitutes one of the pivots on which turned the 
event of the war. 

Notwithstanding this unfortunate circumstance, the stub- 
born and heroic defense of the South Mountain Pass by 

1 Colonel Venable, one of my associates on the staff of General Lee, says in 
regard to this matter: "This is very easily explained. One copy was sent 
directly to Hill from headquarters. General Jackson sent him a copy, as he 
regarded Hill in his command. It is Jackson's copy, in his own handwriting, 
which General Hill has. The other was undoubtedly left carelessly by some 
one at Hill's quarters." 

2 " Upon learning the contents of this order, I at once gave orders for a vig- 
orous pursuit." — General McClellan's testimony, "Report on the Conduct of 
the War," Part L, p. 440. 



68 FOUK YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

Longstreet and *D. H. Hill, and Jackson's complete success 
at Harper's Ferry, including the gallant resistance made at 
Crampton's Gap by portions of McLaws's and Anderson's 
commands 1 against the assaults of Franklin's corps, enabled 
General Lee to unite his forces at Sharpsburg in time to 
give battle, on the 17th of September, to his old adversary ; 
but under altogether different circumstances from such as 
were anticipated. Longstreet and D. H. Hill 2 in resisting 
the assaults of the bulk of McClellan's army had suffered 
very heavily. Jackson had been compelled, after consider- 
able fighting, to hasten from Harper's Ferry (which place 
was surrendered to him on the 15th), by forced marches of 
extraordinary character, to join General Lee, who had re- 
mained with Longstreet. The route from Harper's Ferry 
was strewed with foot-sore and weary men, too feeble to keep 
up with the stronger and more active ; and, instead of going 
into battle with full ranks, the brigades were but as regi- 
ments, and in some cases no stronger than a full company. 

After the affair at South Mountain, the commands of 
Longstreet and Hill were retired to Sharpsburg, and were 
confronted on the 15th by McClellan's army, along the line 
of Antietam Creek, but were not seriously attacked until 
the next day. 

1 Cobb's and Semmes's brigades of McLaws's division, and Mahone's brigade 
of Anderson's division. 

2 The resistance made by General D. H. Hill at South Mountain deserves 
more than a passing notice. On the 14th of September, with the brigades of 
Bodes, Garland, Colquitt, Anderson, and Ripley, numbering in the aggregate 
less than five thousand men, for six or seven hours he successfully resisted 
the repeated assaults of two corps of the army under General McClellan 
(Burnside's and Hooker's), fully thirty thousand strong. About 3 p. m. he was 
reenforced by the brigades of Drayton and Anderson, numbering nineteen 
hundred men, and later in the day was joined by General Longstreet, with the 
brigades of Evans, Pickett, Kemper, Jenkins, Hood, and Whiting ; only four of 
these, however, numbering about three thousand men, became seriously engaged, 
and they not until dusk. Thus it will be seen that a force of less than ten 
thousand men held McClellan in check for an entire day. — " Eeports of the Op- 
erations of the Army of Northern Virginia," p. 112 ; " Keport on the Conduct 
of the War," Part I., p. 640. 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 69 

On the afternoon of the 16th General McClellan directed 
an attack by Hooker's corps on the Confederate left — 
Hood's two brigades — and during the whole of the 17th the 
battle was waged, with varying intensity, along the entire 
line. "When the issue was first joined, on the afternoon of 
the 16th, General Lee had with him less than eighteen thou- 
sand men, 1 consisting of the commands of Longstreet and D. 
H. Hill, the two divisions of Jackson, and two brigades 
under "Walker. Couriers were sent to the rear to hurry up 
the divisions of A. P. Hill, Anderson, and McLaws, hasten- 
ing from Harper's Ferry, and these several commands, as 
they reached the front at intervals during the day, on the 
17th, were immediately deployed and put to work. Every 
man was engaged. We had no reserve. 

The fighting was heaviest and most continuous on the 
Confederate left. It is established upon indisputable Fed- 
eral evidence that the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and 
Sumner, were completely shattered in the repeated but fruit- 
less efforts to turn this flank, and two of these corps were 
rendered useless for further aggressive movements. 2 The 

1 The command of General Longstreet consisted of the six brigades under 
General D. R. Jones, viz., Kemper, Pickett, Jenkins, George Anderson, Dray- 
ton, and Toombs, numbering, according to General Jones's official report, twenty- 
four hundred and thirty men ; two brigades under General Hood, numbering 
twenty-three hundred and thirty-two effective ; and Evans's brigade, fifteen 
hundred strong ; making Longstreet's total effective on the morning of the 16th 
of September six thousand two hundred and sixty-two. General D. H. Hill reports 
that he had but three thousand infantry in line of battle. General Jackson's 
command, by the official report of the division commanders, is shown to have 
been but five thousand strong. The command of General Walker consisted of 
his own brigade and that of General R. Ransom. I am informed by the latter 
that the brigades numbered about sixteen hundred effective each, making thirty- 
two hundred for the two. It will thus be seen that the total effective infantry in 
line of battle on the 16th was but seventeen thousand four hundred and sixty-two. 

2 " General Hooker's corps was dispersed ; there is no question about that. 
I sent one of my staff-officers to find where they were, and General Ricketts, 
the only officer we could find, said that he could not raise three hundred men of 
his corps. 

" There were some troops lying down on the left, which I took to belong to 



70 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

aggregate strength of the attacking columns at this point 
reached forty thousand men, 1 not counting the two divisions 
of Franklin's corps, sent at a late hour in the day to rescue 
the Federal right from the impending danger of being itself 
destroyed ; while the Confederates, from first to last, had 
less than fourteen thousand men on this flank, consisting of 
Jackson's two divisions, McLaws's division, and the two small 
divisions, of two brigades each, under Hood and Walker, 
with which to resist their fierce and oft-repeated assaults. 

As a wall of adamant the fourteen thousand received the 
shock of the forty thousand ; and the latter, staggered by 
the blow, reeled and recoiled in great disorder. 

The disproportion in the centre and on our right was as 
great as, or even more decided than, on our left. 

Indeed, the drawn battle of Sharpsburg was as forcible 
an illustration of Southern valor and determination as was 
furnished during the whole period of the war, when the 
great disparity in numbers between the two armies is con- 
sidered. 

From such informal reports as were received at the time, 
and from my own observation and knowledge, I estimated 
the effective strength of the Confederate army at Sharps- 
burg at thirty-seven thousand men — twenty-nine thousand 
infantry and eight thousand cavalry and artillery. 

But I am now satisfied, after reference to the official re- 
ports of the Maryland campaign, published by authority of 
the Confederate Congress, that my estimate was excessive. 
Fortunately, these reports are explicit, and enable me to de- 
termine, with almost absolute certainty, the effective strength 
of the army in the battle of Sharpsburg. From them the 
following statement of strength is derived : 

Mansfield's command. In the mean time General Mansfield had been killed, 
and a portion of his corps (formerly Banks's) had also been thrown into con- 
fusion." — General Sumner's testimony, " Report on the Conduct of the War," 
Part I., p. 368. 

1 General Sumner's testimony, " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part 
I., p. 368. 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 71 

The command of General Jackson embraced the division 
under General J. R. Jones and that under General Lawton. 
After General Lawton was wounded, the command of the 
latter division devolved upon General Early. General J. R. 
Jones reports the effective strength of his division to have 
been sixteen hundred 1 when the battle began. General 
Early reports the effective strength of his division as fol- 
lows : Lawton' s brigade, eleven hundred and fifty ; Hays's 
brigade, Rye hundred and fifty; Walker's brigade, seven 
hundred ; and his own brigade, one thousand : total effec- 
tive of the division, thirty-four hundred ; 2 and the total 
effective of Jackson's command was, therefore, five thou- 
sand men. 

The command of General Longstreet, at that time, em- 
braced the six brigades under General D. R. Jones, the two 
brigades under General Hood, and an unattached brigade 
under General !N". G. Evans. His other three brigades were 
temporarily detached, under General R. H. Anderson. 

General Jones reports his strength to have been twenty- 
four hundred and thirty effective. 3 The strength of Hood's 
division at the commencement of the campaign was thirty- 
eight hundred and fifty-two ; 4 General Hood puts the losses 
of his division in its encounters with the enemy previous to 
the battle of Sharpsburg at fifteen hundred and twenty; 5 
this, making no deduction for straggling, would make his 
effective in that engagement but twenty-three hundred and 
thirty-two. General Evans states that his brigade numbered 
twenty-two hundred effective at the opening of the campaign, 6 
and reports his loss in the battles about Manassas at six hun- 
dred and thirty-one ; 7 his brigade was also engaged at South 
Mountain, and could not have exceeded fifteen hundred 

1 " Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," p. 222. 

2 Ibid., pp. 190-196. 3 Ibid., p. 219. 

4 " Return of the Army of Northern Virginia of the 20th of July, 1862," 
chapter xiv. 

6 "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," p. 214. 
6 Ibid., p. 290. 7 Ibid., p. 288. 



72 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

effective at Sharpsburg. General Longstreet's command, 
therefore, numbered six thousand two hundred and sixty-two 
effective. General D. H. Hill in his report puts his effective 
at three thousand * on the morning of the 17th. General K. 
H. Anderson's division, embracing on this occasion the 
brigades of Mahone, Wright, Armistead, Wilcox, Pryor, and 
Featherston, and temporarily assigned to General D. H. Hill, 
is stated by the latter to have been three or four thousand 
strong ; 2 call it thirty-five hundred. 

General A. P. Hill's command consisted of the brigades 
of Branch, Gregg, Archer, Pender, and Brockenborough. 
He states the strength of the first three at two thousand ; 8 
and allowing the average of seven hundred each for the 
other two, we have for his division a total effective of thirty- 
four hundred. The other brigade of this division (Thomas's) 
was left at Harper's Ferry. 

The division of General McLaws consisted of the brigades 
of Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes, and Cobb. He reports the 
effective strength of the four brigades to have been twenty- 
eight hundred and ninety-three. 4 

There remains but the small division of two brigades 
under General J. G. Walker ; General Ransom states his 
effective strength at sixteen hundred & ; General Walker 
does not give the strength of his brigade, but I have put 
it at sixteen hundred, on the authority of General Pansom, 
who says, " So far as my memory serves me, my brigade 
was stronger all the time than the other of Walker's di- 
vision." 

With the exception of the single brigade last mentioned, 
the following recapitulation is established upon indisputable 
and contemporaneous authority, being nothing less than the 
testimony of the commanding officers, as shown by their offi- 
cial reports, made at the time : 

1 "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," p. 114. 

2 Ibid., p. 116. * Ibid., p. 129. 4 Ibid., p. 172. « Ibid., p. 291. 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. ?3 

Longstreet's command 6,262 

Jackson's command 5,000 

D. H. Hill's division 3,000 

R. H. Anderson's division 3,500 

A. P. Hill's division 3,400 

McLaws's division 2,893 

J. G. Walker's division 3,200 

Total effective infantry 27,255 

I cannot verify the estimate made for the cavalry and 
artillery, viz., eight thousand ; but I am sure it is rather ex- 
cessive than the reverse. 

This would make General Lee's entire strength thirty- 
five thousand two hundred and fifty-five. 

General McClellan, in his official report, states that he 
had in action, in the same engagement, eighty-seven thou- 
sand one hundred and sixty-four of all arms. 1 

Those thirty-five thousand Confederates were the very 
flower of the Army of Northern Yirginia, who, with in- 
domitable courage and inflexible tenacity, wrestled for the 
mastery, in the ratio of one to three of their adversaries ; 
and with consummate skill were they manoeuvred and shifted 
from point to point, as different parts of the line of battle 
were in turn assailed with greatest impetuosity. The right 
was called upon to go to the rescue of the left ; the centre 
was reduced to a mere shell in responding to the demands 
for assistance from the right and left ; and A. P. Hill's com- 
mand, the last to arrive from Harper's Ferry, reached the 
field just in time to restore the wavering right. At times 
it appeared as if disaster was inevitable, but succor never 
failed, and night found Lee's lines unbroken and his army 
still defiant. 

The weapon used was admirably tempered ; but much as 
we may praise the blade, we should not forget the extraor- 
dinary skill and vigor with which it was wielded in that 
memorable engagement by the great Confederate leader. 

1 Extract from General McClellan's " Report," " The American Conflict," p. 209. 



74 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

The army of General HcClellan had been too severely 
handled and was too badly broken to justify a renewal of 
the attack. In his testimony before the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, that officer said ( u Report," Part I., p. 
441) : " The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss 
had been so great, and there was so mnch disorganization 
in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper 
to renew the attack that day, especially as I was sure of the 
arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about 
fifteen thousand men. As an instance of the condition of 
some of the troops that morning, I happen to recollect the 
returns of the First Corps — General Hooker's — made the 
morning of the 18th, by which there were about thirty-five 
hundred men reported present for duty. Four days after 
that, the returns of the same corps showed thirteen thou- 
sand five hundred. I had arranged, however, to renew the 
attack at daybreak on the 19th." 

The 18th of September, the day after the battle, passed 
therefore without any serious engagement. General Lee's 
army, as may be inferred, was in no condition to take the 
offensive — and on the night of that day it recrossed the 
Potomac River into Virginia. A force sent by General 
McClellan to harass the Confederate rear-guard under Gen- 
eral A. P. Hill, who had but two thousand muskets, had the 
temerity to cross the Potomac in pursuit. Hill promptly 
made his disposition for battle, and in an incredibly short 
time the attacking force of the enemy was wellnigh anni- 
hilated; such as were not killed, captured, or drowned in 
.the river in their efforts to escape, reached the Maryland 
side in an utterly disorganized and demoralized condition. 1 

After these events, General Lee for some time recruited 

1 " A simultaneous, daring charge was made, and the enemy driven pell-mell 
into the river. Then commenced the most terrible slaughter that this war has 
yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating 
bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account, 
they lost three thousand men killed and drowned from one brigade alone. 
Some two hundred prisoners were taken." — A. P. Hill's " Report." 



KETURN TO VIRGINIA. 75 

his army in the lower Valley of Virginia without moles- 
tation. 



STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES AFTEK THE BATTLE. 

The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia, of 
the 22d of September, 1862, after our return to Virginia and 
when the stragglers left behind in the extraordinary marches 
in Maryland had rejoined their commands, shows present for 
duty thirty-six thousand one hundred and eighty-seven in- 
fantry and artillery ; the cavalry, of which there is no report, 
would perhaps increase these figures to forty thousand of all 
arms. 

The return of the Army of the Potomac, of the 20th of 
September, 1862, shows present for duty, at that date, of the 
commands that participated in the battle of Sharpsburg, 
eighty-five thousand nine hundred and thirty of all arms, as 
follows : * 

General McClellan, staff, engineer brigade, etc 1,393 

First Army-Corps, General Meade 12,237 

Second Army-Corps, General Sumner 13,604 

Fifth Army-Corps, General Porter 19,4*77 

Sixth Army-Corps, General Franklin 11,862 

Ninth Army-Corps, General Burnside 10,734 

Twelfth Army-Corps, General Williams 8,383 

Cavalry corps, General Pleasanton 4,543 

Detached commands at Frederick, Williamsport, and Boones- 

boro 3,697 

85,930 

This is exclusive of Crouch's division of the Fourth 
Corps (seven thousand two hundred and nineteen), which 
reached General McClellan after the battle. The Federal 
loss at Boonesboro and Antietam — or Sharpsburg — was four- 
teen thousand seven hundred and ninety-four. 8 

1 See official return from the Adjutant-General's office, United States Army, 
"Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 492. 

2 Ibid., p. 42. 



76 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

Tidings reached General Lee, soon after his return to Vir- 
ginia, of the serious illness of one of his daughters — the darling 
of his flock. For several days apprehensions were entertained 
that the next intelligence would be of her death. One morn- 
ing the mail was received, and the private letters were dis- 
tributed as was the- custom ; but no one "knew whether any 
home news had been received by the general. At the usual 
hour he summoned me to his presence to know if there were 
any matters of army routine upon which his judgment and 
action were desired. The papers containing a few such cases 
were presented to him ; he reviewed and gave his orders in 
regard to them. I then left him, but for some cause returned 
in a few moments, and with my accustomed freedom entered 
his tent without announcement or ceremony, when I was 
startled and shocked to see him overcome with grief, an 
open letter in his hands. That letter contained the sad in- 
telligence of his daughter's death. 

The reader will probably ask why this incident is intro- 
duced here. 

Although apparently without special significance, it illus- 
trates one of the noblest traits of the character of that noble 
man. He was the father of a tenderly-loved daughter, one 
who appealed with peculiar force to his paternal affection 
and care, and whose sweet presence he was to know no more 
in this world ; but he was also charged with the command 
of an important and active army, to whose keeping to a great 
extent were intrusted the safety and honor of the Southern 
Confederacy. Lee the man must give way to Lee the patriot 
and soldier. His army demanded his first thought and care ; 
to his men, to their needs, he must first attend, and then he 
could surrender himself to his private, personal affairs. Who 
can tell with what anguish of soul he endeavored to control 
himself, and to maintain a calm exterior, and who can esti- 
mate the immense effort necessary to still the heart filled 
to overflowing with tenderest emotions, and to give attention 
to the important trusts committed to him, before permitting 



RETURN TO VIRGINIA. 77 

the more selfish indulgence of private meditation, grief, and 
prayer ? Duty first, was the rule of his life, and his every 
thought, word, and action, was made to square with duty's 
inexorable demands. 

Scarcely less to be admired than his sublime devotion to 
duty was his remarkable self-control. General Lee was 
naturally of a positive temperament, and of strong passions ; 
and it is a mistake to suppose him otherwise ; but he held 
these in complete subjection to his will and conscience. He 
was not one of those invariably amiable men whose temper 
is never ruffled ; but when we consider the immense burden 
which rested upon him, and the numberless causes for an- 
noyance with which he had to contend, the occasional crop- 
ping-out of temper which we, who were constantly near him, 
witnessed, only showed how great was his habitual self-com- 
mand. 

He had a great dislike to reviewing army communica- 
tions : this was so thoroughly appreciated by me that I would 
never present a paper for his action, unless it was of decided 
importance, and of a nature to demand his judgment and de- 
cision. On one occasion when an audience had not been 
asked of him for several days, it became necessary to have 
one. The few papers requiring his action were submitted. 
He was not in a very pleasant mood ; something irritated 
him, and he manifested his ill-humor by a little nervous 
twist or jerk of the neck and head, peculiar to himself, ac- 
companied by some harshness of manner. This was per- 
ceived by me, and I hastily concluded that my efforts to save 
him annoyance were not appreciated. In disposing of some 
case of a vexatious character, matters reached a climax ; he 
became really worried, and, forgetting what was due to my 
superior, I petulantly threw the paper down at my side and 
gave evident signs of anger. Then, in a perfectly calm and 
measured tone of voice, he said, " Colonel Taylor, when I 
lose my temper, don't you let it make you angry." 

"Was there ever a more gentle and considerate and yet so 



78 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

positive a reproof ? How magnanimous in the great soldier, 
and yet how crashing to the subordinate ! The rash and dis- 
respectful conduct of the latter would have justified, if it did 
not demand, summary treatment at the hands of the former. 
Instead of this, the first man of his day and generation, great 
and glorious in his humility, condescended to occupy the 
same plane with his youthful subaltern, and to reason with 
him as an equal, frankly acknowledging his own imperfec- 
tions, but kindly reminding the inferior at the same time of 
his duty and his position. 






CHAPTEE VII. 

Battle of Fredericksburg. — Federal Army One Hundred Thousand strong : Con- 
federate Army Seventy-eight Thousand strong. — Battle of Chancellorsville. 
— Federal Army One Hundred and Thirty-two Thousand strong: Confed- 
erate Army Fifty-seven Thousand strong. 

In the latter part of October, 1862, General McClellan 
moved his army to the south side of the Potomac, east of the 
mountains. On the 4th of November he occupied Ashby's 
Gap. His entire army was now concentrated in the neigh- 
borhood of Warrenton. He was at this time again relieved 
of the command of the Army of the Potomac, and General 
Burnside was appointed to succeed him. After a confer- 
ence with General-in-chief Halleck, the new commander de- 
termined by a rapid movement to secure possession of Fred- 
ericksburg, from which point as a base he proposed to renew 
the advance upon the Confederate capital. General Lee, 
whose army at the commencement of these movements was 
concentrated in the lower Yalley of Virginia, had not been 
meanwhile inactive. Closely scrutinizing every movement 
of the enemy, he seemed, by intuition, to divine his purpose, 
and promptly made such disposition as was necessary to fore- 
stall him. 

"When General Burnside's intention to move upon Fred- 
ericksburg was fully developed, General Lee ordered Long- 
street to that point, and directed Jackson, who was still in 
the Yalley, to move rapidly on Orange Court-House. 

Sumner's grand division led the van of the Federal army, 
and its advance arrived opposite Fredericksburg on the af ter- 



X 



80 FOUR YEARS WITH GEXERAL LEE. 

noon of the 17th of November. lS"o serious effort was made 
by General Sumner to cross the river and occupy the town, 
and time was thus afforded for the advance divisions of the 
Confederates to reach the point threatened ; so that when the 
Federal commander arrived opposite, doubtless to his sur- 
prise he found no despicable array of Confederate bayonets 
prepared to dispute his passage of the river. "With his entire 
army he soon occupied Stafford Heights ; and, casting his 
eye southward beyond the level plain or belt which skirts 
the south bank of the river, he saw the Army of Northern 
Yirginia strongly posted upon the range of hills overlooking 
the intervening plain. Again General Lee gave " check ! " 

The nature of the ground rendered it an easy matter for 
the Federal commander to control the southern bank of the 
river. On the 11th of December he threw a force across, 
and occupied the town. The entire army, with the excep- 
tion of one corps, under General Hooker, followed, and by 
the evening of the 12th was well established on the south 
side. 1 As the fog lifted on the morning of the 13th, the 
Confederates beheld the Army of the Potomac drawn up in 
most imposing array, fully one hundred thousand strong, 3 
stretching from above Fredericksburg to Deep Run. It was 
a grand and beautiful sight ; rarely is one more glorious 
vouchsafed to mortal eye. And now, as the command is 
given to the Federal troops to advance, a new interest, a 
spirit of intense excitement, is added to the scene ; and as 
the whole line of blue — solid and regular, bristling with the 
glittering bayonets — moves steadily forward, accompanied by 
the deafening roar of the artillery, the eye taking in the 
whole panorama at a glance, men hold their breath, and 
realize that war is indeed as glorious as it is terrible. 

1 Three divisions of Hooker's corps followed on the 13th, and are included 
in the estimate of the Federal strength. 

2 General Burnside testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War that he had a hundred thousand men on the south side of the river, and in 
action.— "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 656. 



THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 81 

The Federal soldiers advanced right gallantly to the des- 
perate work assigned them ; time and again was the assault 
renewed on the right and on the left of the Confederate line, 
but all in vain. The cool, steady veterans of Lee, under the 
protection of their hastily-constructed or extemporized works, 
made terrible havoc in the ranks of the assailing columns ; 
and division after division recoiled from the terrible shock, 
shattered, discomfited, and demoralized. Their allotted task 
exceeded human endeavor ; and no shame to them that, after 
such courageous and brilliant conduct, their efforts lacked 
success. Less than twenty thousand Confederate troops 
(about one-fourth of the army under General Lee) x were 
actively engaged. It was certainly the most easily won of 
all the grand battles of the war, and it was, indeed, the most 
exhilarating and inspiring to look upon, as beheld from the 
summit of one of the hills occupied by our troops, where 
army headquarters were temporarily established. 

Contrary to the expectation of General Lee, the assault 
was not renewed, 2 and, on the night of the 15th, General 
Burnside retired his army from the south side of the river, 
and resumed his former position on Stafford Heights. 

Much has been said and written about a proposition having 
been made to General Lee by General Jackson, that he be 
allowed to make a night-attack on the enemy after his re- 
pulse. Some of the features of this alleged proposition, as 
published some years ago, are so absurd as to carry in thern- 

1 The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia show that on the 10th De- 
cember, 1862, General Lee had present for duty seventy-eight thousand two 
hundred and twenty-eight, and, on the 20th December, seventy-five thousand 
five hundred and twenty-four of all arms, including the reserve artillery, parked 
some distance in the rear. 

2 " The attack on the 13th had been so easily repulsed, and by so small a 
part of our army, that it was not supposed the enemy would limit his efforts to 
one attempt, which, in view of the magnitude of his preparations and the extent 
of his force, seemed to be comparatively insignificant. Believing, therefore, 
that he would attack us, it was not deemed expedient to lose the advantages of 
our position, and expose the troops to the fire of his inaccessible batteries be- 
yond the river, by advancing against him." — General Lee's " Report." 

6 



82 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

selves evidence of their fictitious character. I can only say 
that I never heard of any such proposition, and I have excel- 
lent authority for asserting, as I do, that none such was ever 
made. 

In speaking of the engagement, General Jackson has the 
following in his official report : " Repulsed on the right, left, 
and centre, the enemy soon after reformed his lines, and 
gave some indications of a purpose to renew the attack. I 
waited some time to receive it ; but he making no forward 
movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The 
artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make 
an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous ; yet 
it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, 
as to induce me to make preparations for the attempt. In 
order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be pre- 
ceded by artillery, and the movement postponed until late in 
the evening, so that, if compelled to retire, it would be under 
the cover of night. Owing to unexpected delay, the move- 
ment could not be gotten ready until late in the evening. 
The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood a 
hundred yards, when the enemy's artillery reopened, and so 
completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed 
movement should be abandoned." In this, perhaps, is to be 
found the explanation of, and all of truth there is in, the 
report referred to. 

For several months after this the army rested in winter- 
quarters, and nothing of special interest occurred, save an 
abortive attempt made in the midst of winter by General 
Burnside to cross the river at United States Ford, in which 
attempt he was completely foiled by the execrable condition 
of the roads, and his troops, after floundering in the mud for 
several days, returned to their camps. 

The Confederate artillery, or a large portion thereof, 
which was parked in the rear, near the railroad, for greater 
convenience in supplying the animals with food, was ordered 
forward by General Jackson — General Lee being in Rich- 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 83 

mortd at the time — as soon as intimation of the purpose of 
General Burnside was disclosed, and was much damaged in 
its hasty but (as events proved) unnecessary efforts to get to 
the front. General Burnside was compelled to relinquish 
whatever design he had entertained, and quiet was again 
established in the two opposing armies. 

Aetive operations were resumed in the spring. General 
Hooker, whose turn it now was, under Federal dispensation, 
to wrestle with General Lee, crossed the Bappahannock in 
the latter part of April, 1863 ; took position at Chancellors- 
ville, and constructed a formidable line of earthworks, from 
which secure position he proposed to move on General Lee's 
flank. 

Of all the battles fought by the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, that of Chancellorsville stands first, as illustrating the 
consummate audacity and military skill of commanders, and 
the valor and determination of the men. General Lee, with 
fifty-seven thousand troops of all arms, intrenched along the 
line of hills south of the Rappahannock, near Fredericks- 
burg, was confronted by General Hooker, with the Army of 
the Potomac, one hundred and thirty-two thousand strong, 
occupying the bluffs on the opposite side of the river. 

On the 29th of April the Federal commander essayed to 
put into execution an admirably-conceived plan of operations, 
from which he doubtless concluded that he could compel 
either the evacuation by General Lee of his strongly-fortified 
position, or else his utter discomfiture when unexpectedly 
and vigorously assailed upon his left flank and rear by the 
" finest army on the planet " — really more than twice the 
size of his own. 

A formidable force, under General Sedgwick, was thrown 
across the river below Fredericksburg, and made demonstra- 
tions of an intention to assail the Confederate front. Mean- 
while, with great celerity and secrecy, General Hooker, with 
the bulk of his army, crossed at the upper fords, and, in an 
able manner and wonderfully short time, had concentrated 



84 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

four of his seven army-corps, 1 numbering fifty-six thousand 
men, at Chancellorsville, about ten miles west of Fredericks- 
burg. His purpose was now fully developed to General Lee 
who, instead of awaiting its further prosecution, immediately 
determined on the movement the least expected by his oppo-, 
nent. He neither proceeded to make strong his left against 
attack from the direction of Chancellorsville, nor did he 
move southward, so as to put his army between that of Gen- 
eral Hooker and the Confederate capital ; but, leaving Gen- 
eral Early, with about nine thousand men, to take care of 
General Sedgwick, he moved with the remainder of his 
army, numbering forty-eight thousand men, toward Chancel- 
lorsville. As soon as the advance of the enemy was encoun- 
tered, it was attacked with vigor, and very soon the Federal 
army was on the defensive in its apparently impregnable 
position. It was not the part of wisdom to attempt to storm 
this stronghold ; but Sedgwick would certainly soon be at 
work in the rear, and Early, with his inadequate force, could 
not do more than delay and harass him. It was, therefore, 
imperatively necessary to strike — to strike boldly, effectively, 
and at once. There could be no delay. Meanwhile two 
more army-corps had joined General Hooker, who now had 
about Chancellorsville ninety -one thousand men — six corps, 
except one division of the Second Corps (Couch's), which had 
been left with Sedgwick, at Fredericksburg. It was a criti- 
cal position for the Confederate commander, but his confi- 
dence in his trusted lieutenant and brave men was such that 
he did not long hesitate. Encouraged by the counsel and 
confidence of General Jackson, he determined still further 
to divide his army ; and while he, with the divisions of An- 
derson and McLaws, less than fourteen thousand men, 
should hold the enemy in his front, he would hurl Jackson 
upon his flank and rear, and crush and crumble him as be- 
tween the upper and nether millstone. The very boldness 
of the movement contributed much to insure its success. 

1 Except one division. 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVI^LE. 85 

This battle illustrates most admirably the peculiar talent 
and individual excellence of Lee and Jackson. For quick- 
ness of perception, boldness in planning, and skill in direct- 
ing, General Lee had no superior : for celerity in his move- 
ments, audacity in the execution of bold designs and impetu- 
osity in attacking, General Jackson had not his peer. 

The flank movement of Jackson's wing was attended 
with extraordinary success. Ou the afternoon of the 2d of 
May he struck such a blow to the enemy on their extreme 
right as to cause dismay and demoralizatian to their entire 
army ; this advantage was promptly and vigorously followed 
up the next day, when Generals Lee and Stuart (the latter 
then in command of Jackson's wing) 1 joined elbows ; and 
after most heroic and determined effort, their now united 
forces finally succeeded in storming and capturing the works 
of the enemy. 

Meantime Sedgwick had forced Early out of the heights 
at Fredericksburg, and had advanced toward Chancellors- 
ville, thus threatening the Confederate rear. General Lee 
having defeated the greater force, and driven it from its 
stronghold, now gathered up a few of the most available of 
his victorious brigades, and turned upon the lesser. 

On the 3d of May Sedgwick's force was encountered in 
the vicinity of Salem Church, and its further progress checked 
by General McLaws, with the five brigades detached by 
General Lee for this service — including "Wilcox's, which had 
been stationed at Banks's Ford. On the next day General 
Anderson was sent to reenforce McLaws with three addition- 
al brigades. Meanwhile, General Early had connected with 
these troops, and in the afternoon, so soon as dispositions 
could be made for attack, Sedgwick's lines were promptly 
assailed and broken — the main assault being made on the 
enemy's left by Early's troops. The situation was now a 

1 General Jackson fell mortally wounded late in the evening of the 2d ; 
General A. P. Hill, who would have succeeded to the command of Jackson's 
wing, was also wounded, and General Stuart assumed the command. 



86 FOUR YEARS WITH GEXERAL LEE. 

critical one for the Federal lieutenant. Darkness came to 
his rescue, and on the night of the 4th he crossed to the north 
side of the river. 

On the 5th General Lee concentrated for another assault 
on the new line taken up by General Hooker ; but on the 
morning of the 6th it was ascertained that the enemy, in 
General Lee's language, "had sought Safety beyond the 
Rappahannock," and the river flowed again between the 
hostile hosts. 

Glorious as was the result of this battle to the Confeder- 
ate arms, it was accompanied by a calamity in the contem- 
plation of which the most brilliant victory of that incompar- 
able army must ever be regarded as a supreme disaster. The 
star of Confederate destiny reached its zenith on the 2d day 
of May, when Jackson fell wounded at the head of his vic- 
torious troops ; it began to set on the 10th of May, when 
Jackson was no more. 



STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 

In confirmation of the figures just given as representing 
the strength of the two armies, I submit the following : Gen- 
eral Longstreet with a portion of his corps was at this time 
operating on the south side of James Eiver, in the neigh- 
borhood of Suffolk. Of his command there remained with 
General Lee but the two divisions of Generals McLaws and 
Anderson. The official return of the Army of JSTorthern 
Yirginia, of March 31, 1863, after a long period of rest and 
recruiting, and when perhaps the several commands attained 
their greatest strength, shows, as present for duty : 

Anderson's and McLaws's divisions 15,649 

Jackson's command 33,333 

Cavalry 6,509 

Reserve artillery (parked in rear) 1,621 

Total of all arms 57,112 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORS YILLE. 87 

I exclude the troops serving in the Yalley district — thirty- 
one hundred and eighty-six — included in the departmental 
return, but not available at Fredericksburg. This return is 
the nearest x to the date of the battle of Chancellorsville of all 
those in the archive-office at Washington, and of all npw in 
existence known to me. 1 General Early had with him at 
Fredericksburg his own division, and one brigade of another 
— in all, according to his statement, nine thousand men. 
General Lee remained in front of General Hooker at Chan- 
cellorsville with fourteen thousand men, viz., the two di- 
visions of McLaws and Anderson, with the exception of 
Barksdale's brigade left with General Early ; this estimate 
includes Wilcox's brigade at Banks's Ford. General Jackson 
had with him in his flanking movement his command, less 
Early's division, in round numbers say twenty-six thousand 
men. General Stuart had six thousand five hundred and 
nine sabres with which to oppose the cavalry column of the 
Federals, numbering twelve thousand men. 

In regard to the Federal strength, I have adopted the 
figures given in the book of Mr. Swinton, confirmed by the 
evidence given before the Congressional Committee on the 
Conduct of the War. The Army of the Potomac, under Gen- 
eral Hooker, consisted of seven army-corps and a body of 
horse, numbering one hundred and thirty-two thousand 2 
present for duty, as follows : 

1 On the 20th of May, 1863, two weeks after the battle, and when Pickett's 
and Hood's divisions had rejoined the army, the total infantry force numbered 
but fifty-five thousand two hundred and sixty-one effective, from which if the 
strength of Pickett's and Hood's divisions is deducted, there would remain forty- 
ODe thousand three hundred and fifty-eight as the strength of the commands 
that participated in the battle of Chancellorsville, on the 20th of May. — See 
" Return " of the 20th of May, 1863, chapter xiv. 

2 " It " (the Army of the Potomac) " numbered one hundred and twenty thou- 
sand men, infantry and artillery, with a body of twelve thousand well-equipped 
cavalry, and a powerful artillery force of above four hundred guns." — Swinton's 
" Army of the Potomac," p. 269. In a foot-note Mr. Swinton thus substantiates 
his estimate of the infantry and artillery : " This estimate is approximate; the 
data are as follows : the effective of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps was 



88 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

The Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Army-Corps 44,661 

The Sixth Army-Corps 22,000 

The First and Third Army-Corps 35,000 

The Second Army-Corps 18,000 

Total infantry and artillery 119,661 

And the corps of cavalry 12,000 

Total of all arms 131,661 

General Sedgwick's force at Falmouth and Fredericks- 
burg originally consisted of the First, Third, and Sixth Army- 
Corps, and one division of the Second Corps, and numbered 
sixty-three thousand men, though only a portion crossed the 
river ; it was subsequently reduced to twenty-eight thousand 
by the withdrawal of the First and Third Corps, w T hich 
joined General Hooker. The latter, when he first moved 
to Chancellorsville, had with him the Fifth, Eleventh, 
Twelfth, and Second Corps (save one division with Sedg- 
wick), numbering, according to the returns, fifty-six thousand 
men; and when he was subsequently joined by the First and 
Third Corps — thirty-five thousand strong (that is, previous 
to the assault by General Lee at Chancellorsville) — he must 
have had with him nearly ninety thousand men. It has al- 
ready been shown that in the assault General Lee had but 
forty thousand men. 

In this comparative statement of strength I have fol- 
lowed the official returns as to both armies. It is proper to 
state that General Hooker in his testimony before the Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the "War (second series, vol. i., p. 
120) puts the effective strength of the Fifth, Eleventh, and 
Twelfth Corps, at Chancellorsville, at thirty-six thousand 

put by General Hooker, just before Chancellorsville, at forty-four thousand six 
hundred and sixty-one (' Report on the Conduct of the War,' second series, vol. 
i., p. 120). The effective of the Sixth Corps is given by General Sedgwick (ibid., 
p. 95) as twenty-two thousand ; and the effective of the First and Third Corps, 
by the same authority, was thirty-five thousand. There remains the Second 
Corps, to which if we give a minimum of eighteen thousand, there will result 
the aggregate of one hundred and nineteen thousand six hundred and sixty- 
one." 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 89 

men. He explains the discrepancy between this and the 
strength of these corps on the 30th of April, viz., forty-four 
thousand six hundred and sixty-one, by stating that the re- 
turns included the artillery, and that the greater portion of 
the latter did not march with the corps ; he also excludes 
heavy detachments left with the trains, "as well as regi- 
ments left behind for discharge" (from service?). Now, the 
same necessity existed for General Lee to guard his trains ; 
and, of his strength, quite as large a proportion of the artil- 
lery was not up. None of the reserve artillery which I have 
included in my estimate of the Confederate strength was 
engaged, being some miles in rear at the time. But even 
adopting General Hooker's estimate of the three corps men- 
tioned, then adding twelve thousand for that portion of the 
Second which joined him (all but Gibbon's division), and the 
First and Third Corps — thirty-five thousand, as given by 
General Sedgwick — and his strength at Chancellorsville, ex- 
clusive of Pleasanton's cavalry, was eighty-three thousand. 
The testimony of General Hancock and General Sedgwick 
confirms this estimate. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

The Pennsylvania Campaign. — The Battle of Gettysburg. — Strength of the 
Opposing Armies. 

From the very necessities of the case, the general theory 
upon which the war was conducted on the part of the South 
was one of defense. The great superiority of the North in 
men and material made it indispensable for the South to 
husband its resources as much as possible, inasmuch as the 
hope of ultimate success which the latter entertained, rested 
rather upon the dissatisfaction and pecuniary distress which 
a prolonged war would entail upon the former — making the 
people weary of the struggle — than upon any expectation of 
conquering a peace by actually subduing so powerful an ad- 
versary. 

Nevertheless, in the judgment of General Lee, it was a 
part of a true defensive policy to take the aggressive when 
good opportunity offered; and by delivering an effective 
blow to the enemy, not only to inflict upon him serious loss, 
but at the same time to thwart his designs of invasion, 
derange the plan of campaign contemplated by him, and 
thus prolong the conflict. 

The Federal army, under General Hooker, had now re- 
occupied the heights opposite Fredericksburg, where it could 
not be attacked except at a disadvantage. Instead of quietly 
awaiting the pleasure of the Federal commander in design- 
ing and putting into execution some new plan of campaign, 
General Lee determined to manoeuvre to draw him from his 
impregnable position and if possible to remove the scene of 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 91 

hostilities beyond the Potomac. His design was to free the 
State of Virginia, for a time at least, from the presence of 
the enemy, to transfer the theatre of war to Northern soil, 
and, by selecting a favorable time and place in which to 
receive the attack which his adversary would be compelled 
to make on him, to take the reasonable chances of defeating 
him in a pitched battle ; knowing full well that to obtain 
such an advantage there would place him in position to 
attain far more decisive results than could be hoped for 
from a like advantage gained in Virginia. But even if un- 
able to attain the valuable results which might be expected 
to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in 
Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was thought that the move- 
ment would at least so far disturb the Federal plan for the 
summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the 
season for active operations. 1 

In pursuance of this design, early in the month of June, 
General Lee moved his army northward by way of Cul- 
peper, and thence to and down the Valley of Virginia to 
Winchester. 

The army had now been reorganized into three army- 
corps, designated the First, Second, and Third Corps, and 
commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, 
Ewell, and A. P. Hill. 

The Second Corps was in advance, and crossed the 
branches of the Shenandoah, near Front Poyal, on the 12th 
of June. Brushing aside the force of the enemy under Gen- 
eral Milroy, that occupied the lower Valley — most of which 
was captured and the remnant of which sought refuge in the 
fortifications at Harper's Ferry a — General Ewell crossed the 

1 General Lee's " Report." 

2 " These operations resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the Valley, 
the capture of four thousand prisoners, with a corresponding number of small- 
arms, twenty-eight pieces of superior artillery, including those taken by Gen- 
eral Rodes and General Hays, about three hundred wagons and as many horses, 
together with a considerable quantity of ordnance, commissary, and quarter- 
master's stores." — General Lee's " Report of the Pennsylvania Campaign." 



92 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

Potomac River with his three divisions in the latter part of 
June, and, in pursuance of the orders of General Lee, trav- 
ersed Maryland and advanced into Pennsylvania. 

General A. P. Hill, whose corps was the last to leave the 
line of the Rappahannock, followed with his three divisions 
in Ewell's rear. General Longstreet covered these move- 
ments with his corps ; then moved by Ashby's and Snicker's 
Gaps into the Yalley and likewise crossed the Potomac 
River, leaving to General Stuart the task of holding the 
gaps of the Blue Ridge Mountains with his corps of cavalry. 

The Federal commander had meanwhile moved his army 
so as to cover "Washington City; and, as soon as he was 
thoroughly informed, by Ewell's rapid advance, of the real 
intention of his adversary, he too crossed into Maryland. 

On the 27th of June General Lee was near Chambers- 
burg with the First and Third Corps, the Second being still 
in advance, but within supporting distance. 

With the exception of the cavalry, the army was well in 
hand. The absence of that indispensable arm of the service 
was most seriously felt by General Lee. He had directed 
General Stuart to use his discretion as to where and when 
to cross the river — that is, he was to cross east of the moun- 
tains, or retire through the mountain-passes into the Yalley 
and cross in the immediate rear of the infantry, as the move- 
ments of the enemy and his own judgment should deter- 
mine — but he was expected to maintain communication with 
the main column, and especially directed to keep the com- 
manding general informed of the movements of the Federal 
army. 

The army continued to advance. On the 1st of July 
General Lee reached Cashtown and stopped to confer with 
General A. P. Hill, whose corps was concentrating at that 
point, and who reported that the advance of Heth's division 
had encountered the cavalry of the enemy near Gettysburg. 
Instructions had been sent to General Heth to ascertain 
what force was at Gettysburg, and, if he found infantry 



TEE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 93 

opposed to him, to report the fact immediately, without 
forcing an engagement. 

No tidings whatever had been received from or of our 
cavalry under General Stuart since crossing the river ; and 
General Lee was consequently without accurate information 
of the movements or position of the main Federal army. 1 
An army without cavalry in a strange and hostile country is 
as a man deprived of his eyesight and beset by enemies ; he 
may be never so brave and strong, but he cannot intelli- 
gently administer a single effective blow. 

The sound of artillery was soon heard in the direction of 
Gettysburg. General Hill hastened to the front. General 
Lee followed. 

On arriving at the scene of battle, General Lee ascer- 
tained that the enemy's infantry and artillery were present in 
considerable force. Heth's division was already hotly en- 
gaged, and it was soon evident that a serious engagement 
could not be avoided. 

Orders had previously been sent to General Ewell to re- 
call his advanced divisions, and to concentrate about Cash- 
town. "While en route for that point, on the morning of the 
1st of July, General Ewell learned that Hill's corps was mov- 
ing toward Gettysburg, and, on arriving at Middletown, he 

1 " On the morning of the 29th of June the Third Corps, composed of the divis- 
ions of Major-Generals Anderson, Heth, and Pender, and five battalions of artil- 
lery, under command of Colonel R. L. Walker, was encamp'ed on the road from 
Chambersburg to Gettysburg, near the village of Fayetteville. I was directed 
to move on this road in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehanna, 
menacing the communications of Harrisburg with Philadelphia, and to coop- 
erate with General Ewell, acting as circumstances might require. Accordingly, 
on the 29th I moved General Heth's division to Cashtown, some eight miles 
from Gettysburg, following on the morning of the 30th with the division of Gen- 
eral Pender, and directing General Anderson to move in the same direction on 
.the morning of the 1st of July. On arriving at Cashtown General Heth, who 
had sent forward Pettigrew's brigade to Gettysburg, reported that Pettigrew 
had encountered the enemy at Gettysburg, principally cavalry, but in what 
force he could not determine. A courier was then dispatched with this informa- 
tion to the general commanding." — Extract from A. P. Hill's " Report," " South- 
ern Historical Society Papers," November, 18Y6. 



94 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

turned the head of his column in that direction. "When 
within a few miles of the town, General Bodes, whose divis- 
ion was in advance, was made aware, by the sharp cannon- 
ading, of the presence of the enemy in force at Gettysburg, 
and caused immediate preparations for battle to be made. 

On reaching the scene of conflict, General Bodes made 
his dispositions to assail the force with which Hill's troops 
were engaged, but no sooner were his lines formed than he 
perceived fresh troops of the enemy extending their right 
flank, and deploying in his immediate front. "With this 
force he was soon actively engaged. The contest now be- 
came sharp and earnest. Neither side sought or expected a 
general engagement ; and yet, brought thus unexpectedly in 
the presence of each other, found a conflict unavoidable. 

The battle continued, with varying success, until perhaps 
3 p. m., when General Early, of E well's corps, reached the 
field with his division, moved in on Bodes' s left, and attacked 
r- the enemy with his accustomed vigor and impetuosity. This 
decided the contest. The enemy's right gave way under 
Early's assault. Pender's division, of Hill's corps, had mean- 
while been advanced to relieve that of Heth ; and Eodes, 
observing the effect of Early's attack, ordered his line for- 
ward. There resulted a general and irresistible advance of 
our entire line ; the enemy gave way at all points, and were 
driven in disorder through and beyond the town of Gettys- 
burg, leaving over five thousand prisoners in our hands. 

In this action the force engaged on the Confederate side, 
as already stated, consisted of the divisions of Heth and Pen- 
der, of Hill's corps, and those of Early and Eodes, of Ewell's 
corps. On the side of the Federals there was the First 
Corps, embracing the divisions of "Wadsworth, Doubleday, 
and Eobinson ; the Eleventh Corps, embracing the divisions 
of Schurz, Barlow, and Steinwehr; and the cavalry force 
under General Buford. The infantry force on each side was 
about the same, 1 and the preponderance in numbers was with 

1 The four divisions of Confederates had an average strength of six thousand 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 95 

the Federals, to the extent of General Buford's cavalry 
command. 

General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through 
Gettysburg and up the hills beyond. He then directed me 
to go to General Ewell and to say to him that, from the 
position which he occupied, he could see the enemy retreat- 
ing over those hills, without organization and in great con- 
fusion, that it was only necessary to press " those people " 
in order to secure possession of the heights, and that, if pos- 
sible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these in- 
structions, I proceeded immediately to General Ewell and 
delivered the order of General Lee ; and, after receiving 
from him some message for the commanding general in re- 
gard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter and 
reported that his order had been delivered. 

General Ewell did not express any objection, or indicate 
the existence of any impediment, to the execution of the 
order conveyed to him, but left the impression upon my mind 
that it would be executed. In the exercise of that discre- 
tion, however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord 
to his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard 
for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate 
a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it unwise to 
make the pursuit. The troops were not moved forward, 
and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the po- 

wben General Lee started on this campaign, reduced at this date to about five 
thousand five hundred, as will be shown later in this narrative ; making the 
total engaged in the action of the first day twenty-two thousand. It could not 
have exceeded twenty-four thousand. General Butterfield, chief of staff of the 
Army of the Potomac, testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War (" Report," second series, p. 428) that on the 10th of June the First 
Corps had eleven thousand three hundred and fifty, and the Eleventh Corps ten 
thousand one hundred and seventy-seven, present for duty ; and that previous to 
the battle of Gettysburg the First Corps was increased by the addition of Stan- 
nard's Vermont Brigade. It would appear, then, that the First and Eleventh 
Corps, at the time of the engagement, had a total strength of from twenty-two 
to twenty-four thousand. Mr. Swinton puts the loss sustained by these two 
corps at " near ten thousand men." 







96 FOUR TEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

sition which it was designed that General Ewell should 
seize. 

Major-General Edward Johnson, whose division reached 
the field after the engagement, and formed on the left of 
Early, in a conversation had with me, since the war, about 
this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our 
inaction at that time, assured me that there was no hinderance 
to his moving forward ; but that, after getting his command 
in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged or 
had advanced any great distance, for some unexplained rea- 
son, he had received orders to halt. This was after General 
Lee's message was delivered to General Ewell. 

Such was the condition of affairs when darkness veiled 
the scene on the evening of the first day. The prevailing 
idea with General Lee was, to press forward without delay ; 
to follow up promptly and vigorously the advantage already 
gained. Having failed to reap the full fruit of the victory 
before night, his mind was evidently occupied with the idea 
of renewing the assault upon the enemy's right with the 
dawn of day on the second. The divisions of Major-Gen- 
erals Early and Bodes, of Ewell's corps, had been actively 
engaged, and had sustained some loss, but were still in ex- 
cellent condition, and in the full enjoyment of the prestige 
of success and a consequent elation of spirit, in having so 
gallantly swept the enemy from their front, through the 
town of Gettysburg, and compelled him to seek refuge be- 
hind the heights beyond. The division of Major-General 
Edward Johnson, of the same corps, was perfectly fresh, not 
having been engaged. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, 
was also now up. With this force General Lee thought that 
the enemy's position could be assailed with every prospect 
of success ; but, after a conference with the corps and divis- 
ion commanders on our left, who represented that, in their 
judgment, it would be hazardous to attempt to storm the 
strong position occupied by the enemy, with troops some- 
what fagged by the marching and fighting of the first day ; 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 97 

that the ground in their immediate front furnished greater 
obstacles to a successful assault than existed at other points 
of the line, and that it could be reasonably concluded, since 
they had so severely handled the enemy in their front, that 
he would concentrate and fortify with special reference to 
resisting a further advance just there, he determined to make 
the main attack well on the enemy's left, indulging the hope 
that Longstreet's corps would be up in time to begin the 
movement at an early hour on the 2d. He instructed Gen- 
eral Ewell to be prepared to cooperate by a simultaneous ad- 
vance by his corps. General Longstreet was unexpectedly 
detained, however, as will best appear from the following 
extract from his report of the Gettysburg campaign. In 
speaking of his movements on the 1st day of July, he says : 

Our march on this day was greatly delayed by Johnson's 
division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from 
Shippensburg, and the long wagon-trains that followed him. 
McLaws's division, however, reached Marsh Creek, four miles 
from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division got 
within nearly the same distance of the town about twelve o'clock 
at night. Law's brigade was ordered forward to its division dur- 
ing the day, and joined about noon on the 2d. 

Previous to his joining I received instructions from the 
commanding general to move with the portion of my command 
that was up around to gain the Emmettsburg road on the en- 
emy's left. The enemy, having been driven back by the corps 
of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill the clay previous, 
had taken a strong position extending from the hill at the cem- 
etery along the Emmettsburg road. 

Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an 
attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its divis- 
ion. As soon after his arrival as we could make our prepara- 
tions, the movement was begun. 

Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself, 

guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the 

move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. 

McLaws's division got into position opposite the enemy's left 

7 



98 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

about 4 P. m. Hood's division was moved on farther to our right, 
and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left. 

General Longstreet here explains the cause of the delay 
in bringing up his troops on the first day ; but, notwith- 
standing this, the divisions of Hood and McLaws (with the 
exception of Law's brigade) encamped within four miles of 
Gettysburg at midnight of the 1st of July. He then re- 
ceived instructions to move with the portion of his command 
that was then tip, to gain the Emmettsburg road on the 
enemy's left; but fearing that his force was too weak to 
venture to make an attack, he delayed until Law's brigade 
joined its division, about noon on the 2d. 

In this, General Longstreet clearly admits that he as- 
sumed the responsibility of postponing the execution of the 
orders of the commanding general. Owing to the causes 
assigned, the troops were not in position to attack until 4 
p. m. One can imagine what was going on in the Federal 
lines meanwhile. Bound Top, the key to their position, 
which was not occupied in the morning, they now held in 
force, and another corps (Sedgwick's) had reached the field. 

Late as it was, the original plan was adhered to. The 
two divisions of Longstreet's corps gallantly advanced, forced 
the enemy back a considerable distance, and captured some 
trophies and prisoners. 

Ewell's divisions were ordered forward, and likewise 
gained additional ground and trophies. 

On Cemetery Hill the attack by Early's leading brigades 
was made with vigor. They drove the enemy back into the 
works on the crest, into which they forced their way, and 
seized several pieces of artillery ; but they were compelled 
to relinquish what they had gained, from want of expected 
support on their right, and retired to their original position, 
bringing with them some prisoners and four stands of colors. 
In explanation of this lack of expected support, General 
Kodes, who was on General Early's right, states in his report 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 99 

that after lie had conferred with General Early, on his left, 
and General Lane, on his right, and arranged to attack in 
concert, he proceeded at once to make the necessary prepara- 
tions ; but as he had to draw his troops out of the town by 
the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then 
traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards, 
while General Early had to move only half that distance, 
without change of front, it resulted that, before he drove in 
the enemy's skirmishers, General Early had attacked, and 
been compelled to withdraw. 

CThe whole affair was disjointed. There was an utter 
absence of accord in the movements of the several com- 1 
mands, and no decisive result attended the operations of the / 
second day. 

It is generally conceded that General Longstreet, on this 
occasion, was fairly chargeable with tardiness, and I have 
always thought that his conduct, in this particular, was due 
to a lack of appreciation on his part of the circumstances 
which created an urgent and peculiar need for the presence 
of his troops at the front. 

As soon as the necessity for the concentration of the 
army was precipitated by the unexpected encounter on the 
1st of July with a large force of the enemy near Gettysburg, 
General Longstreet was urged to hasten his march, and this, 
perhaps, should have sufficed to cause him to push his 
divisions on toward Gettysburg, from which point he was 
distant but four miles, early on the 2d ; but I cannot say that • 
he was notified, on the night of the 1st, of the attack pro- 
posed to be made on the morning of the 2d, and the part his 
corps was to take therein. Neither do I think it just to 
charge that he was alone responsible for the delay in attack- 
ing that ensued after his arrival on the field. I well remem- 
ber how General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of 
the troops, until he finally became restless, and rode back to 
meet General Longstreet, and urge him forward ; but, then, 
there was considerable delay in putting the troops to work 



100 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

after they reached the field, and much time was spent in dis- 
cussing what was to be done, which, perhaps, could not be 
avoided. At any rate, it would be unreasonable to hold 
General Longstreet alone accountable for this. 

Indeed, great injustice has been done him in the charge 
that he had orders from the commanding general to attack 
the enemy at sunrise on the 2d of July, and that he dis- 
obeyed these orders. This would imply that he was in posi- 
tion to attack, whereas General Lee but anticipated his early 
arrival on the 2d, and based his calculations upon it. I have 
shown how he was disappointed, and I need hardly add that 
the delay was fatal. In this connection, I submit the follow- 
ing correspondence : 

New Orleaxs, La., April 20, 1875. 

My dear Colonel : Upon reading an address by Mr. Pen- 
dleton, published in the December number of the Southern 
Magazine^ I saw for the first time that General Lee had ordered 
me to attack the left of the Federal army at " sunrise," on the 
second day of the battle of Gettysburg. 

It occurs to me that if General Lee had any such idea as an 
attack at sunrise, ycu must surely be advised of it. Right sure 
am I that such an order was never delivered to me, and it is not 
possible for me to believe that he ever entertained an idea that 
I was to attack at that hour. My two divisions, nor myself, did 
not reach General Lee until 8 A. m. on the 2d, and if he had 
intended to attack at sunrise he surely would have expressed 
some surprise, or made some allusion to his orders. 

Please do me the favor to let me know what you know of 
this sunrise attack. . . . 

I remain very respectfully and truly yours, 

James Longstreet. 

Colonel W. H. Taylor, Norfolk, Virginia. 

Norfolk, Va., April 28, 1875. 
Dear General : I have received your letter of the 20th 
inst. I have not read the article of which you speak, nor have 
I ever seen a copy of General Pendleton's address ; indeed, I 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 101 

have read little or nothing of what has been written since the 
war : in the first place, because I could not spare the time ; and, 
in the second, because, of those of whose writings I have heard, 
I deem but very few entitled to any attention whatever. 

I can only say that I never before heard of the " sunrise at- 
tack " you were to have made, as charged by General Pendle- 
ton, If such an order was given you, I never knew it, or it has 
strangely escaped my memory. I think it more than probable 
that, if General Lee had had your troops available the evening 
previous to the day of which you speak, he would have ordered 
an early attack / but this does not touch the point at issue. 

I regard it as a great mistake on the part of those who, per- 
haps because of political differences, now undertake to criticise 
and attack your war record. Such conduct is most ungenerous, 
and I am sure meets the disapprobation of all good Confeder- 
ates with whom I have the pleasure of associating in the daily 
walks of life. 

Yours very respectfully and truly, 

W. H. Taylor. 

General James Longstreet, New Orleans. 

Since the date of this correspondence, several communi- 
cations have appeared in the public prints, from the pen of 
General Longstreet, in reference to the battle of Gettysburg. 
He claims that General Lee gave battle there in spite of his 
remonstrances. Had such been the fact, it would work no 
discredit to General Lee, though at variance with his usual 
propensity to defer to such objections on the part of his lieu- 
tenants ; but I never heard of it before, neither is it consistent 
with General Longstreet's assertion to Mr. Swinton, since 
made, that at the time in question " the Army of Northern 
Yirginia was in condition to undertake anything" In this 
opinion he but expressed the sentiment of the whole army ; 
an overweening confidence possessed us all. JSTow, in a 
retrospective view of the results attained, it is easy to con- 
clude that it would have been well not to have attacked the 
third day. But did we accomplish all that could have been 



102 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

reasonably expected ? And if we failed to attain results 
reasonably to be expected of an army in condition to under- 
take anything, bow did it bappen ? 

General Lee determined to renew tbe attack upon the 
enemy's position on tbe 3d day of July. In bis report of 
tbe campaign, in speaking of tbe operations of tbe second 
day, be says : 

The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, 
with proper concert of action, and with the increased support 
that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery 
to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed ; 
and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. 

The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reenforced by 
Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field dur- 
ing the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next 
morning ; and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's 
right at the same time. 

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as 
early as was expected ; it appears that be was delayed by 
apprehensions that bis troops would be taken in reverse as 
they advanced. General Ewell, who bad orders to cooperate 
with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware 
of any impediment to tbe main attack arranged to be made 
on tbe enemy's left, having reenforced General Johnson, 
whose division was upon our extreme left during tbe night 
of tbe 2d, ordered him forward early tbe next morning. 

In obedience to these instructions, General Johnson be- 
came hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed 
of tbe bait which bad been called on our right. 

After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy 
was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General John- 
son found himself unable to carry the strongly -fortified crest of 
the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having 
been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely 
superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 103 

flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his 
original position about 1 p. m. 1 

General Lee then had a conference with General Long- 
street, and the mode of attack and the troops to make it 
were thoroughly debated. I was present, and understood the 
arrangement to be that General Longstreet should endeavor 
to force the enemy's lines in his front. That front was held 
by the divisions of Hood and McLaws. To strengthen him 
for the undertaking, it was decided to reenforce him by such 
troops as could be drawn from the centre. 

Pickett's division, of Longstreet' s corps, was then up, 
fresh and available. Heth's division, of Hill's corps, was 
also mentioned as available, having in great measure recuper- 
ated since its active engagement of the first day ; a so also 
were the brigades of Lane and Scales, of Pender's division, 
Hill's corps; and as our extreme right was comparatively 
safe, being well posted, and not at all threatened, one of the 
divisions of Hood and McLaws, and the greater portion of 
the other, could be moved out of the lines and be made to 
take part in the attack. Indeed, it was designed originally 
that the two divisions last named, reenforced by Pickett, 
should make the attack ; and it was only because of the ap- 
prehensions of General Longstreet that his corps was not 
strong enough for the movement, that General Hill was 
called on to reenforce him. 

Orders were sent to General Hill to place Heth's division 
and two brigades of Pender's at General Longstreet's dis- 
posal, and to be prepared to give him further assistance if 
requested. 

The assault was to have been made with a column of not 

1 Extract from General Lee's " Report." 

9 Note by Colonel Venable. — " They were terribly mistaken about Heth's 
division in this planning. It had not recuperated, having suffered more than 
was reported on the first day. Heth had suffered heavily on the 1st, before 
Pender and Rodes got up. He had gone almost into Gettysburg. Rodes found 
dead Mississippians on the wooded hill just above the town." — C. S. V. 



'I 



{ 



104 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

less than two di visions, and the remaining divisions were to 
have been moved forward in support of those in advance. 
This was the result of the conference alluded to as under- 
stood by me. 

Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill appears to have had the 
same impression, for he says in his report of the operations 
of his corps at this time : " I was directed to hold my line 
with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's, now com- 
manded by General Lane, and to order Heth's division, com- 
manded by Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales's brigades, of 
Pender's division, to report to Lieutenant-General Longstreet 
as a support to his corp s, in the assault on the enemy's lines." 

General Longstreet proceeded at once to make the dis- 
positions for attack, and General Lee rode along the portion 
of the line held by A. P. Hill's corps, and finally took posi- 
tion about the Confederate centre, on an elevated point, from 
which he could survey the field and watch the result of the 
movement. 

After a heavy artillery fire along the entire line, and at 
a given signal, the movement began, but the plan agreed on 
was not carried out. The only troops that participated in 
the attack were the divisions of Pickett (First Corps) and 
Heth (Third Corps) — the latter, since the wounding of Gen- 
eral Heth, commanded by General Pettigrew — and the bri- 
gades of Lane, Scales, and "Wilcox. The two divisions were 
formed in advance — the three brigades as their support. 
The divisions of Hood and McLaws (First Corps) were pas- 
sive spectators of the movement. 

To one who observed the charge, it appeared that Pet- 
tigrew's line was not a continuation of that of Pickett, but 
that it advanced in echelon. It would seem that there was 
some confusion in forming the troops, for Captain Louis G. 
Young, of General Pettigrew's staff, says : 

On the morning of the 3d of July, General Pettigrew, com- 
manding Heth's division, was instructed to report to General 
Longstreet, who directed him to form in the rear of Pickett's divi- 






THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 105 

sion, and support his advance upon Cemetery Hill, which would 
be commenced as soon as the fire from our artillery should have 
driven the enemy from his guns and prepared the way for at- 
tack. And I presume that it was in consequence of this having 
been the first plan settled on, that the erroneous report was cir- 
culated that Heth's division was assigned the duty of support- 
ing that of Pickett. But the order referred to was counter- 
manded almost as soon as given, and General Pettigrew was in- 
structed to advance upon the same, line with Pickett, a portion 
of Pender's division acting as supports. 

Wilcox's brigade was ordered to support Pickett's right 
flank, and the brigades of Lane and Scales acted as supports 
to Heth's division. 

General Lane, in his report, says : 

General Longstreet ordered me to form in rear of the right 
of Heth's division, commanded by General Pettigrew. Soon 
after I had executed this order, putting Lowrance on the right, 
I was relieved of the command of the division by Major-General 
Trimble, who acted under the same orders that I had received. 
Heth's division was much longer than Lowrance's brigade and 
my own, which constituted its only support, and there was, con- 
sequently, no second line in rear of its left. 

The assaulting column really consisted of Pickett's di- 
vision — two brigades in front, and one in the second line as 
a support l — with trie brigade of Wilcox in rear of its right 
to protect that flank ; while Heth's division moved forward 
on Pickett's left in echelon, or w T ith the alignment so imper- 
fect and so drooping on the left as to appear in echelon, 2 with 
Lane's and Scales's brigades in rear of its right, and its left 
without reserve or support, and entirely exposed. 

Thus the column moved forward. It is needless to say a 
word here of the heroic conduct of Pickett's division ; that 

1 Pickett had but three brigades at Gettysburg : Corse had been left with his 
brigade at Hanover Junction. 

2 " It was formed in echelon a hundred )\ards in rear." — C. S. Venable. 



106 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

charge has already passed into history as " one of the world's 
great deeds of arms." While, doubtless, many brave men of 
other commands reached the crest of the height, this was the 
only organized body that entered the works of the enemy. 1 
Much can be said in excuse for the failure of the other com- 
mands to fulfill the task assigned them. As a general rule, 
the peculiarly rough and wooded character of the country in 
which our army was accustomed to operate, and which in 
some respects was unfavorable for the manoeuvres of large 
armies, was of decided advantage to us ; for, in moving upon 
the enemy through bodies of woods, or in a broken, rolling 
country, not only was the enemy at a loss how to estimate 
our strength, but our own men were not impressed with that 
sense of insecurity which must have resulted from a thor- 
ough knowledge of their own weakness. 

1 " The troops moved steadily on under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, 
the main attack being directed against the enemy's left centre. His batteries 
reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own, having nearly exhausted their 
ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the in- 
fantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking 
party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took 
place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our 
left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in 
front, and from Cemetery Hill on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, 
after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advance-works, and capturing 
some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, 
and driven back with heavy loss." — Extract from General Lee's "Report," 
"Southern Historical Society Papers," July, 1876, p. 44. 

In justice to the gallant men and officers of Heth's division, I here append 
the testimony of Captain Louis G. Young, aide to General Pettigrew, who, in 
describing the part taken in the third day's fight by the division, says : " Under 
this fire from artillery and musketry, the brigade on our left, reduced almost to 
a line of skirmishers, gave way. Pettigrew's and Archer's brigades advanced a 
little farther, and in perfect continuation of Pickett's line, which arrived at the 
works before we did, only because they jutted out in his front, and because his 
had to move over a considerably shorter distance. The right of the line, formed 
by Archer's and Pettigrew's brigades, rested on the works, while the left was, 
of course, farther removed, say forty to sixty yards. Subjected to a fire even 
more fatal than that which had driven back the brigade on our left, and the men 
listening in vain for the cheering commands of officers, who had, alas ! fallen, 
our brigade gave way likewise, and, simultaneously with it, the whole fine." 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 107 

It was different here. The charge was made down a 
gentle slope, and then np to the enemy's lines, a distance of 
over half a mile, denuded of forests, and in full sight of the 
enemy, and perfect range of their artillery. These combined v, J 
causes produced their natural effect upon Pettigrew's division 
and the brigades supporting it, caused them to falter, and / 
finally retire. Then Pickett's division continuing the charge ) 
without supports, and in the sight of the enemy, was not 
half so formidable or effective as it would have been had 
trees or hills prevented the enemy from so correctly estimat- *v 
ing the strength of the attacking column, and our own troops *^ 
from experiencing that sense of weakness which the known^VVV^^# w 
absence of support necessarily produced. In spite of all this, » 
it steadily and gallantly advanced to its allotted task. As |p>* 
the three brigades under Garnett, Armistead, and Kemper, 
approach the enemy's lines, a most terrific fire of artillery 
and small-arms is concentrated upon them ; but they swerve 
not — there is no faltering; steadily moving forward, they 
rapidly reduce the intervening space, and close with their 
adversaries : leaping the breastworks, they drive back the 
enemy, and plant their standards on the captured guns, amid 
shouts of victory — dearly won and short-lived victory. 

"No more could be exacted, or expected, of those men of 
brave hearts and nerves of steel ; but where are the supports 
to reap the benefit of their heroic efforts, and gather the 
fruits of a victory so nobly won ? Was that but a forlorn 
hope, on whose success, not only in penetrating the enemy's 
lines, but in maintaining its hold against their combined and 
united efforts to dislodge it, an entire army was to wait in 
quiet observation? Was it designed to throw these few 
brigades — originally, at the most, but two divisions — upon 
the fortified stronghold of the enemy, while, full half a mile 
away, seven-ninths of the army in breathless suspense, in 
ardent admiration and fearful anxiety, watched, but moved 
not % I maintain that such was not the design of the com- 
manding general. Had the veteran divisions of Hood and 



w 



108 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

McLaws been moved forward, as was planned, in support of 
those of Pickett and Pettigrew, 1 not only would the latter 
division, in all probability, have gained the enemy's works, 
as did that of Pickett, but these two would have been enabled, 
with the aid of Hood and McLaws, to resist all efforts of the 
enemy to dislodge them. The enemy closing in on Pickett's 
brigades, concentrating upon that small band of heroes the 
fire of every gun that could be brought to bear upon them, 
soon disintegrated and overpowered them. Such as were 
not killed, disabled, and made captive, fell back to our lines. 

It appears that General Longstreet deemed it necessary 
to defend his right flank and rear with the divisions of Mc- 
Laws and Hood. These divisions, as before stated, consti- 
tuted all of the Confederate line held by Longstreet' s troops, 
and it is not apparent how they were necessary to defend 
his flank and rear. The nearest infantry force of the enemy 
to our right occupied the hills — Round Top and Little Pound 
Top — and the only force that could be said to have threat- 
ened our flank and rear consisted of a few brigades of cav- 
alry, so posted as to protect the enemy's left. 

It is not my purpose here to undertake to establish the 
wisdom of an attack on the enemy's position on the third 
day, which General Longstreet contends was opposed by his 
judgment, and of which, he says, he would have stayed the 
execution, had he felt that he had the privilege so to do ; nor 
do I propose to discuss the necessities of his position, which 
he represents to have been such as to forbid the employment 
of McLaws's and Hood's divisions in the attack ; neither do I 
seek any other than a just explanation of the causes of our 
failure at that time ; but well recalling my surprise and dis- 
appointment when it was ascertained that only Pickett's 
division and the troops from Hill's corps had taken part in 
the movement, and with positively distinct impressions as 

1 " As they were ordered to do by General Lee, for I heard him give the orders 
when arranging the fight ; and called his attention to it long afterward, when 
there was discussion about it. He said, ' I know it ! I know it ! ' " — Colonel C. 
S. Venable. 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 109 

to the occurrences just related, I deem it proper to record 
them for confirmation or refutation as the undisputed facts 
of the case, and the testimony of others, may determine. 1 

1 The following correspondence explains itself, and is submitted, without 
comment, in connection with the assertions of fact just made : 

Norfolk, Va., January 29, 1877. 
General James Longstreet, New Orleans. 

Dear General : I have been anxious to ascertain definitely the relative 
strength of the two opposing armies during the war, and, after devoting my odd 
moments to an investigation of the matter for a long time past, I have at last 
succeeded in reaching a satisfactory result. In putting these matters in shape, 
and in order to give continuity and connection to the notes, I have touched upon 
the more important incidents in General Lee's career, placing on record my 
recollection of facts, and sustaining myself as much as possible by the contem- 
poraneous testimony of those who participated in the several events. 

In regard to the third day's operations at Gettysburg, according to my recol- 
lection, General Lee had a conference with you as to the attack to be made 
that day, when it was determined that an assault should be made on your front, 
by your corps, reenforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's. 
My recollection is distinct in that all of your divisions were to take part in the 
assault, and I never did understand why Hood and McLaws were never 
ordered forward. Colonel Tenable agrees with me entirely in this particular. 

I write, therefore, to say that if you differ from me, or care to present any 
explanation of the non-action of Hood and McLaws, I should be pleased to have 
any statement you may make accompany that which I propose to present in 
my notes. 

My desire is to do what I can toward eliminating the truth from the mass of 
contradictory evidence that exists, and particularly anxious am I to avoid doing 
injustice to any one, especially to one who dealt such vigorous blows for the 
South, and whom I learned, during the war, to esteem so highly as yourself. 
Yours respectfully, W. H. Taylor. 



New Orleans, La., February 2, 1877. 
Colonel W. H. Taylor, Norfolk, Va. 

My dear Sir: I have your esteemed favor of the 29th ult., and have noted 
its contents. 

In reply to your inquiry for a statement in regard to the supposed orders of 
General Lee in reference to the battle of the third day, I have only to say that 
General Lee gave no orders for placing the divisions of McLaws and Hood in 
the column of attack on that day. I cannot, therefore, have any explanation to 
make at this time why these divisions were not in that column. 

In putting your notes upon the events of the war together for publication, it 
seems to me that care should be had that undue influences should not give 
shape or tone to them. Least of all should you omit items that you may deem 
essential to General Lee's vindication, upon account of kindly feelings that may 
have subsisted between us. Nor do I know of good reasons why a report of 
your views upon matters of public history should interrupt personal relations. 

I have the privilege of giving my account afterward, and ara quite willing to 
have a minute investigation of Gettysburg, and to have the world know my con- 
nection with it from the inception of the campaign to its close. 
I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

James Loxgstreet. 



110 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

After the assault on the enemy's works on the 3d of 
July, there was no serious fighting at Gettysburg. The 4th 
passed in comparative quiet. Neither army evinced any dis- 
position to assail the other. Notwithstanding the brilliant 
achievements of Ewell and Hill on the first day, and the de- 
cided advantage gained by Longstreet on the second, the 
failure of the operations of the third day, involving, as they 
did, but two divisions of the army, deprived us of the pres- 
tige of our previous successes, and gave a shadow of right to 
our adversary's claim of having gained a victory. Their 
exultation, however, should be tempered with moderation, 
when we consider that, after one day of absolute quiet, the 
Confederates withdrew from their front without serious 
molestation, and with bridges swept away, and an impas- 
sable river in rear, stood in an attitude of defiance until their 
line of retreat could be rendered practicable, after which 
they safely recrossed into Virginia. Then, again, so serious 
was the loss visited upon the Federals in the engagements 
of the first and second days, and so near success was the 
effort to storm their position on the third day, that they were 
themselves undecided as to whether they should stand or re- 
treat. In discussing several councils or conferences held 
by General Meade with his corps-commanders, General 
Sickles testified, before the Committee on the Conduct of 
the War, that the reason the Confederates were not fol- 
lowed up was on account of differences of opinion whether 
or not the Federals should themselves retreat, as " it was by 
no means clear, in the judgment of the corps-commanders, or 
of the general in command, whether they had won or not." ' 

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES IN THE GETTYSBURG 

CAMPAIGN. 

It appears from the official returns on file in the "War 
Department, that on the 31st of May, 1863, the Army of 
Northern Virginia numbered : infantry, fifty-four thousand 

1 " Report on the Conduct of the War," second series, vol. i., p. 302, 1865. 



\\\ 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. HI 

three hundred and fifty-six ; cavalry, nine thousand five hun- 
dred and thirty-six ; and artillery, four thousand four hun- 
dred and sixty ; of all arms, sixty-eight thousand three hun- 
dred and fifty-two effective. This was immediately before 
the invasion of Pennsylvania, and may be regarded as rep- 
resenting the maximum of General Lee's army in the Gettys- 
burg campaign. 

At the time of that return the army was divided into but 
two corps or wings, one under Longstreet, and the other — 
Jackson's old corps — -under A. P. Hill. The former em- 
braced the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, Pickett, and 
Hood ; and the latter those of A. P. Hill, Early, Bodes, and 
Johnson. Immediately after the date of this return, the 
army was reorganized into three corps, as follows : Long- 
street's (First Corps), embracing the divisions of McLaws, 
Pickett, and Hood ; Ewell's (Second Corps), embracing the 
divisions of Early, Eodes, and Johnson ; and Hill's (Third 
Corps), embracing the divisions of Anderson, Heth, and 
Pender. 

The last two divisions of Hill's corps were formed by 
adding Pettigrew's brigade, which joined the army just at 
that time, and J. P. Davis's brigade (formed for him by 
taking scattered Mississippi regiments from mixed brigades), 
to the six which constituted A. P. Hill's old division, and 
dividing the eight into two divisions of four brigades each. 
The army remained the same as to brigades, with the excep- 
tion of the one additional under General Pettigrew. Gen- 
eral Corse was left with his brigade of Pickett's division, and 
a North Carolina regiment, 1 at Hanover Junction, and took 
no part in the Pennsylvania campaign ; his command offset 
the brigade brought to the army by General Pettigrew, and 
I therefore assume that the army return just now quoted 
shows General Lee's maximum strength in that campaign. 

On the 20th of July, 1863, after the return of General 
Lee to Virginia, his army numbered forty-one thousand 

1 The Forty-fourth North Carolina, of Pettigrew's brigade. 






112 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

three hundred and eighty-eight effective, exclusive of the 
cavalry corps, of which no report is made in the return of 
the date last mentioned ; allowing seven thousand six hun- 
dred and twelve, a fair estimate for the cavalry, the effective 
total of the army, on the 20th of July, was forty-nine thou- 
sand. It appears, therefore, that General Lee's loss in the 
Pennsylvania campaign was about nineteen thousand. 

Concerning the strength of the Federal army, General 
Meade testified as follows before the Committee on the Con- 
duct of the War (second series, vol. i., p. 337) : u Including all 
arms of the service, my strength was a little under one hun- 
dred thousand men — about ninety-five thousand. I think Gen- 
eral Lee had about ninety thousand infantry, four thousand 
to five thousand artillery, and about ten thousand cavalry." 
Again he testifies : " I think the returns showed me, when I 
took command of the army, amounted to about one hundred 
and five thousand men : included in those were the eleven 
thousand of General French." In this latter matter the evi- 
dence is against General Meade. General Hooker, on the 
27th of June, 1863, telegraphed to General Halleck, from 
Poolesville, " My whole force of enlisted men for duty will 
not exceed one hundred and five thousand (105,000)." This 
would make his total effective (officers and men) fully one 
hundred and twelve thousand. This dispatch 1 was received 
by General Halleck at 9 a. m. On reaching Sandy Hook, 
subsequently, on the same day, General Hooker telegraphed 
as follows concerning the garrison at Harper's Ferry under 
General French : " I find ten thousand men here in condi- 
tion to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. 
They cannot defend a ford of the river ; and, as far as Har- 
per's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the 
fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the 
troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession 
of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public 
property could have been secured to-night, and the troops 

1 " Report on the Conduct of the War," second series, vol. i., p. 291. 



THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. H3 

marclied to where they could have been of some service." 
This dispatch was received by General Halleck at 2.55 p. m. 1 

It is evident that the garrison at Harper's Ferry was not 
embraced in the returns alluded to by General Hooker, in 
his first dispatch. Although General Halleck refused these 
troops to General Hooker, they were immediately awarded 
to General Meade on his assuming command when General 
Hooker was relieved. 

Without more accurate returns of the two armies at Get- 
tysburg, we are left to form our conclusions as to their 
strength from the data given above. I put the Army of the 
Potomac at one hundred and ~&ve thousand, and the Army 
of Northern Virginia at sixty-two thousand of all arms — 
fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and four 
thousand artillery— and believe these figures very nearly 
correct. 

In this estimate, I adopt the strength of the Federal 
army as given by its commander on the 27th of June, but 
four days before the first encounter at Gettysburg, excluding 
all consideration of the troops at Harper's Ferry, although 
General Meade, on assuming command, at once ordered Gen- 
eral French to move to Frederick with seven thousand men, 
to protect his communications, 2 and thus made available a 
like number of men of the Army of the Potomac, who would 
otherwise have been detached for this service. 

On the side of the Confederates, the entire cavalry corps is 
included. That portion which General Stuart accompanied 
made a complete circuit of the Federal army, and only joined 
General Lee on the evening of the second day; and the 
brigades under Generals Jones and Robertson, which had 
been left to guard the passes of the Blue Pidge, did not 
rejoin the army until the 3d of July ; only the commands 
of Generals Imboden and Jenkins had been with the army 
from the time of crossing the Potomac, and they accom- 

1 " Report on the Conduct of the War," second series, vol. i., p. 292. 
3 Ibid., p. 335. 



114 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

panied General Ewell. "General Stuart had several skir- 
mishes during his march, and at Hanover quite a severe en- 
gagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which 
was finally compelled to withdraw from the town. The ranks 
of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous 
march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food 
and forage." J I have deducted from the strength of Gen- 
eral Lee's army, at the opening of the campaign, one month 
previous to the battle, only a reasonable allowance for losses 
by sickness and straggling, casualties in the encounters with 
the enemy under General Milroy and in the constant skir- 
mishing of the cavalry before and after leaving Virginia, and 
the detachments left to guard our communications, to pro- 
tect captured property, and to escort prisoners taken on the 
Virginia side of the river. 

1 General Lee's " Report of the Pennsylvania Campaign." 



CHAPTER IX. 

General Lee retires to Virginia. — Affair at Bristoe Station. — The Tete-de-Pont. 
— Mine Run. — General Meade's Advance and Retreat. — Dahlgren's Raid. 

Ox the 5th of July our army left Gettysburg. Owing 
to the swollen condition of the Potomac, it did not recross 
into Virginia until the 13th of the same month ; it was not, 
however, seriously annoyed or molested in the interval, 
though confidently and anxiously expecting to be attacked. 
In consequence of Meade's advance into Virginia east of the 
mountains, General Lee moved his army so as to confront 
him, and soon established his line of defense along the Rap- 
idan River, where the army was allowed two months of com- 
parative rest and quiet. In October General Lee again 
advanced, but no general engagement ensued. The follow- 
ing extracts from notes taken by me at the time will serve 
to illustrate the nature and extent of the movements then 
made: 

Bristoe Station, October, 1863. 
On Sunday (11th) we continued our march for Culpeper 
Court-House, where the enemy had been in position, with a 
view of reaching his flank or forcing him to retire. On ar- 
riving at a point five miles from the Court-House, we learned 
that Meade had taken refuge on the farther side of the Rap- 
pahannock River, and it was necessary to try another flank- 
movement. On Monday, therefore, we . started for Warrenton 
by way of Warrenton Springs. On reaching the river near 
the latter point our progress was opposed by the enemy 
who held the opposite bank ; but we very soon succeeded in 



116 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

forcing a passage at the ford. "We camped near the springs 
that night, and passed them the next day on our way to War- 
renton. On Wednesday we left Warrenton and reached this 
place the same day. Here Hill's advance met a corps of the 
enemy and at once engaged it. Our other corps came up in 
good time, and we should have punished the enemy severely ; 
but matters were not properly managed and they all escaped 
us, and, what is worse, they got the better of us in what little 
fighting there was. Our people were not put into battle cor- 
rectly, too few of one corps being engaged, and the other not 
having its line of battle in the proper direction. By unpardon- 
able mismanagement the enemy was allowed to capture five 
pieces of our artillery. There was no earthly excuse for it, as 
all our troops were well in hand, and much stronger than the 
enemy. 

The next morning it was discovered that the latter had re- 
treated toward Centreville and taken refuge behind his fortifica- 
tions. For the past two days we have been destroying this 
railroad, which is highly essential to the Federals in their " on 
to Richmond ; " and from present indications I think that a gen- 
eral engagement is improbable, and that the fighting for this 
season is pretty much over. We have taken about fifteen hun- 
dred prisoners, forced the enemy back to Alexandria and Cen- 
treville without any general battle, and gained from him, for a 
time at least, a large portion of our State. 

Camp near Brandy Station, November 1, 1863. 
This evening the enemy advanced upon us at Kelly's Ford on 
the Rappahannock River, and also at Rappahannock Station ; 
effected a crossing at the former place, rushed upon our men (two 
brigades) who were at the latter place defending the bridge, 
overwhelmed and captured most of them. Thus, in a very few 
words, I record the saddest chapter in the history of this army. 
Twelve or fifteen hundred men were captured, and also a battery 
of artillery of four pieces. 

Reference is here made to the unfortunate affair of the 
tete-de-jpont near Rappahannock bridge. At the time, great 



OPERATIONS ALONG THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 11 7 

chagrin was felt at the disaster, and much discussion was had 
as to the responsibility therefor. 

Some maintained that the place was naturally strong, and 
that, with the aid of the earthworks, it could be readily de- 
fended ; others contended that the works were of but little 
protection, and the means of escape, in event of disaster, in- 
adequate. I cannot do better, in aiding to effect a deter- 
mination of these questions, than quote, from the official 
reports of General Lee and Major-General Early, the views 
they respectively entertained. 

General Lee says : 

To hold the line of the Rappahannock at this part of its 
course it was deemed advantageous to maintain our communi- 
cation with the north bank, to threaten any flank-movement 
the enemy might make above or below, and thus compel him to 
divide his forces, when it was hoped that an opportunity would 
be presented to concentrate on one or the other part. For this 
purpose, a point was selected a short distance above the site of 
the railroad-bridge, where the hills on each side of the river 
afforded protection to our pontoon-bridge, and increased the 
means of defense. The enemy had previously constructed some 
small earthworks on these hills, to repel an attack from the 
south. That on the north side was converted into a tete-de-pont, 
and a line of rifle-trenches extended along the crest on the right 
and left to the river-bank. The works on the south side were 
remodeled, and sunken batteries for additional guns constructed 
on an adjacent hill to the left. Higher up on the same side 
and east of the railroad, near the river-bank, sunken batteries 
for two guns, and rifle-pits, were arranged to command the rail- 
road embankment, under cover of which the enemy might ad- 
vance. The works were slight, but were deemed adequate to 
accomplish the object for which they were intended. The pon- 
toon-bridge was considered a sufficient means of communication, 
as, in the event of the troops north of the river being compelled 
to withdraw, their crossing could be covered by the artillery 
and infantry in the works on the south side. Four pieces of 



118 POUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

artillery were placed in the tUe-de-pont and eight others in the 
works opposite. 

In speaking of the assault by the enemy, he continues : 

As soon, however, as it became dark enough to conceal his 
movements, the enemy advanced in overwhelming numbers 
against our rifle-trenches and succeeded in carrying them in the 
manner described in the reports of Generals Early and Hays. 
It would appear from these reports, and the short duration of 
the firing, that the enemy was enabled to approach very near 
the works before being seen. The valley in our front aided in 
concealing his advance from view, and a strong wind effectually 
prevented any movements from being heard. It was essential 
to the maintenance of the position, under these circumstances, 
that sharp-shooters should have been thrown forward to give 
early information of his approach, in order that he might be 
subjected to fire as long as possible, but it is not stated that 
this precaution was taken. The breaking of the enemy's first 
line and the surrender of part of it, as described in the reports, 
also contributed to divert attention from the approach of the 
second and third, and enabled them to press into the works. 
The darkness of the night, and the fear of injuring our own men 
who had surrendered, prevented General Early from using the 
artillery on the south bank. . . . 

The suggestions above mentioned afford the only explana- 
tion I am able to give of this unfortunate affair, as the courage 
and good conduct of the troops engaged have been too often 
tried to admit of any question. 

The loss of this position made it necessary to abandon the 
design of attacking the force that had crossed at Kelly's Ford, 
and the army was withdrawn to the only tenable line between 
Culpeper Court-House and the Rappahannock, where it re- 
mained during the succeeding day. The position not being 
regarded as favorable, it returned the night following to the 
south side of the Rapidan. 

General Early, whose division alternated with that under 



OPERATIONS ALONG THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 119 

General Johnson in furnishing a garrison for the works, and 
whose troops were on duty the day in question, says : 

The works on the north side of the river were, in my judg- 
ment, very inadequate and not judiciously laid out or con- 
structed. . . . There was no ditch on the outside of the work. 
... I had myself pointed out some of the defects of the works to 
the engineers having charge of them, and I had urged the neces- 
sity of having another bridge farther up the stream. The fact is, 
in my opinion, the position was susceptible of being made very 
strong, but, in order to enable a small force to hold it against a 
large attacking force, the works ought to have been entirely in- 
closed, and with a deep ditch on the outside, so that an attack- 
ing column could have had its progress checked. But the works 
were so constructed as to afford no obstacle in themselves to an 
attacking enemy, and only furnished a temporary protection 
to our troops. ... In a short time some firing of musketry at 
and in front of the rifle -trenches was observed from the flashes 
of the guns, it being impossible to hear the report by reason of 
the wind, though the distance was but short. After this firing 
had continued for some minutes it slackened somewhat, and, 
not hearing from it, we were of opinion that it was from and at 
the enemy's skirmishers. 

The works were quickly overrun, and, as before stated, 
the greater part of two brigades was captured, as also the 
four pieces of artillery in the tete-de-jpont. After this the 
pontoon-bridge was burned. 

Camp near Brandy Station, Novemler 7, 1863. 

We are all packed up and will move to-night. We are now 
in the line of outposts, and this is not exactly the place for the 
commanding general. No sleep to-night, and to-morrow an 
active, stirring Sunday. How singular it is that most of our 
battles and movements occur on that day, when, of all others, 
we should most enjoy quiet and be most reminded of peace ! 

I think that General Meade means to fight, and General Lee 
will accommodate him, but on ground of his own choosing. 



120 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

The movements here alluded to only resulted in both 
armies being reestablished in their old lines along the Rapi- 
dan River, without an engagement. 

Camp near Orange, November 26, 1863. 

We are just on the eve of another move. This morning 
and afternoon all the indications favor the supposition that the 
enemy is moving down the river, and we have been busy pre- 
paring for a counter-move in the same direction. Matters seem 
to be drifting toward our old and renowned battle-fields, Chan- 
cellorsville and Fredericksburg. The enemy occupies the line 
of the Rapidan on the north side, we on the south side. He 
will in all probability move to Germania Ford, near the conflu- 
ence of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, where he will 
cross. Then, as we will be advancing in that direction, there 
will be a clash somewhere between that point and Fredericks- 
burg. We have all our arrangements made to move before 
dawn in the morning. 

Camp near Orange, December, 1863. 

By the dawn of day on the 27th of last month, we were 
many miles from Orange on our way to meet Meade's army, 
which had crossed to the south side of the Rapidan. It was 
intensely cold. We left camp at 3 a. m. — as usual, the general 
was ahead of every one else — and we arrived at Verdiersville 
without any army whatever, the troops not having progressed 
that far. During the morning the army caught up with us, and 
we proceeded to advance toward Fredericksburg. In the after- 
noon we first met the enemy ; on the right there was a little 
skirmishing; on the left, Johnson's division engaged and severe- 
ly chastised a corps of the enemy ; at the same time our cavalry, 
under General Rosser, attacked and destroj^ed a large ordnance- 
train in the enemy's rear. With the exception of one other 
cavalry affair, no more fighting of any consequence occurred. 
On Saturday we selected our position on the line of Mine Run, 
and proceeded to fortify it. In an incredibly short time (for our 
men work now like beavers) we were strongly intrenched, and 
ready and anxious for an attack. The general gave his atten- 
tion to the whole line — directing important changes here and 



MINE RUN. 121 

there ; endeavoring to impress the officers with the importance 
of success in the impending engagement ; and presenting a fine 
example of untiring energy and zeal. He was busy the whole 
time. 

On Sunday, as we were riding down the lines, attended by 
General Hill with his staff and others, we came upon a collec- 
tion of men engaged in divine worship. We had been riding at 
a pretty fair gait, but the general at once halted, and listened 
to the' singing of the men. He heard the entire hymn, and as 
the benediction was pronounced, reverently raised his hat from 
his head, received the blessing, and then continued his ride 
along the fortifications. It was a striking scene, and one well 
calculated to impress solemnly all who witnessed it. The para- 
pet was crowded with men ; here and there at proper intervals 
waved the battle-flags; and from many dozen embrasures 
frowned the now silent artillery. This all looked exceedingly 
warlike, and it was a cheering thing to see that, while ready for 
action, our men did not forget that, to secure victory, divine 
help should be implored. 

On Monday we confidently looked for an attack. It passed 
without one. The enemy was in our immediate front, and he, 
too, had intrenched. This looked rather queer, to see two large 
armies face to face, each busily constructing works for defense. 

Tuesday came and went without an attack. General Lee 
had now become impatient, and, seeing how reluctant the enemy 
was to bring on an engagement, he determined to relieve him of 
further embarrassment by becoming the aggressor, and forcing 
him into a fight. Consequently, during the night two fine 
divisions were relieved from the trenches and concentrated on 
our right, ready to be thrown on the enemy's left flank ; other 
necessary arrangements for a grand battle were completed 
before morning. 

Information received during the night indicated some activity 
in the enemy's lines, and at dawn of day it was found that he 
had fled, and was fast making his way back toward the river. 
Pursuit was immediately ordered and made; but General Meade 
had too much the advance of us, and reached the north side of 
the Rapidan before we could overtake him. Both armies then 



122 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

retired to their original positions. Undoubtedly we were most 
benefited by the movement. We captured about seven hun- 
dred prisoners, four hundred mules and horses, and destroyed 
or secured one hundred and twenty or one hundred and thirty 
wagons ; the enemy's loss in killed and wounded will reach per- 
haps one thousand. So, all things considered, we may be said 
to have canceled Bristoe Station. It was an almost bloodless 
victory ; for we enjoy all the moral effects of a victory, without 
its usual and distressing losses. General Meade expected either 
to take us unawares, turn our flank, and force us from behind 
the fortifications on the Rapidan, or else he concluded that, as 
soon as he crossed, General Lee would retreat to Hanover Junc- 
tion ; but our general is not so easily frightened into a retreat, 
and can very readily change his front. 

Both armies remained in a state of comparative inaction 
during the months of January and February, 1864, until the 
28th day of the latter month, when a powerful cavalry ex- 
pedition, embracing three columns, under Kilpatrick, Dahl- 
gren, and Custer, started from the Federal lines with the 
avowed purpose of capturing and sacking the city of Rich- 
mond. At this time General Lee w-as at Richmond. The 
indications of the advance of Custer's column on our left, 
received at army headquarters on the evening of the 28th, 
were confirmed on the 29th, when the w T hole movement w r as 
fully developed. The route of this column was to have been 
via Charlottesville, at which point there was no Confederate 
force, and the country intervening was filled with our artil- 
lery and wagon camps. Upon the receipt of the first intelli- 
gence of this movement on the evening of the 28th, all the 
trains moving in the direction of the threatened route were 
diverted. On the 29th a force of infantry was dispatched 
by rail to Charlottesville; but the advance of the enemy 
operating on this flank was effectually checked before reach- 
ing that place by our horse-artillery and dismounted cavalry. 

The column which moved upon our right, under Kilpat- 
rick, was more successful. The entire Confederate cavalry 



DAHLGREN'S RAID. 123 

picket stationed at Eley's Ford was captured ; and this col- 
umn of the enemy reached the Central Railroad before any 
intelligence was received of its advance. After cutting the 
road, it proceeded toward Richmond. General Lee returned 
to the army on the last train, which passed up but a few 
hours before the enemy reached the road, and thus barely 
escaped capture. The fate of this column, and especially of 
that portion of it commanded by Colonel Dahlgren, is well 
known. The results were most disastrous to the Federals, 
including the death of that officer, and the capture of his 
orders, exposing the damaging fact of the intention of the 
enemy to pillage and burn the city and kill the most promi- 
nent Confederate officials. 

Early in April General Lee was directed to inquire of 
General Meade, by flag of truce, if he or his Government 
sanctioned what Colonel Dahlgren had proposed and ordered 
in his address to his troops. On the 18th of April a reply to 
this communication was received, to the effect that neither 
General Meade, General Kilpatrick, nor the authorities at 
Washington, ordered or approved the burning of Richmond, 
the killing of Mr. Davis and his cabinet, or anything else 
not rendered necessary by military causes or not legitimate 
in civilized warfare. General Kilpatrick stated that the 
photographic copy of the " address " which had been received 
through General Lee was a f ac-simile of an address which 
Colonel Dahlgren had submitted to him for his approval, 
and which he had approved in red ink, except that it lacked 
that approval and contained the objectionable exhortations 
or orders, which were not in that submitted to him. The 
disclaimer of General Meade was most candid and emphatic. 

Information was received, about the latter part of April, 
of the advance of the Mnth (Federal) Corps from the neigh- 
borhood of Annapolis to reenforce General Grant, who had 
now assumed command of the Army of the Potomac. 



CHAPTEE X. 

General Grant in Command of the Federal Army of the Potomac. — His Advance. 
— From the Wilderness to Petersburg. — Strength of the Two Armies. 

By reference to the official returns of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia, 1 I find that on the 20th of April, 1864, the 
Second Corps reported seventeen thousand and seventy-nine 
and the Third Corps twenty-two thousand one hundred and 
ninety-nine present for duty ; there were also two unattached 
commands — viz., the Maryland line and the Provost Guard, 
numbering together eleven hundred and twenty-five effective. 
Two divisions of the First Corps had but recently arrived 
from Tennessee, and were not embraced in this return. I 
am without certain information as to their strength at that 
time. When the First Corps was detached for service in 
Tennessee, the effective strength of its three divisions was 
fourteen thousand six hundred and sixty-eight {see return of 
August 31, 1863). After the hard service in the West, I am 
sure that the two divisions under Generals Field and Ker- 
shaw, when they rejoined the army, could not have exceeded 
ten thousand effective. With this liberal estimate, it appears 
that General Lee's total infantry force was fifty thousand 
four hundred and three; to which if we add the cavalry 
corps, eight thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven, and 
the artillery corps, four thousand eight hundred and fifty- 
four, as given in the same return, we have a total present for 
duty, of all arms, of sixty-three thousand nine hundred and 

1 Now on file in the Archive-Office, War Department, Washington, D. 0. 



IN THE WILDERNESS. 125 

eighty-four — in round numbers say sixty-four thousand men 
*— under General Lee, at the opening of the campaign of 
1864. 

The official return of the Army of the Potomac of the 1st 
of May, 1864, shows present for duty one hundred and 
twenty thousand three hundred and eighty men of all arms ; 
to which if we add the Ninth Corps, not embraced in this 
return, but which joined General Grant before he commenced 
active operations, and which numbered, according to official 
returns, twenty thousand seven hundred and eighty, we have 
a total of one hundred and forty-one thousand one hundred 
and sixty men of all arms under General Grant at the open- 
ing of the campaign. 1 

I have given the relative strength of the two armies at 
the outset of this campaign, in order that the reader, in fol- 
lowing the course of events, may have a proper appreciation 
of the difficulties which beset General Lee in the task of 
thwarting the designs of so formidable an adversary, and 
realize the extent to which his brilliant genius made amends 
for paucity of numbers, and proved more than a match for 
brute force, as illustrated in the hammering policy of General 
Grant. 

If one hundred and forty thousand men are made to 
grapple in a death-struggle with sixty thousand men, of the 
former twenty thousand should survive the total annihilation 
of the latter, even though the price exacted for such destruc- 
tion be in the ratio of two for one. Behold the theory of 
the Federal commander and an epitome of his conception of 
strategy >, as exemplified on the sanguinary field extending 
from the Wilderness to James River ! 

On the 4th day of May General Grant opened the cam- 
paign by crossing to the south side of the Eapidan Eiver, 
with the intention of placing his army between that of Gen- 
eral Lee and Eichmond, his objective point. 

1 These figures are taken from the " Report of the Secretary of War to the 
First Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress," vol. i., 1865-'66, pp. 3-5, 55. 



126 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

General Lee was fully aware of the great disparity in the 
strength of the two armies, and of the efforts that had been 
made, under General Grant's direction, to increase the effi- 
ciency of the Army of the Potomac by every possible means, 
and it was doubtless expected that he would hesitate to give 
battle against such fearful odds, and proceed to manoeuvre 
to avoid a general engagement, and, by " masterly retreat," 
retard the progress of his adversaiy. 

The Federal commanders should by this time have learned 
to expect, with moral certainty, that, just as soon as they 
emerged from their own lines, there was an arm uplifted 
that would inevitably fall upon them with the speed of light- 
ning and with tremendous power. 

So soon as the real design of General Grant was disclosed, 
General Lee advanced to attack him. It was, indeed, a bold 
movement ; but, strange to relate, it appears not to have 
been expected by the enemy. Moving down on the south 
side of the Rapidan, the Army of Northern Virginia soon 
encountered its old adversary, under its new commander, in 
the Wilderness, and, without parley or delay, grappled it, 
and took the initiative in what was destined to be a pro- 
longed and bitter struggle. 

General Grant, who had started for a march, found it 
necessary to concentrate for battle. Much hard fighting en- 
sued : for two days there was a murderous wrestle ; severe 
and rapid blows were given and received in turn, until sheer 
exhaustion called a truce, with the advantage on the Confed- 
erate side. Notably was this the case in a brilliant assault 
made by General Longstreet on the Federal left on the 6th 
of May ; and in a turning movement on their right on the 
same day, executed by a portion of General E well's (Second) 
corps — the brigades of Gordon, Johnston, and Pegram — 
doubling up that flank and forcing it back a considerable 
distance. 

Mention should also be made of the stubborn and heroic 
resistance, on the 5th of May, by the divisions of Heth and 



IN THE WILDERNESS. 127 

Wilcox of Hill's (Third) corps — fifteen thousand strong 1 — 
against the repeated and desperate assaults of five divisions 
of the enemy — the four divisions of Hancock's corps and one 
of Sedgwick's — numbering about forty-five thousand men, in 
which the Confederates completely foiled their adversaries, 
and inflicted upon them most serious loss. 8 

The Third Division of Hill's (Third) corps, under General 
Anderson, and the two divisions of Longstreet's (First) corps, 
did not reach the scene of conflict until dawn of day on the 
morning of the 6th. Simultaneously the attack on Hill was 
renewed with great vigor. In addition to the force which 
he had so successfully resisted the previous day, a fresh 
division of the Fifth Corps, under General Wadsworth, had 
secured position on his flank, and cooperated with the column 
assaulting in front. After a short contest, the divisions of 
Heth and Wilcox, who had expected to be relieved, and were 
not prepared for the enemy's assault, were overpowered and 
compelled to retire, just as the advance of Longstreet's col- 
umn reached the ground. The defeated divisions were in 
considerable disorder, and the condition of affairs was exceed- 
ingly critical. General Lee fully appreciated the impending 
crisis, and, dashing amid the fugitives, personally called upon 
the men to rally. General Longstreet, taking in the situation 
at a glance, was prompt to act — immediately caused his 
divisions to be deployed in line of battle, and gallantly ad- 
vanced to recover the lost ground. 

The soldiers, seeing General Lee's manifest purpose to 
advance with them, and realizing the great danger in which 
he then was, called upon him in a beseeching manner to " go 

1 " Return of the Army of Northern Virginia," April 20, 1864, chap. xiv. 

2 The troops engaged in this assault were, Getty's division (four brigades) of 
the Sixth Corps ; Hancock's corps — viz., Birney's division (two brigades), Mott's 
division (two brigades), Gibbon's division (three brigades), and Barlow's division 
(four brigades) : in all, fifteen brigades. The Army of the Potomac embraced 
but thirty-two brigades, and numbered near one hundred thousand infantry. I 
therefore estimate that the fifteen brigades here engaged numbered forty-five 
thousand men. — (See Swinton's " Army of the Potomac," pp. 425, 426.) 



128 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

to the rear," promising that they would soon have matters 
rectified, and begging him to retire from a position in which 
his life was so exposed. The general was evidently touched 
and gratified at this manifestation of interest and anxiety on 
the part of his brave men, and waved them on, with some 
words of cheer. Their advance under such circumstances 
was simply irresistible ; every man felt that the eye of the 
commanding general was upon him, and was proud of the 
opportunity of showing him that his trust in his men was 
not misplaced. The Federal advance was checked, and the 
Confederate lines reestablished. 

Not content with this, as soon as the proper dispositions 
could be made, General Longstreet, as before mentioned, 
took the offensive, and assailed, with great impetuosity, the 
force which had overwhelmed Hill's divisions. The Fed- 
erals were in turn soon compelled to yield all the ground 
heretofore gained, and, upon being further pressed, to fall 
back for shelter to a line of works some distance in rear of 
the line, held by them the day previous, and which had been 
constructed for the protection of the Brock Eoad, along 
which one of their columns advanced on the 4th of May. 

So far, complete success had crowned General Longstreet's 
movement. The necessary orders were given by him to fol- 
low up the advantage gained, and dispositions were made to 
press the dismayed and fleeing enemy. Surely a decisive 
victory was now to be vouchsafed the Confederate arms, 
when, lo ! by an accident truly calamitous in its results, the 
Confederates were deprived of their leader. General Long- 
street, with his staff, was advancing along the road at the 
head of Jenkins's brigade, when the latter — mistaken for a 
body of the enemy by a portion of the flanking column, 
which continued its advance through the woods — was fired 
into. General Longstreet was seriously wounded, and Gen- 
eral Jenkins fell dead. The forward movement was checked, 
and thus was time afforded the Federals in which to rally, 
reenforce, and reform, behind their intrenchments. Thus, 



IN THE WILDERNESS. 129 

by a strange fatality, a second time was Lee's lieutenant 
stricken down in the tangled mazes of the Wilderness, when 
in the full tide of victory, and that not by hostile hand ! 

In these encounters in the Wilderness the Confederates 
inflicted severe losses upon the enemy, and, besides gaining 
ground, captured prisoners, artillery, and other trophies. As 
can be well understood, these results were attained, however, 
at serious cost to General Lee, who, constrained to spare his 
men as much as possible, hesitated to assail the enemy in his 
intrenched position, and hopefully awaited attack. General 
Grant did not again assume the aggressive, and so the 7th 
passed in comparative quiet. 

General Grant, in pursuance of his original design, then 
attempted, by a rapid flank movement, to secure possession of 
Spottsylvania Court-House ; but General Lee, on the night of 
the 7th, anticipated his purpose, and detached a portion of 
Longstreet's corps, under command of General K. H. Ander- 
son, to move at once to that point. The van of the opposing 
forces, each making for the same goal, arrived almost simul- 
taneously on the morning of the 8th at the Court-PIouse. 
The Federals, a little in advance, drove back the Confederate 
cavalry, but were in turn quickly dispossessed of the strategic 
point by the opportune arrival of Anderson's infantry. The 
two armies then swung round, each forming on its advanced 
guard as a nucleus, and on the 9th confronted each other in 
line of battle. 

General Lee was still between his adversary and Rich- 
mond. These movements were necessarily made with great 
rapidity, and the several commands, as they moved into line, 
proceeded at once to fortify in the positions in which they 
found themselves, without due regard to a perfect alignment, 
and ignoring to a certain extent natural advantages and dis- 
advantages. The line of defense, as thus originally con- 
structed, was consequently imperfect, and at some points 
quite vulnerable. 

On the 10th of May, by a spirited dash, the enemy made 



130 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

a lodgment on the left of General Ewell, obtaining tempo- 
rary possession of a portion of the lines and a battery of 
artillery. It was there again that General Lee started for the 
breach, with the purpose of leading the troops in the effort 
to regain the lost ground, when his staff and other officers 
surrounded him and urged him to desist, imploring him not 
thus to expose himself to an almost certain death. To their 
expostulations he replied that he would relinquish his pur- 
pose if they would see to it that the lines were reestablished 
— that that " must be done." And it was done ! The 
enemy was quickly made to relinquish his temporary advan- 
tage, and both guns and ground were recovered. 

Upon an examination of the lines, General Lee had de- 
tected the weakness of that portion known as " the salient," 
to the right of the point assailed on the 10th, to which I have 
just alluded, and occupied by the division of General Edward 
Johnson (E well's corps), and had directed a second line to be 
constructed across its base, to which he proposed to move 
back the troops occupying the angle. These arrangements 
were not quite completed, when he thought he saw cause to 
suspect another flank-movement by General Grant, and, on 
the night of the 11th, ordered most of the artillery at this 
portion of the lines to be withdrawn, so as to be available to 
take part in a counter-movement. Toward the dawn of day, 
on the 12th, General Johnson discovered indications of an 
impending assault upon his front. He sent immediate orders 
for the return of his artillery, and caused other preparations 
for defense to be made ; but the enemy, who could advance 
without discovery to within a short distance of the works 
under cover of a body of woods, had massed there a large 
force, and, with the advent of the first rays of morning light, 
by a spirited assault, quickly overran that portion of the lines 
before the artillery could be put in position, and captured 
most of the division, including its brave commander. The 
army was thus cut in twain, and the situation was one well 
calculated to test the skill of its commander and the nerve 



SPOTTSYLVANIA. 131 

and courage of the men. Dispositions were immediately 
made to repair the breach, and troops were moved up from 
the right and left to dispute the further progress of the as- 
saulting column. Then occurred the most remarkable mus- 
ketry-fire of the war : from the sides of the salient, in the 
possession of the Federals, and the new line, forming the 
base of the triangle, occupied by the Confederates, poured 
forth, from continuous lines of hissing fire, an incessant, ter- 
rific hail of deadly missiles. No living man nor thing could 
stand in the doomed space embraced within those angry 
lines ; even large trees were felled — their trunks cut in twain 
by the bullets of small-arms. Never did the troops on either 
side display greater valor and determination. Intense and 
bitter was the struggle. The Confederates, moving up to 
fill the gap, fell with tremendous power upon the Federal 
mass, caused it to recoil somewhat, closed with it in a hand- 
to-hand conflict, but failed to dislodge it ; while the Federal 
assault, which threatened such serious consequences, was 
effectually checked, and the advantage to the enemy result- 
ing therefrom was limited to the possession of the narrow 
space of the salient and the capture of the force which had 
occupied it. The loss of this fine body of troops was serious- 
ly felt by General Lee ; but sadly reduced though his army 
was, by this and a week's incessant fighting, such was the 
metal of what remained that his lines, thus forcibly rectified, 
proved thereafter impregnable. 

Several days of comparative quiet ensued. The army 
under General Grant was at this time heavily reenforced 
from Washington. In his official report of this campaign he 
says, " The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th (of May), 
were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of 
reinforcements from Washington." l In numerical strength 
his army so much exceeded that under General Lee that, 
after covering the entire Confederate front with double lines 

1 General Grant's " Report," " Report of the Secretary of War to the Thirty- 
ninth Congress," vol. ii., p. 1106. 



132 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

of battle, lie had in reserve a large force with which to extend 
his flank, and compel a corresponding movement on the part 
of his adversary, in order to keep between him and his covet- 
ed prize — the capital of the Confederacy. 

On the 18th another assault was directed against the 
Confederate lines, but it produced no impression. ]S"o effort 
was made after this — the task was a hopeless one, and was 
reluctantly relinquished. 

On the night of the 20th, General Grant started on an- 
other flank -movement in the direction of Bowling Green. 
General Lee in order to intercept him moved to Hanover 
Junction. 

I again make one or two extracts from notes taken at the 
time, as illustrating the spirit of the army and the character 
of the work it was called on to perform : 

Camp at Hanover Junction, May 23, 1864. 

.... For the first time since the 4th of the month we 
were on yesterday spared the sight of the enemy. On the day 
before it was discovered that he was leaving our front and mov- 
ing toward Bowling Green. He dared not, as we prayed he 
would, attack us again at Spottsylvania. With several rivers 
between his army and ours, he could move to Bowling Green 
and below without any danger of our intercepting him. He 
would thus get some miles nearer Richmond, in a geographical 
sense, but in reality be as far from that city as ever, because 
this army will still confront him, let him change his base as 
often as he pleases. To counteract his new design, our army 
was put in motion for this place. The enemy had the start of 
us, but by excellent marching we have again placed him in our 
front. It is probable that he will make still another move to 
our right, and land somewhere near West Point. 

This would of course necessitate our moving between that 
point and Richmond. Why General Grant did not carry his 
army to his new base without incurring the heavy losses he has 
sustained in battle, I cannot say. If Fredericksburg was his 
destination, he could have attained possession of it without the 



HANOVER JUNCTION. 133 

loss of a hundred men. The same can be said of West Point. 
After his discomfiture in the Wilderness, he started for Spott- 
sylvania Court-House, hoping to reach there before General Lee. 
There were but few indications of his intended departure from 
our front at that time to most of us, but General Lee seemed to 
divine his intention, and sent a corps to Spottsylvania just in 
time to meet the enemy at that place. We engaged them and 
beat them back, thereby securing the Court-House. In com- 
menting upon this, the Northern papers say that we retreat- 
ed and that Grant pursued us ; while the truth is, General 
Grant was completely outgeneraled. No doubt the entire 
North is this day rejoicing over our retreat to this point ; yet 
the battle-field was left in our possession, and we marched here 
without any molestation whatever. This does not look like a 
retreat. Our army is in excellent condition ; its morale as good 
as when we met Grant — two weeks since — for the first time. 
He will feel us again before he reaches his prize. His losses 
have been already fearfully large. Our list of casualties is a 
sad one to contemplate, but does not compare with his terrible 
record of killed and wounded : he does not pretend to bury 
his dead, leaves his wounded without proper attendance, and 
seems entirely reckless as regards the lives of his men. This, 
and his remarkable pertinacity, constitute his sole claim to su- 
periority over his predecessors. He certainly holds on longer 
than any of them. He alone, of all, would have remained this 
side of the Rapidan after the battles of the Wilderness. 

The gage of battle proffered by General Lee at Hanover 
Junction was declined by General Grant, who, in order to 
extricate his army from a position of some embarrassment, 
about the 26th of May, recrossed to the north side of the 
North Anna River, and made another detour to the east. 
General Lee moved upon a parallel line. If his army had 
been of even reasonable proportions in comparison with that 
of his adversary, his movement would have been of another 
character, and one of the two wings of the Federal army 
would have been assailed while on the south side of the 
river. 



134 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

On the 30th of May General Lee was in line of battle, 
with his left at Atlee's Station. 

Camp at Atlee's Station, early Morning, May 30, 1864. 

.... We are confronting General Grant, and only waiting 
to have him located — to have his position well developed — 
before this army is let loose at its old opponent. On yesterday 
afternoon the enemy appeared to be advancing toward us, and 
this morning I confidently expected to hear the firing of small- 
arms before this hour. . . . We have now had three weeks of 
constant fighting, marching, and watching. . . . 

The general has been somewhat indisposed, and could at- 
tend to nothing except what was absolutely necessary for him 
to know and act upon. ... He is now improving. 

The indisposition of General Lee here alluded to was 
more serious than was generally supposed. Those near him 
were very apprehensive lest he should be compelled to give 
up. To quote the words of one of his greatest admirers and 
most trusted friends, Lieutenant-General Early : 

One of his three corps commanders had been disabled by 
wounds at the Wilderness, and another was too sick to com- 
mand his corps, while he himself was suffering from a most an- 
noying and weakening disease. In fact, nothing but his own 
determined will enabled him to keep the field at all ; and it was 
there rendered more manifest than ever that he was the head 
and front, the very life and soul of his army. 

After feeling the Confederate position, attack was de- 
clined by the enemy. By another gyratory movement of the 
kind so persistently pursued by General Grant in this cam- 
paign, the two armies again gravitated east, and were soon 
(June 3d) face to face on the historic field of Cold Harbor. 
Here, gallant but fruitless efforts were made by General 
Grant to pierce or drive back the army under General Lee. 
The Confederates were protected by temporary earthworks, 
and while under cover of these were gallantly assailed by 



COLD HARBOR. 135 

the Federals. But in vain : the assault was repulsed along 
the whole line, and the carnage on the Federal side was 
frightful. I well recall having received a report after the 
assault from General Hoke — whose division reached the army 
just previous to this battle — to the effect that the ground in 
his entire front, over which the enemy had charged, was 
literally covered with their dead and wounded ; and that up 
to that time he had not had a single man killed. No won- 
der that, when the command was given to renew the assault, 
the Federal soldiers sullenly and silently declined to advance. 1 
After some disingenuous proposals, General Grant finally 
asked a truce to enable him to bury his dead. Soon after 
this he abandoned his chosen line of operations, and moved 
his army to the south side of James Kiver. The struggle 
from the Wilderness to this point covered a period of over 
one month ; during which time there had been an almost 
daily encounter of hostile arms, and the Army of Northern 
Yirginia had placed hors de combat of the army under Gen- 
eral Grant a number equal to its entire numerical strength at 
the commencement of the campaign, and, notwithstanding its 
own heavy losses and the reenf orcements received by the 
enemy, still presented an impregnable front to its opponent, 
and constituted an insuperable barrier to General Grant's 
" On to Eichmond ! " 

After an unsuccessful effort to surprise and capture 
Petersburg — which was prevented by the skill of Generals 
Beauregard and Wise, and the bravery of the troops, consist- 
ing in part of militia and home-guards — and a futile endeav- 
or to seize the Eichmond & Petersburg Eailroad, General 
Grant concentrated his army south of the Appomattox Eiver. 
General Lee, whom he had not been able to defeat in the 

1 " The order was issued through these officers to their subordinate command- 
ers, and from them descended through the wonted channels ; but no man stirred, 
and the immobile lines pronounced a verdict, silent, yet emphatic, against fur- 
ther slaughter. The loss on the Union side in this sanguinary action was over 
thirteen thousand, while on the part of the Confederates it is doubtful whether 
it reached that many hundreds." — (Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 487.) 



136 FOUR YEARS WITH GEXERAL LEE. 

open field, was still in his way, and the' siege of Petersburg 
was begun. 

General Lee was compelled about this time to detach 
General Early, with the Second Corps, to check the advance 
of the Federal force under General Hunter that was moving 
up the Yalley, laying waste as it advanced and threatening 
our communications with the interior via Lynchburg. It 
will be well understood that he could not spare any portion 
of his army, already greatly inferior in numerical strength 
to its opponent, but no other troops were available. 

It has been seen that, at the commencement of this ex- 
traordinary campaign, the effective strength of the army un- 
der General Lee was sixty-four thousand men, and that 
under General Grant one hundred and forty-one thousand 
one hundred and sixty men. The only reinforcements re- 
ceived by General Lee were as follows : Near Hanover Junc- 
tion he was joined by a small force under General Breckin- 
ridge, from Southwestern Yirginia, twenty-two hundred 
strong, and Pickett's division of Longstreet's (First) corps, 
which had been on detached service in North Carolina ; 
Hoke's brigade of Early's division, twelve hundred strong, 
which had been on detached duty at the Junction, here also 
rejoined its division ; and at Cold Harbor General Lee re- 
ceived the division of General Hoke, also just from North 
Carolina — the two divisions (Pickett's and Hoke's) number- 
ing eleven thousand men. 1 The aggregate of these reinforce- 
ments (fourteen thousand four hundred men) added to Gen- 
eral Lee's original strength would give seventy-eight thou- 

1 The " Monthly Return of General Lee's Army," of the 30th of June, 1864, 
shows that at that date Pickett's division numbered four thousand eight hun- 
dred and eighty-four, and Hoke's division five thousand two hundred and eighty- 
six, making together ten thousand one hundred and seventy effective. Hoke 
was engaged at Cold Harbor, but suffered little loss ; Pickett lost a few hundred 
men in his assault on the enemy's lines between the James and Appomattox 
Rivers on the 16th of June. The joint loss of the two divisions did not ex- 
ceed eight hundred men between the time they joined General Lee and the date 
of the return quoted. 



COLD HARBOR. 137 

sand four hundred as the aggregate of all troops engaged 
under him from the "Wilderness to Cold Harbor. 

When at Spottsylvania Court-House General Grant was 
reenforced from "Washington, but I can only conjecture to 
what extent. The Secretary of War states that " the chief 
part of the force designed to guard the Middle Department 
and the Department of Washington was called forward to 
the front" l at this time. The same authority puts the effec- 
tive strength of these two departments on the 1st of May at 
forty-seven thousand seven hundred and fifty-one men, 2 of 
which the chief part — let us say, thirty-five thousand — was 
sent to the aid of General Grant. At Cold Harbor he was 
joined by General W. F. Smith with four divisions, taken 
from the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, numbering sixteen 
thousand men. 3 Adding these reinforcements to General 
Grant's original strength, we have one hundred and ninety- 
two thousand one hundred and sixty men as the aggregate 
of the troops employed by him in his operations from the 
Bapidan to the James. 

The Federal loss in the battles of the Wilderness, Spott- 
sylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, is put at " above 
sixty thousand men " by Mr. Swinton in his history of the 
" Army of the Potomac." 

1 " Report of the Secretary of War, First Session, Thirty-ninth Congress," 
vol. L, 1865-'66, p. V. 
8 Ibid., pp. 5, 6. 
3 Swinton, " Army of the Potomac," p. 482. 



CHAPTER XI. 

Siege of Petersburg. — General Lee's Yiews as to the Removal of General John- 
ston from the Command of the Army of Tennessee. — Movements of Sher- 
man's Army. — Inevitable Result of the Persistent Effort to hold Petersburg 
and Richmond. 

Haying failed to obtain possession of Petersburg by sur- 
prise, and General Lee being now well established in his line 
of defense, General Grant determined upon the method of 
slow approaches, and proceeded to invest the city and its 
brave defenders by a line of earthworks and mines. While 
with his constantly-increasing numbers General Grant under- 
took to tighten the ligature thus applied to the carotid artery 
of the Confederacy, General Sherman was sent upon his des- 
olating expedition through the States of Georgia and South 
Carolina to add the policy of starvation to that of attrition 
inaugurated a few months previous. After this manner it 
was proposed to exhaust and wear out the people who could 
not be beaten in a trial of arms. It is beyond the scope of 
my undertaking to record, in detail, the events and incidents 
of that ten months' siege. Reduced in numbers as was the 
Army of Northern Virginia, and limited as it was in sup- 
plies of all kinds, it nevertheless dealt many vigorous and 
destructive blows to its adversary, and contributed much to 
its already imperishable renown. I note as especially wor- 
thy of mention the recapture of our lines, after the explo- 
sion of the Federal mine at the " Crater," by the troops un- 
der General Mahone, and the many brilliant sorties made 
under the direction of that gallant soldier upon the Federal 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 139 

left near the "Weldon road; the very successful attack on 
Hancock, at Reams's Station, by Heth's division and a por- 
tion of Wilcox's, on the 25th of August, under the direction 
of General A. P. Hill ; as also the bold and successful ex- 
ploits of our cavalry under General Hampton; the final 
charge made upon the Federal lines by General Gordon's 
troops, on the 25th of March ; and, last but not least, the 
heroic defense of Fort Gregg, on the 2d of April, by a 
mixed command of infantry and dismounted artillery — 
drivers armed with muskets. 

In chronological order it is well here to mention a mat- 
ter about which there has been some misapprehension in the 
public mind. Reference is made to the part taken by Gen- 
eral Lee in the removal of General Johnston from the com- 
mand of the Army of Tennessee. In the early part of July 
a telegram was received by General Lee from the President, 
stating that a heavy pressure was being brought to bear 
upon him for the removal of General Johnston, asking his 
views in regard to it, and what he thought of the appoint- 
ment of General Hood to the command of that army. The 
reply of General Lee was, in substance, that, while he re- 
garded General Hood as a most capable and deserving offi- 
cer, he could not recommend the change proposed ; and that, 
in his judgment, it would be unwise, under the circumstances 
then existing, to make any change in commanders. The 
telegraphic communication between the President and Gen- 
eral Lee was conducted in cipher- in all matters of impor- 
tance. The duty of interpreting these dispatches and put- 
ting them into cipher devolved upon me, and their contents 
were more positively and permanently impressed upon my 
memory than would have been the case in the mere reading 
or copying of an ordinary message. 

Conscious that it would be unbecoming on my part to 
express any opinion concerning the order of the President 
directing the change alluded to, I touch upon this delicate 
matter only as it concerns General Lee, and not with the de- 



140 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

sire of adding a feather's weight to the arguments for or 
against the wisdom or propriety of the order relieving Gen- 
eral Johnston of command, save that which my former com- 
rades in arms will attach to the opinion of General Lee. 

Reverting to the notes from which I have previously 
quoted, I append additional extracts, whose only value, if 
any they have, is derived from the fact that they were writ- 
ten by one who was brought into daily and intimate relations 
with General Lee, and whose position made him thoroughly 
informed as to all matters of routine in the Army of North- 
ern Virginia ; and, therefore, then- tone may be regarded as 
in some measure indicative of the spirit and temper of that 
army ; and the intimations of contemplated changes or prob- 
able movements therein made, as the reflex of the views and 
opinions of General Lee as to what was regarded as expedi- 
ent or probable : 

Neajb Petersburg, Va., August 28, 1864. 
We have had some irregular but quite severe fighting dur- 
ing the past two weeks, and in summing up the result there is 
a decided balance in our favor. Still, the enemy retains pos- 
session of the Weldon Railroad. To do this, however, has cost 
General Grant about twelve thousand men. 

North Side James River, October 27, 1864. 

There are indications of a general movement. The enemy 
is in motion at all points. We may have to move any moment. 
General Hill, at Petersburg, reports the enemy making a general 
advance on his right. General Longstreet here reports a dem- 
onstration along his entire line, and there is some activity on 
the river and between the James and Appomattox. The gen- 
eral has gone to the lines alone. 

North Side, November 1, 1864. 

The general informed me last night that he wished to go to 
Petersburg, and, as he would probably remain a week or more, 
it would be necessary to take everything along with us. He 
has gone ahead, and will take a ride by Pickett's line. 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 141 

Petersburg, Va., November 7, 1864. 
On leaving the north side the general left it to me to select 
an abiding-place for our party here. I, of course, selected a 
place where I thought he would be comfortable, although I 
firmly believe he concluded that I was thinking more of myself 
than of him. I took possession of a vacant house and had his 
room prepared, with a cheerful fire, and everything made as 
cozv as possible. It was entirely too pleasant for him, for he is 
never so uncomfortable as when comfortable. A day or two 
after our arrival he informed me that he desired to visit the cav- 
alry-lines, and thought it best to move our camp down. So we 
packed up bag and baggage — books and records — and moved to 
a point about eight miles distant, pitched our tents, and con- 
cluded that we were fixed for some days at least. The next 
morning, however, the general concluded that we had better re- 
turn. So back I came to Petersburg, and as I could find no 
better place — nor a worse one that was suitable — I returned to 
the house we had vacated, where we are now comfortably estab- 
lished. This is the first time we have been quartered in a house. 

Near Petersburg, Va., November 27, 1864. 
While General Lee was in Richmond, I concluded to move 
headquarters, as a party that proposed to occupy the house as 
soon as we should vacate had given a gentle hint by sending to 
inquire " when General Lee would leave the house." The only 
other house available was one two miles from the city, kindly 
offered by the owner, Mr. Turnbull. So here we are at " Edge 
Hill." I am finely fixed in the parlor with piano, sofas, rock- 
ing-chairs, and pictures ; capital surroundings for a winter cam- 
paign. After locating the general and my associates of the 
staff, I concluded that I would have to occupy one of the miser- 
able little back-rooms, but the gentleman of the house sug- 
gested that I should take the parlor. I think that the general 
was pleased with his room, and on entering mine he remarked: 
" Ah ! you are finely fixed. Couldn't you find any other room ? " 
" No," I replied, " but this will do. I can make myself tolerably 
comfortable here." He was struck dumb with amazement at 
my impudence, and soon vanished. 



142 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

Edge Hill, December 4, 1864. 
Since the affair at Stony Creek we have had perfect quiet on 
our lines. The Sixth Corps, which has been with Sheridan in 
General Early's front, has started for City Point — so we are in- 
formed by telegraph. General Gracie, who showed such tact in 
getting General Lee to descend from a dangerous position, was 
killed near the lines a day or so ago. He was an excellent 
officer, had passed through many hard-fought battles, escaped 
numberless dangers, and was finally killed while quietly viewing 
the enemy from a point where no one dreamed of danger. I 
have just received a telegram from General Ewell reporting 
great commotion on the part of the enemy in his front this 
evening. Movements tend to Fort Harrison. 

Edge Hill, December 12, 1864. 
We have had much excitement during the past week; nor 
has the end yet come. Couriers were arriving during the whole 
of last night — and what a bitter cold night it was ! So far the 
enemy have accomplished but little. The whole movement 
seems to have been a grand raid on the Weldon Railroad, and, 
although the bridge was saved by the valor of our troops, the 
enemy succeeded in destroying about ten miles of the road. 
There were other movements along the lines, but in results they 
were trifling. Last night another advance was reported, but it 
was probably only reinforcements going to the rescue of the 
first column. 

Edge Hill, December 18, 1864. 
We have had comparative quiet since the recent affair on 
the Weldon road. It is difficult to anticipate events now, but 
it appears more probable that the vicinity of Wilmington, 
North Carolina, will he the scene of the next engagement than 
either Petersburg or Richmond. 

Edge Hill, February 5, 1865. 

Instead of a quiet Sunday, we have had one of considerable 

excitement : the indications are that General Grant is once more 

moving on us. It is not positively know T n whether or not he 

has been reenforced by General Thomas, but, all things consid- 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 143 

ered, it is better that we should fight now than later. The 
present movement is probably a raid upon our railroads — the 
South Side and the Richmond & Danville. We are sanguine, 
and never expect anything but success; but the approaching 
spring campaign will be a trying one. Sherman may occasion 
us a great deal of trouble, and it may be necessary to make 
very important changes in the campaign, and for this army 
to change its position. 

Edge Hill, February 6, 1865. 

After all, yesterday's excitement resulted in but little. The 
enemy have not gone after our railroads, having been checked 
at Dinwiddie Court-House. They have extended their lines 
somewhat, but as yet show no disposition to attack in force. 
Richmond is doubtless much excited over the return of the Peace 
Commission and the result of its mission. Our people now 
know what they have to expect. 

Edge Hill, February 20, 1865. 

Truly matters are becoming serious and exciting. If some- 
body doesn't arrest Sherman's march, where will he stop ? They 
are trying to corner this old army, but like a brave lion brought 
to bay at last it is determined to resist to the death, and if die 
it must to die game. We are to have some hard knocks, we are 
to experience much that is dispiriting, but if our men are true 
(and I really believe that most of them are) we will make our 
way successfully through the dark clouds that now surround 
us. Our people must make up their minds to see Richmond go, 
but must not lose spirit, must not give up. The general left 
but a few moments ago. My orders are to be in marching 
order, to lose no time, to begin my preparations to-morrow. 
These instructions apply to army headquarters only. The army 
will retain its position still a time longer, but the general-in- 
chief may soon bid it a temporary adieu and repair to another 
scene of excitement. 

Edge Hill, February 24, 1865. 

Now that General Johnston has been placed in command of 
his old army by General Lee, it is not probable that the latter 
will go to South Carolina — at any rate not immediately. . . . 
It is not to be denied that our condition at this time is a criti- 



144 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

cal one; but, although it is a crisis in our affairs, it is the same 
with the enemy. Suppose we were to concentrate on Sherman 
and crush him, would not the aspect of affairs be entirely 
changed? Well, that is not beyond the range of possibility. 
Much depends on the check given to Sherman's career. Rich- 
mond may be lost to us — and Sherman may be overwhelmed. 
The defeat of Sherman would restore Richmond. To be rid of 
him would more than compensate for such temporary sacrifice. 
The rumors in Richmond are great exaggerations of facts. 
Some of our weaker men have deserted their colors, but the de- 
sertion is not so great as reported. We are getting something 
to eat, and most of our brave fellows are in good heart, although 
grieved to hear of despondency behind them. All at home 
should send words of cheer and encouragement to the army. 

Edge Hill, March 5, 1865. 

I do not, cannot, yet despair; but it is evident that there 
has been a rapid, radical change in the tone of public sentiment, 
in which some of our officials participate. Some high in au- 
thority tell us that the people are tired, that they are not sup- 
ported by the people, and that public sentiment has undergone 
a change. Claiming to be prompted by a desire to prevent the 
further effusion of blood, these talk of terms and reconstruc- 
tion. I do not think our military situation hopeless by any 
means; but I confess matters are far worse than I ever ex- 
pected to* see them. 

Edge Hill, March 23, 1865. 

The dread contingency of which some intimation has been 
given is near at hand. No one can say what the next week may 
bring forth, although the calamity may be deferred a while 
longer. Now is the hour when we must show of what stuff we 
are made. It would be worse than useless to indulge in repin- 
ings and regrets, which could only impair our efficiency and. 
tend to dishearten those who look to us for protection. 

Edge Hill, March 27, 1865. 
Matters have not improved since the 23d; there is no cause 
for hope now which did not exist then. The probable contin- 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 145 

gency is a foregone conclusion. There appears to be an unac- 
countable apathy and listlessness in high places. It would be 
better to face the misfortune bravely, and prepare for it in an- 
ticipation. There seems to be no preparation for the removal 
of the several departments of the government; when the press- 
ure is upon us it may be impracticable. I say nothing of our 
fight; it was gallantly done, as far as it went. [Allusion is here 
made to the attack made on the Federal lines by a portion of 
Gordon's command.] 

It is a very simple matter to trace, through the dates 
here given, the steady progress toward the inevitable doom 
which, sooner or later, awaited the Confederates in their 
inflexible purpose to hold the city of Richmond. 

General Lee was opposed to that policy which desig- 
nated certain points as indispensable to be held, except so 
far and so long as they possessed strategic value to the ar- 
mies operating in the field. He maintained that the deter- 
mination to retain possession of such, under all circumstances 
and at any cost, caused a fallacious value to attach to suc- 
cess in such endeavor, and, in event of failure, entailed a 
moral loss on us, and assured an elation to the enemy alto- 
gether disproportionate to the material benefit to be derived 
from continued possession ; not that he would not have 
made an earnest effort to save such points as Yicksburg 
and Eichmond from falling into the hands of the enemy 
— especially the latter, which had a real value, strategical- 
ly considered ; but when it came to a siege, to settle down 
behind intrenchments and permit the gradual and complete 
circumvallation of the place besieged, by an adversary with 
unlimited resources of men and material, he preferred to 
move out, to manoeuvre, to concentrate, and to fight. 

His policy at Petersburg would have been to unite 
the greater portion of his army — before it wasted away 
from incessant battle and from desertion 1 — with that under 

1 A few words in regard to this desertion : The condition of affairs through- 
10 



146 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

General Johnston, and to fall upon General Sherman with 
the hope of destroying him, and then, with the united 
armies, to return to confront General Grant. Having the 
interior line, he could move to accomplish such purpose 
much more quickly than his adversary could to thwart it, 
Such a policy involved the giving up of Eichmond, it is 
true ; but that which was pursued involved the same thing 
with a certainty more absolute, and left Sherman to over- 
whelm Johnston, and at the same time to destroy the gran- 
aries of the Confederacy, from which Lee's army was sup- 
plied. 

In my opinion, as a general rule, the Administration was 
in perfect accord with General Lee in all his designs, and 
gave a hearty cooperation in all his movements ; but I think 
the exception was furnished in the persistent effort to hold 
Richmond and Petersburg, after it became evident that it 
could be but a question of time, and would probably involve 
the complete exhaustion of the principal army of the Con- 
federacy. 

If it shall be the verdict of posterity that General Lee 
in any respect fell short of perfection as a military leader, it 
may perhaps be claimed : first, that he was too careful of 
the personal feelings of his subordinate commanders, too 
fearful of wounding their pride, and too solicitous for their 
reputation. Probably it was this that caused him sometimes 
to continue in command those of whose fitness for their 
position he was not convinced, and often led him, either 
avowedly or tacitly, to assume responsibility for mishaps 

out the South at that period was truly deplorable. Hundreds of letters ad- 
dressed to soldiers were intercepted and sent to army headquarters, in which 
mothers, wives, and sisters, told of their inability to respond to the appeals of 
hungry children for bread, or to provide proper care and remedies for the 
sick ; and, in the name of all that was dear, appealed to the men to come 
home and rescue them from the ills which they suffered and the starvation 
which threatened them. Surely never was devotion to one's country and to 
one's duty more sorely tested than was the case with the soldiers of Lee's 
army during the last year of the war. 



SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 147 

clearly attributable to the inefficiency, neglect, or careless- 
ness, of others. I have heard him express the wish that 
General A had the command of a certain division instead 
of Genera] B, when General A was a brigadier in Major- 
General B's division, and a recommendation from the 
general to the department would doubtless have procured 
the change. The world already knows how prone he was 
at all times to take upon his own shoulders the respon- 
sibility for failure or mishap, and thus shield those from 
censure who had really failed to execute his orders or 
designs. 

In the next place it may be said that he was too law- 
abiding, too subordinate to his superiors in civil authority 
— those who managed the governmental machinery. Brought 
up in the school of the soldier he had early imbibed the 
idea that discipline was essential in the military life, and 
that subordination was the key-stone of discipline. Obedi- 
ence to orders was, in his judgment, the cardinal principle 
with all good soldiers of every grade. As a rule, no one 
can deny the correctness of this view ; but those were ex- 
traordinary times, and, in some matters, ordinary rules were 
extraordinary evils. General Lee should have been supreme 
in all matters touching the movements and discipline of his 
army, whereas, under the law and the regulations of the 
Department of War made in conformity thereto, he had not 
even the power to confer promotion on the field of battle, 
and thus to recognize and reward meritorious conduct ; and 
in matters concerning the movements of his army he was of 
course under authority, and more or less controlled by politi- 
cal considerations. Perhaps it could not be otherwise under 
our peculiar form of government, but it would never be pos- 
sible to get the full measure of a man's capacity for military 
affairs who was thus trammeled. 

A month or two before the close of the war the scope 
of General Lee's authority was enlarged, and he was made 
general-in-chief of all the armies of the Confederacy ; but 



148 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

the end was then near at hand, and the affairs of the South 
hopeless. 

The traits of character alluded to, excessive generosity 
and perfect subordination, while they adorned the life of 
General Lee, are not compatible with the generally accepted 
notions of perfection in a revolutionary leader. 



CHAPTEE XII. 

Evacuation of Petersburg. — General Lee's Retreat up JameB River. — Appo- 
mattox. — Surrender. — General Lee goes to Richmond. 

On the first day of April General Grant directed a heavy 
movement against the Confederate right near Five Forks ; 
this necessitated the concentration of every available man at 
that point to resist the Federal advance, and a consequent 
stretching out of our line, already so sadly attenuated that 
at some places it consisted of but one man to every seven 
yards — nothing more than a skirmish-line. It was without 
serious resistance, therefore, that on the 2d of April the 
Federals obtained possession of a portion of the lines be- 
tween Hatcher's Eun and the city. Indeed, we had so few 
men to contest the matter with them that they were within 
our lines before it was reported to General Lee or General 
Hill. From the point occupied by these officers, detached 
squads of men were observed advancing toward us in the 
plateau beyond ; it was impossible to say whether they were 
our men or the enemy; and it was for the purpose of solv- 
ing this doubt and ascertaining the actual condition of affairs 
in that locality, that General A. P. Hill rode toward these 
detachments, by the fire from one of which he was shot dead 
from his horse. 

Under cover of a heavy fire of artillery the Federal army 
now made a general advance. It was apparent that our 
position could be no longer maintained. General Lee com- 
municated to the authorities at Eichmond his intention of 



150 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

evacuating his lines that night, for which emergency they 
should have been prepared. 

During the whole day he was engaged in issuing orders 
and sending dispatches by couriers and by telegraph, in 
preparation for this event. Early in the forenoon, while 
the telegraph-operator was working his instrument at head- 
quarters, under the supervision of the staff-officer charged 
with the duty of transmitting these orders, a shell came 
crashing through the house, and the operator declared him- 
self unable longer to work his instrument. He was ordered 
to detach it, and as the staff-officer and the operator emerged 
from the house, they with difficulty escaped capture at the 
hands of the Federal infantry, which just then advanced 
upon and drove away the battery of artillery which had 
been placed in position around the house to assist in delay- 
ing the advance of the enemy. The comfortable dwelling 
of Mr. Turnbull, occupied by General Lee as his headquar- 
ters, and thus hastily evacuated by the rear-guard of his 
military family, was soon enveloped in flames. It is to be 
hoped that the fire was accidental ; by General Lee it was 
then thought and feared to have been by design. One of 
the many arguments always advanced by him why he should 
not occupy a house was, that, in event of its falling into the 
hands of the enemy, the very fact of its having been occu- 
pied by him might possibly cause its destruction ; and, as 
before stated, it was only during the last year of the war, 
when his health was somewhat impaired, that one of his 
staff had the temerity, on the occasion of one of the gen- 
eral's visits to Richmond, to turn in his tent to the quarter- 
master's department, and move his effects into a house, 
which he was thus almost compelled to occupy. 

After a gallant resistance our forces were retired to the 
second or inner line of defense around the city of Peters- 
burg, and there maintained their ground till nightfall. By 
the dawn of day next morning the lines had been evacuated, 
and the gallant but sadly-reduced Army of Northern Yir- 



GENERAL LEE'S RETREAT. 151 

ginia had made good way in its retreat westwardly toward 
Amelia Court-House. The intention was to take the direc- 
tion of Danville, and turn to our advantage the good line 
for resistance offered by the Dan and Staunton Rivers. 
The activity of the Federal cavalry and the want of sup- 
plies compelled a different course, and the retreat was con- 
tinued up the South Side Railroad toward Lynchburg. 

Despite the great numerical superiority of the Federals 
and their immense resources, General Lee managed to check 
their pursuit from time to time, and to continue his retreat 
for seven days, until, on the morning of the 9th of April, 
our advance under General Gordon was confronted by the 
enemy in the neighborhood of Appomattox Court-House. 
The returns from the various commands made that morning 
showed an aggregate of eight thousand muskets in line of 
battle. 

On the previous evening I became separated from Gen- 
eral Lee in the execution of his orders in regard to the park- 
ing of our trains in places of safety, and did not rejoin him 
until the morning of the 9th. After making my report the 
general said to me, 1 " "Well, colonel, what are we to do ? " 

In reply, a fear was expressed that it would be necessary 
to abandon the trains, which had already occasioned us such 
great embarrassment ; and the hope was indulged that, re- 
lieved of this burden, the army could make good its escape. 

" Yes," said the general, " perhaps we could ; but I have 
had a conference with these gentlemen around me, and they 
agree that the time has come for capitulation." 

"Well, sir," I said, "I can only speak for myself; to 
me any other fate is preferable — " 

" Such is my individual way of thinking," interrupted 
the general. 

1 General Lee frequently thus addressed those around him — not that he at- 
tached any importance to or expected any aid from what might be said in re- 
ply ; but, in giving expression to that which occupied his own mind — thinking 
aloud, so to speak — -he at the same time drew from others such information as 
they might possess, or such views as they might entertain. 



152 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

" But," I immediately added, " of course, general, it is 
different with you. You have to think of these brave men 
and decide not only for yourself, but for them." 

" Yes," he replied ; " it would be useless and therefore 
cruel to provoke the further effusion of blood, and I have 
arranged to meet General Grant with a view to surrender, 
and wish you to accompany me." 

Shortly after this the general, accompanied by Colonel 
Marshall and myself, started back in the direction from 
which we had come, to meet General Grant as had been 
arranged. 

We continued some distance without meeting any one 
after passing our lines ; but finally came upon a staff-officer 
sent by General Grant's order to say to General Lee that he 
had been prevented from meeting him at that point, and to 
request that he would meet him upon the other road. Gen- 
eral Lee then retraced his steps, and, proceeding toward 
our front in the direction of Appomattox Court-House, dis- 
mounted at a convenient place to await General Grant's 
communication. Very soon a Federal officer, accompanied 
by one of General Gordon's staff, rode up to where General 
Lee was seated in a small orchard on the road-side. .This 
proved to be General Forsythe, of General Sheridan's staff, 
who was sent by General Sheridan to say that, as he had 
doubt as to his authority to recognize the informal truce 
which had been agreed upon between General Gordon and 
himself, he desired to communicate with General Meade on 
the subject, and wished permission to pass through our lines 
as the shortest route. I was assigned to the duty of escort- 
ing General Forsythe through our lines and back. This 
was scarcely accomplished, when General Babcock rode up 
and announced to General Lee that General Grant was pre- 
pared to meet him at the front. 

I shrank from this interview, and while I could not then, 
and cannot now, justify my conduct, I availed myself of the 
excuse of having taken the two rides through the extent of 



SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX. 153 

our lines and to those of the enemy, already mentioned, and 
did not accompany my chief in this trying ordeal. 

The scene witnessed upon the return of General Lee 
was one certain to impress itself indelibly upon the memory ; 
it can be vividly recalled now, after the lapse of many years, 
but no description can do it justice. The men crowded 
around him, eager to shake him by the hand ; eyes that had 
been so often illumined with the fire of patriotism and true 
courage, that had so often glared with defiance in the heat 
and fury of battle, and so often kindled with enthusiasm 
and pride in the hour of success, moistened now ; cheeks 
bronzed by exposure in many campaigns, and withal be- 
grimed with powder and dust, now blanched from deep 
emotion and suffered the silent tear ; tongues that had so 
often carried dismay to the hearts of the enemy in that in- 
describable cheer which accompanied " the charge," or that 
had so often made the air to resound with the psean of vic- 
tory, refused utterance now ; brave hearts failed that had 
never quailed in the presence of an enemy ; but the firm 
and silent pressure of the hand told most eloquently of souls 
filled with admiration, love, and tender sympathy, for their 
beloved chief. He essayed to thank them, but too full a 
heart paralyzed his speech ; he soon sought a short respite 
from these trying scenes and retired to his private quarters, 
that he might, in solitude and quiet, commune with his own 
brave heart and be still. Thus terminated the career of the 
Army of Northern Virginia — an army that was never van- 
quished ; but that, in obedience to the orders of its trusted 
commander, who was himself yielding obedience to the dic- 
tates of a pure and lofty sense of duty to his men and 
those dependent on them, laid down its arms, and furled the 
standards never lowered in defeat. 

The work of paroling the army was now proceeded with, 
and was completed on the 10th of April. On the same day 
General Meade called to pay his respects to General Lee. 
The latter reported to his staff, after the visit, that the con- 



154 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

versation had naturally turned upon recent events, and that 
General Meade had asked him how many men he had at 
Petersburg at the time of General Grant's final assault. He 
told him in reply that by the last returns he had thirty- 
three thousand muskets. (In his recital of the matter he 
appealed to me to know if his memory was correct, and was 
answered in the affirmative.) General Meade then said, 
" You mean that you had thirty-three thousand men in the 
lines immediately around Petersburg ? " to which General 
Lee replied " No," that he had but that number from his 
left on the Chickahominy Kiver to his right at Dinwiddie 
Court-House. At this General Meade expressed great sur- 
prise, and stated that he then had with him, in the one wing 
of the Federal army which he commanded, over fifty thou- 
sand men. 

The number of men and officers paroled, including the 
stragglers who had caught up with the army, and all the 
extra-duty or detailed men of every description, was in round 
numbers between twenty-six and twenty-seven thousand. 

On his way to Richmond General Lee stopped for the 
night near the residence of his brother, Mr. Carter Lee, of 
Powhatan County ; and, although importuned by his brother 
to pass the night under his roof, the general persisted in 
pitching his tent by the side of the road, and going into 
camp as usual. This continued self-denial can only be ex- 
plained upon the hypothesis that he desired to have his men 
know that he shared their privations to the very last. 

On the 12th day of April he returned to the city of 
Richmond a paroled prisoner of war, but a monarch still in 
the hearts of his countrymen, and an object of admiration in 
the eyes of the civilized world. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

General Lee indicted by the Grand-Jury at Norfolk. — His Advice to the Young 
Men of "Virginia. — His Purpose to write a History of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia. — His Desire to obtain Correct Information of the Strength 
of that Army. 

In June of the same year a United States grand-jury in 
Norfolk, Virginia, indicted Mr. Davis, General Lee, and 
others, for treason, or something similar to it. I immedi- 
ately informed General Lee of the fact, and at the same time 
expressed a regret that some of our young men were dis- 
couraged at not being able to obtain employment, and many 
in consequence talked of migrating to other countries. He 
replied as follows : 

Eichmond, Va., June 17, 1865. 

My dear Colonel: I am very much obliged to you for 
your letter of the 13th. I had heard of the indictment by the 
grand-jury at Norfolk, and made up my mind to let the au- 
thorities take their course. I have no wish to avoid any trial 
the Government may order, and cannot flee. I hope others may 
be unmolested, and that you at least may be undisturbed. 

I am sorry to hear that our returned soldiers cannot obtain 
employment. Tell them they must all set to work, and, if they 
cannot do what they prefer, do what they can. Virginia wants 
all their aid, all their support, and the presence of all her sons 
to sustain and recuperate her. They must therefore put them- 
selves in a position to take part in her government, and not be 
deterred by obstacles in their way. There is much to be done 
which they only can do. . . . 

Very truly yours, R. E. Lee. 

Colonel W. H. Taylor. 



156 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

This letter utterly refutes the charge repeatedly made by 
writers at the North that, after the cessation of hostilities, 
General Lee held himself aloof in sullen silence, declining 
to accept the situation. But two months had elapsed since 
the surrender at Appomattox — not a sufficient time for the 
subsidence of the passion engendered by war and the heal- 
ing of the wounds occasioned by defeat ; the hearts of the 
people of the South were yet filled with resentment and 
bitter hatred toward their Northern adversaries — and yet 
he, their greatest captain, counseled a prompt and ready 
acquiescence in the inevitable, urging his countrymen not 
to be deterred by seeming obstacles from resuming their 
citizenship with all its obligations — that is, not to flinch 
from a compliance with distasteful requirements, but to con- 
form to all legal enactments necessary to enable them to 
resume the reins of the government of their State, and thus 
save her from adventurous aliens, and consequent spoliation 
and ruin. 

Soon after this, General Lee conceived the idea of pre- 
paring the data for a complete history of the campaigns of 
the Army of Northern Virginia. Early in August I received 
the following letter from him, which fully explains his pur- 
pose in this regard : 

Near Cartersyille, July 31, 1865. 

Mv dear Colonel : I am desirous that the bravery and de- 
votion of the Army of Northern Virginia shall be correctly 
transmitted to posterity. This is the only tribute that can now 
be paid to the worth of its noble officers and soldiers ; and I am 
anxious to collect the necessary data for the history of the 
campaigns in Virginia, from the commencement of its organiza- 
tion to its final surrender. I am particularly anxious that its 
actual strength in the different battles it has fought be correctly 
stated. You know all its official returns, records, etc., from the 
time of my connection with it, have been lost or destroyed. 

As you prepared the tri-monthly returns for so long, and 
tested their accuracy, I have thought its gradual changes may 



CONJECTURAL RETURNS OE FORCE, ETC. 15 7 

have been impressed upon your memory, and that you might 
state with some confidence its effective strength, at each of the 
great battles it has fought, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery. 
You may also have some memoranda within your reach that 
would assist your memory. Please give me at least the benefit 
of your recollection. . . . 

Very truly yours, R. E. Lee. 

Colonel Walter H. Taylor. 

Upon the receipt of this letter, I communicated with Mr. 
Thomas White, of Alexandria, Virginia, a detailed soldier and 
most estimable gentleman, who occupied, during the period 
of the whole war, the position of chief clerk in the office of 
the adjutant-general of the Army of Northern Virginia, and 
whose duty it was, under the supervision of the adjutant- 
general, to compile the army field-returns from those of the 
several corps, and requested him to give his recollection of 
our effective strength at the important periods of the war. 
In response to this request, Mr. "White sent the following 
statement of the effective strength of the army at the several 
dates given, according to his recollection : 

Seven Days' Battles around Richmond. 

Effective infantry. ., 73,000 

Effective cavalry 3,000 

Effective artillery 4,000 

Total effective of all arms 80,000 



Cedar Run, or Slaughter's Mountain. 

Effective infantry 18,500 

Effective cavalry 2,000 

Effective artillery 1,000 

Total effective of all arms 21,500 



Second Manassas. 

Effective infantry 38,000 

Effective cavalry , 5,000 

Effective artillery 4,000 

Total effective of all arms 47,000 



158 CONJECTURAL RETURNS OF FORCE 



Harper's Ferry. 

Jackson 12,000 

J. G.Walker- 3,000 

Infantry 15,000 



Crampton Gap. 

McLaws 4,000 

Anderson 4,000 

Infantry 8,000 



Boonsboro'. 

Longstreet 8,000 

D.H.Hill 7,000 

Infantry 15,000 



Sharpsburg. 

Effective infantry 33,000 

Effective cavalry 4,500 

Effective artillery 4,000 

Total effective of all arms 41,500 



Fredericksburg. 

Effective infantry 50,500 

Effective cavalry 4,000 

Effective artillery 4,000 

Total effective of all arms 68,500 



Chancellorsville. 

Effective infantry 42,000 

Effective cavalry 4,000 

Effective artillery 3,000 

Total effective of all arms 49,000 



Gettysburg. 

Effective infantry 55,000 

Effective cavalry 7,000 

Effective artillery 5,000 

Total effective of all arms 67,000 






OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 159 

Bristoe Station. 

Effective infantry 32,000 

Effective cavalry 6,000 

Effective artillery., 4,500 

Total effective of all arms 42,500 

Mine Run. 

Effective infantry 30,500 

Effective cavalry 6,000 

Effective artillery 4,500 

Total effective of all arms 41,000 



Wilderness. 

Effective infantry 48, 500 

Effective cavalry 8,000 

Effective artillery 5,000 

Total effective of all arms 61,500 



Spottsylvania Cottrt-House. 

Effective infantry 41,500 

Effective cavalry 7,000 

Effective artillery 4,500 

Total effective of all arms 53,000 



Cold Harbor. 

Effective infantry 47,000 

Effective cavalry 6,000 

Effective artillery 4,500 

Total effective of all arms 57,500 



Petersburg, June 21, 1864. 

Effective infantry 36,000 

Effective cavalry 4,000 

Effective artillery 3,500 

Total effective of all arms 43,500 

Petersburg, October 1, 1864. 

Effective infantry 32,000 

Effective cavalry 3,000 

Effective artillery 3,500 

Total effective of all arms 38,500 



160 CONJECTURAL RETURNS OF FORCE 



Petersburg, January 1, 1865. 

Effective infantry 38,500 

Effective cavalry 2,500 

Effective artillery 4,500 

Total effective of all arms 45,500 



Petersburg, April 1, 1865. 

Effective infantry 36,000 

Effective cavalry 3,500 

Effective artillery 4,000 

Total effective of all arms 43,500 



A duplicate of the statement of Mr. White was sent by 
him to General Lee, who, on the 2d of ^November, 1865, 
wrote as follows : 

Lexington, Va., November 2, 1865. 

My dear Colonel : Your letter of August has remained a 
long time unanswered. Since then, I have received from White, 
to whom I had written, a statement of our effective strength at 
the chief battles, which appeared to me larger at some points 
than I thought. Marshall has also given me his recollection on 
the subject, which does not entirely correspond with mine, 
either. When I get yours, I shall have to make a just average. 

I have made no progress as yet in writing, and very little in 
collecting information. Every one, I suppose, is embarrassed 
by loss of papers, and the necessary devotion to his business. 
It is as much as I can do to answer applications of our dis- 
tressed soldiers and bereaved parents. Matters are working 
much smoother, and time will cure all things. 

Most truly yours, R. E. Lee. 

Colonel Walter H. Taylor. 

The reader will observe that, with the statement of Mr. 
White before him, General Lee's only criticism in regard 
thereto was, that it represented our strength to have been 
greater at certain periods than he thought it was. It is very 
much to be regretted that the general did not prepare, over 



OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 161 

his own signature, a statement of the effective strength of 
his army at the most important epochs in its history. Such 
a statement would have been accepted without question by 
the world. In its absence, his letter commenting upon the 
foregoing statement — which fortunately has been preserved 
— assumes great historical value, for it establishes beyond 
all cavil or doubt the extent of the disparity of numbers be- 
tween the two armies, should Mr. "White's estimates be made 
the standard of comparison. 

11 



CHAPTEE XIV. 

The Strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, taken from the Original Re- 
turns now on File in the Archive-Office of the War Department, Washing- 
ton, D. C. 

After the notes contained in the preceding chapter had 
been prepared, and when I was about to address myself to 
the task of reproducing the statement of the strength of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, made by me from memory, 
soon after the war, in compliance with the request of Gen- 
eral Lee, I ascertained that some of the field and monthly 
returns of that army were on file in the archives of the War 
Department at Washington. 

Inasmuch as several unsuccessful attempts had been made 
to obtain permission to examine the Confederate papers there 
on file, and recognizing the force of the objection of the offi- 
cials in charge to a general inspection of those documents, it 
was with considerable misgiving, and indeed with but little 
hope, that I caused application in my behalf to be made to 
the authorities for permission to examine the army returns 
alluded to ; relying solely upon the fact of my having super- 
vised the preparation of those returns for several years as an 
argument in favor of having an exception made in my case. 

Success crowned my effort, and I take this opportunity 
of expressing my appreciation of the very kind and courteous 
treatment I received at the hands of the officials of the War 
Department, who extended to me every facility for the ac- 
complishment of my purpose ; and at the same time I take 
pleasure in assuring my former comrades-in-arms of the evi- 
dent purpose of the Government authorities charged with 



OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, ETC. 163 

the custody of these records to discard all sectional bias in 
the prosecution of their labors, and to preserve faithfully and 
impartially all documents which are now in their custody, or 
which may be hereafter committed to their care, in order 
that, so far as it is in their power, the truth, and nothing but 
the truth, shall be preserved. Let us indulge the hope that 
the day is not far distant when the American people, with- 
out distinction, will find pleasure in the contemplation of all 
that was manly, all that was virtuous, all that was noble, all 
that was praiseworthy, in the recent struggle between the 
sections, whether developed on the side of the North or that 
of the South ; and that the next generation will cherish, with 
pardonable pride, the remembrance of the deeds of valor, 
sacrifice, and noble daring, with which the history of that 
war so richly abounds, whether the heroes thereof wore the 
blue or the gray. 

Let censure fall only where fanatics feigned to be patriots, 
or men forgot their manhood, and, screened behind an al- 
leged military necessity, gave evidence of an evil heart in 
deeds of malignant cruelty or wanton destruction ; and let 
merit be acknowledged and praise be bestowed wherever firm 
devotion to principle and to duty found illustration in deeds 
of valor and of sacrifice. 

As soon as practicable I availed myself of the permission 
accorded me, and proceeded to make an examination of the 
army returns on file in the Department. The first paper that 
was examined by me proved to be an informal return of the 
strength of the army commanded by General Joseph E. 
Johnston, which I at once recognized as having been on file 
in General Lee's office, and the indorsement upon which was 
in my own handwriting, except the date, which was added 
either by Mr. Davis or General Long, who was then private 
secretary to General Lee, and read as follows : " Army near 
Richmond, Department of Northern Yirginia, May 21, 
1862." "Within was the following statement of the strength of 
the several commands of which that army was then composed : 



164 OFFICIAL EETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 

First Division — Major-General G. W. Smith. 

Whiting's brigade 2,398 

Hood's brigade 1,922 

W. H. Hampton's brigade 2,225 

S. R. Hatton's brigade 2,030 

Pettigrew's brigade 2,017 

Total 10,592 

Second Division — Major-General Longstreet. 

A. P. Hill's brigade 2,512 

Pickett's brigade 2,460 

R. H. Anderson's brigade. 2,168 

Wilcox's brigade 2,616 

Colston's brigade 1,750 

Pryor's brigade 2,310. 

Total 13,816 

Third Division — Major-General Magruder. 

McLaws's brigade 2,084 

Kershaw's brigade 2,567 

Griffith's brigade c . 2,534 

H. Cobb's brigade 3,796 

Toombs's brigade 2,357 

D. R. Jones's brigade 2,342 

Reserve artillery — Cabell 240 

Total 15,920 

Fourth Division — Major-General D. H. Hill. 

Early's brigade 2,380 

Rodes's brigade 3,040 

Colonel Ward's command 890 

Raines's brigade 1,830 

Featherstone's brigade 2,224 

Colonel Crump's command 787 

Total 11,151 

Cavalry brigade 1,289 

Reserve artillery : 

Pendleton's 611 

Washington 309 

Total 920 

Total strength of all arms 53,688 

I then examined carefully all the field and monthly re- 
turns of the " Department of Northern Virginia" on file in 
the Archive-Office, and copied therefrom the following ex- 
tracts, which make an authoritative statement of the strength 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 165 



of the army commanded by General Lee at the periods 
named : 

Date of Return, July 20, 1862. 



DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AND NORTH 
CAROLINA 



Department of North Carolina. 

Longstreet's division 

D. H. Hill's division . . 

McLaws's division 

A. P. Hill's division 

Anderson's division 

D. R. Jones's division 

Whiting's division 

Stuart's cavalry 

Pendleton's artillery 

Rhett's artillery 

Total, including Department of North Carolina 



Present for Duty. 



Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


722 


11,509 


557 


7,929 


550 


8,998 


514 


7,188 


519 


10,104 


357 


5,760 


213 


3,500 


252 


3,600 


295 


3,740 


103 


1,716 


78 


1,355 



4,160 



65,399 



September 22, 1862. 



ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA 



Longstreet's command 

Jackson" 1 s command: 

D. H. Hill's division 

A. P. Hill's division 

Ewell's division 

Jackson's division 

Total 

September 30, 1862 



Present for Duty. 



Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


1,410 

310 
318 
280 
183 


19,001 

4,739 
4,435 
3,144 
2,367 



2,501 



33,686 



ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



Longstreet's command. , 
Jackson's command. . . 
Reserve artillery , 

Total , 

No report of cavalry 



Present for Duty. 



Officers. Enlisted Men. 



1,927 

1,699 

50 



3,676 



26,489 

21,728 

716 



48,933 



166 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
October 10, 1862. 



AEMT OF NOETHEEN 


VIEGINIA. 


Present foe Dcty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Longstreet's command 


2,022 

1,841 

395 

48 


27,934 




25,603 




5,338 


Reserve artillery 




858 


Total 


4,306 


59,733 







Near Winchester, October 20, 1862. 



AEMT OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 



Longstreet's command. 
Jackson's command. . . 

Cavalry 

Reserve artillery 



Total. 



Present foe Duty. 



Officers. 



2,241 

2,002 

417 

45 



4,705 



Enlisted Men. 



29,748 

26,368 

6,119 

865 



63,100 



Culpeper Court-House, 


November 


ie 


, 1862. 




AEMT OF NOETHERN 


VIRGINIA. 




Present foe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Longstreet's command 


2,308 
2,243 
457 
No report. 


29,522 


Jackson's command 


29,461 


Cavalry 


6,697 
No report. 












Total 


5,008 


65,680 













Fredericksburg, 


November 


20. 


1862. 




AEMT OF NORTHERN 


VIRGINIA. 






Present fob Ditty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Longstreet's command 


2,325 
2,346 
603 
No report. 


29,288 


Jackson's command 


30,441 


Cavalry. . . , 


8,551 


Reserve artillery 


No report. 












Total 


5,274 


68,280 













FKOM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 167 

Fredericksburg, December 10, 1862. 



AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGDJIA. 


Peesent ] 


?ob Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Long street's command: 

Anderson's division 


531 
559 
675 
521 
253 
24 
13 


7,083 
7,311 
6,860 
6 795 


McLaws's division 


Pickett's division 


Hood's division 


Ransom's division 


3,595 

402 


Alexander's artillery 


Walton's artillery 


184 






Total under Longstreet , 


2,576 


32,230 




Jackson's command: 

Jackson's division 


463 

588 

594 

781 

24 


4,526 

8,327 

7,100 

10,743 

449 


D. H. Hill's division 


Ewell's division 


A. P. Hill's division 


Brown's artillery 






Total under Jackson 


2,450 


31,145 




Cavalry 


602 
36 


8,512 
677 


Reserve artillery 






Total 


5,664 


72,564 





Fredericksburg, December 20, 1862. 




AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 


Peesent j 


toe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Longstreet's command 


2,620 

2,353 

602 

38 


31,670 
29,046 


Jackson's command 


Cavalry (report of December 10th used) 


8,512 


Reserve artillery 


683 






Total 


5,613 


69,911 







Fredericksburg, December 31, 1862. 

Longstreet's command — Total effective 30,060 

Jackson's " " 27,608 

Cavalry " ., 8,814 

Artillery " 4,490 



Total effective of all arms. 



70,972 



168 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 



Fredericksburg, January 31, 1863. 

Longstreet's command — Total effective 

Jackson's " " 

Cavalry " 

Artillery " 

Valley District (General W. E. Jones) 



28,696 

29,698 

7,125 

2,874 

3,833 



Total effective, including troops in the Valley of Virginia 72,226 



Fredericksburg, February 28, 1863. 

Anderson's and McLaws's divisions — Total effective. . . 
Jackson's command .... 

Cavalry " 

Artillery " 

Valley District " 



14,540 

.... 30,977 

5,912 

3,552 

3,578 

Total effective, including troops in the Valley of Virginia 58,559 



Fredericksburg, March 31, 1863. 

Anderson's and McLaws's divisions * — Total effective. 
Jackson's four divisions " 

Cavalry " 

Artillery in rear " 

Valley District " 



... 15,649 

... 33,333 

... 6,509 

... 1,621 

... 3,186 

Total effective, including troops in the Valley of Virginia 60,298 
Fredericksburg, May 20, 1863. 



AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 


Pbesent 


for Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Longstreefs command: 

Anderson's division 


553 
579 
558 
640 


6,439 
6,454 
5,847 
6,858 


McLaw's division 


Pickett's division 


Hood's division 




Total under Longstreet 


2,330 


25,598 




Hill's command: 

Hill's division . 


722 
545 
496 
419 


7,986 
6,457 
5,925 
4,783 


Rodes's division 


Early's division 


Johnson's division 




Total under Hill 


2,182 


25,151 






Cavalry (one regiment not reported) 


482 
245 


6,524 


Artillery (Dearing's battalion and two batteries not re- 
ported) 


4,708 




Total 


5,239 


61,981 





1 Pickett, Hood, and Eansom, detached. 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 169 

Fredericksburg, Mat 31, 1863. 

Longstreet's command — Total effective. 26,583 

A. P. Hill's " " 27,773 

Cavalry " 9,536 

Artillery " 4,460 

Total effective of all arms 68,352 



Bunker Hill, July 20, 1863. 



AEMT OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 



Longstreefs Corps: 
McLaws's division 
Pickett's division 
Hood's division 

Swell's Corps : 

Rodes's division 
Early's division 
Johnson's division 

Hill's Corps: 

Anderson's division 
Heth's division 
Pender's division 

Cavalry 

Artillery 



Total. 



Peesent foe Duty. 



Officers. 



1,186 



1,277 



961 

No report. 
274 



3,698 



Enlisted Men. 



11,731 



12,440 



8,930 

No report. 
4,589 



37,690 



CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, JULY 31, 1863. 



Longstreet's corps — Total effective. 
Ewell's corps " 
Hill's corps " 
Artillery corps " 
Cavalry corps 



... 12,823 
... 12,369 
... 11,207 
. . . 4,736 
No report. 



Total effective of all arms 

Orange Court-House, August 10, 



41,135 



1863. 



AEMT OF NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 



Longstreet's corps. 

Ewell's corps 

Hill's corps 

Cavalry corps. . . . 
Artillery corps. . . 



Total. 



Peesent foe Duty. 



Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


1,279 


13,559 


1,371 


14,422 


1,115 


12,398 


595 


8,404 


277 


4,880 



4,637 



53,663 



170 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 

Orange Court-House, August 20, 1863. 



AEMY OF ETOETHEEN 


VIEGINIA. 


Present i 


"ob Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Longstreet's corps 


1,242 

1,369 

1,094 

617 

290 


13,323 

14,900 

13,059 

8,094 

4,906 


Ewell's corps 


Hill's corps 


Cavalry corps 


Artillery corps 






Total 


4,612 


54,282 





Orange Court-House, August 31, 1863. 

Longstreet's corps — Total effective 14,668 

Ewell's corps " 15,428 

Hill's corps " 13,'601 

Cavalry corps (1,333 dismounted) 7,701 

Artillery corps — Total effective 4 929 



Total effective of all arms 56,327 

Orange Court-House, September 10, 1863. 



AEMY OF NOETHEEF YIEGINIA. 



Ewell's corps 

Hill's corps , 

Cooke's brigade (unattached). 

Artillery 

Cavalry 



Total 

Longstreet's corps detached. 



Present for Duty. 



Officers. Enlisted Men. 



1,274 

1,034 

134 

147 

No report. 



2,589 



15,804 

14,087 

2,100 

3,226 

No report. 



35,217 





Orange 


Court-House, 


September 20 


, 1863. 




AEMY 


OF 


NOETHEEN 


YIEGmiA. 


Present ] 


?OB Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Ewell's corps ... 


1,391 

1,075 

135 

560 

184 


16,235 


Hill's corps 


14,297 
2,045 


Cooke's brigade 


Cavalry corps 


7,547 


Artillery corps . . 


3,337 














Total 


3,345 


43,461 







FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 171 

Orange Court-House, September 30, 1863. 

Ewell's corps — Total effective 16,638 

Hill's corps " 15,073 

Cooke's brigade " 2,150 

Cavalry corps " 6,744 

Artillery corps " 3,762 

Total effective of all arms 44,367 



Near Brandy Station, October 20, 1863. 



AEMY OP NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



Ewell's corps. . 
Hill's corps. . . 
Cavalry corps. 
Artillery corps. 



Total 



Cooke's brigade attached to Heth's division. 



Present foe Duty. 



Officers. Enlisted Men. 



1,526 

1,328 

505 

218 



3,577 



16,595 

16,069 

6,867 

3,620 



43,151 



Brandy Station, October 31, 1863. 

Ewell's corps — Total effective 17,097 

Hill's corps " 16,533 

Cavalry corps " 7,917 

Artillery corps " 4,067 



Total effective of all arms 45,614 



Orange Court-House, November 20, 1863. 



Present foe Ditty. 



AEMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



Ewell's corps. . 
Hill's corps . . . 
Cavalry corps. 
Artillery corps 

Total . . 




44,728 



172 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
Orange Court-House, December 10, 1863. 



AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 



Ewell's corps 

Hill's corps 

Cavalry corps , 

Artillery corps 

Provost-guard 

Headquarters battalion 

Total 

Add Twenty first North Carolina Regiment just report- 
ed, not included in above 

Total 



Present foe Dtjty. 



3,651 



Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


1,413 

1,415 

552 

244 

18 

9 


15,447 

17,872 

7,481 

4,371 

311 

114 


3,651 


45,596 

500 



46,096 



Orange Court-House, December 20, 1863. 



AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGLKTIA. 



Ewell's corps 

Hill's corps 1 

Cavalry corps 

Artillery corps 

Headquarters battalion. 



Total. 



Present for Duty. 




43,285 



Orange Court-House, December 31, 1863. 

Ewell's corps — Total effective 15,540 

Hill's corps " 15,468 

Cavalry corps " 7,550 

Artillery corps " 4,138 



Total effective of all arms. 42,696 

Unattached commands, Valley District, Maryland line, provost 

guard, and headquarters battalion 862 



1 "Walker's brigade, Heth's division, and Thomas's brigade, Wilcox's division, detached. 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR 
Orange Court-House, January 10, 



DEPARTMENT. 173 

1864. 





Peesent foe Duty. 


DEPAETMENT OP NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 


Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


r, j n ( Early's division 


406 
410 
440 


4,714 
4,476 
6 134 


Second Corps \ J division 
Lieutenant-General Ewell. | Rodes , g diyision 








1,256 


15,324 


Third Corps, ( ^7?'! ? ivision 

t-~„<.™^+ ru 5„i mil "\ Heth's division 


412 

258 
325 


5,957 
4,391 


Lieutenant-General Hill. | WUcox , g divigion 


4,972 




995 


15,320 


Cavalry Corps, j Hampton's division 

Major - General Stuart. \ Fitz Lee's division 


273 
250 


3,931 
3,617 


Artillery corps . 


523 
217 


7,548 
4,338 




Total Army of Northern Virginia 


2,991 
67 


42,530 


Unattached commands, Maryland line, provost-guard, 
and headquarters battalion 


1,073 


Total Department of Northern Virginia 






3,058 


43,603 



Valley District not reported. 



Orange Court-House, January 31, 1864. 

Total Effective. 

f Early's division 3,604 Hoke's brigade detatched. 

Second Corps, J Johnson's division. . 4,156 

Lt.-Gen. Ewell. 1 ,, , , A . . . K n , ( 12th and 21st Ga., and 43d N. 

[Rodes s division . . . 5,042 } Q . Regiments not reported> 

12,802 

mi • 1 p ( Anderson's division 5,577 

inira ^orps 1 Heth , g divigion m _ _ 4 ^ 2 Walker's brigade detached. 
xji. -i*en. mil. ( Wilcox's division. . 4,896 Thomas's brigade detached. 



14,745 



TRosser's brigade, Lee's brigade, 
Cavalry Corps, j Hampton's division, 2,198 J three regiments of Wickham's 
Maj.-Gen. Stuart ( Fitz Lee's 1,162) brigade, and two of Gordon's, 



3,360 

g.§ r Artillery corps 3,842 

1 1 J Maryland line 706 

1 1 j Provost-guard 281 

S§<3 [Headquarters battalion 113 



[ not reported. 



Total effective 35,849 



174 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 

Orange Court-House, February 10, 1864. 



AEMT OF NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 


Pbesent foe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


r, , ~ ( Early's division 


295 
364 

392 


3,653 l 
4,140 
5,129 2 


Second Corps \ John J son , s divigion 

Lieutenant-General Ewell. | Rodeg , g divigion 






1,051 


12,922 


m , . , n ( Anderson's division 

. Third Corps t Heth , g divigion 


415 

267 
330 


5,595 
4,41 1 3 


Lieutenant-General Hill. | Wilcox>B divigion 


4,962 4 




1,012 


14,968 




Not 

139 

46 

17 

7 


reported. 
2,588 






706 


Provost-guard. . 


228 




193 






Total . 


2,272 


31,535 







Orange Court-House, March 10, 


1864. 




AEMY OF NOETHEEN YIEGINIA. 


Peesent foe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


d j n i Early's division 


229 
392 
429 


3,781 5 


Second Corps, 1 T i > j- • • 
Lieutenant-General Ewell. j J R f™™ s dmsion 


4,362 
5,898 s 






1,050 


14,041 


Third Corps, j ^"T' ? P™™ 

T . ., , ~ F \ T,-.,, < Heth s division 


419 
406 
440 


5,684 
6,038 
6,571 


Lieutenant-General Hill. j micox , & division 






1,265 


18,293 


Cavalry 


Not 
200 
26 


reported. 

4,100 

428 


Artillery corps 


Provost-guard and headquarters battalion 






Total 


2,541 


36,862 





1 Hoke's brigade detached. 

3 Twelfth and Twenty-first Georgia and Forty-third North Carolina Eegiments detached. 

3 Walker's brigade detached. 4 Thomas's brigade detached. 

D Hoke's brigade detached. 

6 Twenty-first Georgia and Forty-third North Carolina Eegiments detached. 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN TJ. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 175 
Orange Court-House, March 20, 1864. 



DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



Present for Duty. 



Officers. 



Enlisted Men. 



c , « ( Early's division 

Second Corps .. J Johnson's division. . 
Lieutenant-General Ewell. | Rodes , g ^^^ _ > 

Third Corns ( Anderson's division.. 

Lieutenant-General Hill, j wdcox's Xision. .' ." ! 

Cavalry corps 

Artillery corps 

Total Army of Northern Virginia 

Valley District 

Maryland line 

Provost-guard 

Headquarters battalion 

Total Department of Northern Virginia 



310 
426 

426 



55 
41 
20 
12 



3,134 



3,91V 1 

4,568 

6,143 2 



1,162 


14,628 


452 
419 
474 


5,831 
6,245 
6,793 


1,345 


18,869 


292 
207 


4,478 3 
4,066 


3,006 


42,041 



736 
761 
237 
200 



43,975 



Orange Court-House, April 10, 1864. 



DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 


Present for Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


a i n ( Early's division 


349 
496 

502 


4,185 4 

4,849 

6,603 5 


Second Corps, 1 T i, » a- • • 
Lieutenant-Gene/alWl.. g££S&Z?.\ V/".: 


V 






1,347 


15,637 


TMrfC„ n jA^^vision 


490 
460 
515 


6,381 
6,507 
7,311 


Lieutenant-General Hill. ) „~? , ,. .. 

( Wncox's division 




1,465 


20,199 



1 Hoke's brigade detached. 

2 Twenty -first Georgia and Forty-third North Carolina Regiments detached. 

3 Chambliss's and Lomax's brigades not reported. 

4 Hoke's brigade detached. 

5 Twenty-first Georgia and Forty-third North Carolina Regiments detached. 



176 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 

Orange Court-House, April 10, 1864 — Continued. 





Peebent 


foe Duty. 


DEPAETMENT OF NOETHEEN YIEGLNIA. 


Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Cavalry Corps, j Hampton's division 

Major- General Stuart. \ Fitz Lee's division 


180 
285 


2,667 
4,796 




465 


7,463 


Artillery corps 


234 


4,486 




Total Army of Northern Virginia 


3,511 

Not 

42 

22 

12 


47,785 
reported. 
737 


Valley District 


Maryland line 


Provost-guard 


286 


Headquarters battalion 


223 






Total Department of Northern Virginia. . . . 


3,587 


49,031 



Orange Court-House, April 20, 1864. 





Pbesent for Duty. 


DEPAETMENT OF NOETHEEN YIEGINIA. 


Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


~ , ~ ( Earlv's division 


356 
506 
512 


4,182 


Second Corps. ) "7 t y , \. . • 

T . . . n Vt? „ •< Johnson's division 

Lieutenant-General EirelL } Rodeg , s divigion 


4,894 
6,629 






1,374 


15,705 


m, . , n ( Anderson's division 

. Third Corps J H h , divisJon 


507 
516 
528 


6,439 
6,948 
7,261 


Lieutenant - General Hill. | Wilcox , g ^^.^ 




1,551 


20,648 


Cavalry Corps, ( Hampton's division 

Major- General Stuart. ( Fitz Lee's division 


286 
279 


2,931 
5,001 




565 


7,932 


Artillery corps 


237 


4,617 








3,727 

Not 

45 

27 

11 


48,902 




reported. 


Maryland line 


760 




293 




219 






Total Department of Northern Virginia 


3,810 


50,174 



Hoke's brigade, Early's division, and two regiments of Rodes's division, 
detached. 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 177 

Petersburg, June 30, 1864. 



TEOOPS UNDER GENERAL LEE. 


Pbesent fob Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Depart. N. C. and So. Va., j B. R. Johnson's division . . 
General Beauregard. ( Hoke's division 


472 

350 


6,364 
4,936 






822 


11,300- 


tv , „ ( Pickett's division 

First Corps 3 Field's division 


' 348 
413 

337 


4,536 
4,344 


Major- General Anderson. | KershaVs division 


4,180 




1,098 


13,060 


m, • j n ( Anderson's division 

. Third Corps > H h , diyi . 


411 
440 
351 


4,880 
5,159 


Lieutenant- General Hill. | Wilcox , g divigion 


4,289 




1,202 


14,328 


Cavalry Corps, jSS^T: ". il! ! 
Major- General Hampton. | w R R Lee , g division > 


130 

173 


2,888 
1,553 

2,677 




303 


7,118 


Artillery corps 


257 


5,263 






Total 


3,682 


51,069 







Second Corps detached under General Early. Dearing's brigade of cavalry 
not reported. Only three battalions of artillery of the Second Corps reported. 



Near Petersburg, July 10, 1864. 



TROOPS UNDER GENERAL LEE. 


Pbesent foe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Dept. N. C. and So. Va., j B. R. Johnson's division. . 
General Beauregard. { Hoke's division 


487 
346 


6,391 

4,678 




833 


11,069 


First Corps, ( *?*&#*. divisi ° n 

,.. . ~, , . F \ •{ Field s division 


381 
427 
342 


4,472 
4,284 


Major-General Anderson. ^ Kmhm , s dMsion 


4,217 




1,150 


12,973 



12 



178 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
Near Petersburg, July 10, 1864 — Continued. 



TROOPS TTNDETC GENERAL LEE. 


Pbesent foe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Third Corps, ( t^f* * vision ' 

T . , , n L ', T-r-n •< Heths division 


468 
447 
373 


5,567 
5,276 
4,410 


Lieutenant-General Hill. | W ^ Q ^ ^ion 




1,288 


15,253 


Cavalry Corps, \ Hampton's division 

■kit - n , n * \ Fitz Lee's division 

Major-General Hampton. | w> R F Lee , g ^.^ 


195 
115 
216 


2,888 
1,591 
3,957 




526 


8,436 


Artillery corps 


276 


5,293 






Total 


4,073 


53,024 







First Corps, 
Anderson. 



Second Corps, 
Early. 



Third Corps, 
A. P. Hill. 



Cavalry Corps. 4 
Artillery corps 



Petersburg, August 31, 1864. 

Total Effective. 

Pickett's division 4,544 

Field's division 3,944 

Kershaw's division 3,445 

11,933 

Breckinridge's division 2,104 

Rodes's division 3,013 

Gordon's division 2,544 

Ramseur's division 1,909 



Mahone's division 4,09U 

Heth's division 4,075 

Wilcox's division 4,054 

Fifth Alabama Battalion 151 



'Hampton's division 2.769 

Fitz Lee's division Detached. 

W. H. F. Lee's division 2,575 

Dearing's brigade 1,395 



Total effective of all arms. 



9,570 



12,374 



6,739 
3,631 

44,247 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN TJ. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 179 

Petersburg, September 10, 1864. 



ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 


Present 


foe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


First Corps, ' 
Anderson. 1 


Pickett's division 


361 

409 

No report. 


4 542 


Field's division 


4,046 


Kershaw's division 








770 


8,588 




Breckinridge's division 


194 
307 
271 

182 
39 


2,172 
3,244 
2,690 
2,010 




Rodes's division 


Second Corps, J 


Gordon's division 


Early. 


Ramseur's division 




Carter's artillery 


818 










993 


10,934 


f 

Third Corps, J 
A. P. Hill. 1 


Heth's division 


323 

321 

351 

14 


4,159 
4,120 


Mahone's division 


Wilcox's division 


4,211 


Fifth Alabama Battalion 


145 








1,009 


12,635 




f Hampton's division 


184 

*133 

353 

16 

82 


2,736 




Fitz Lee's division 


Cavalry Corps, 
Hampton. 


W. H. F. Lee's division 


2,545 
3,215 


Lomax's division 


Horse artillery 


225 




Dearing's brigade 


1,430 






Artillery corps 




768 
249 


10,151 

4,486 






Total 


3,789 


46,794 





Chafin's Bluff, October 20, 1864. 



ARMY 


OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 


Present 


FOR DTJTT. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 




( Pickett's division 


364 
330 
301 


4,967 
3,491 

3,787 


First Corps, 


•< Field's division 


Longstreet. 


( Hoke's division 








995 


12,245 



180 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
Chafin's Bluff, October 20, 1864 — Continued. 



AEHY OF NOETHEEN .VIRGINIA. 


Pees eot foe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


mi . , ~ ( Heth's division 


337 
360 
348 


4,540 
4,730 


Third Corps, \ wn , ^ 


A. P. Hill. ) tut i , j- • • 

( Mahone s division 


4 368 








1,045 


13,638 


( Hampton's division 


101 

130 

70 

3 


1,330 
2,834 
1,211 


Cavalry Corps, J W. H. F. Lee's division 


Hampton. | Dearing's brigade 


[_ Horse artillery 


78 








304 


5,453 


Artillery corps 


252 

149 
22 


4,246 


First District, Department North Carolina and South- 
ern Virginia, Wise's command 


2,248 


Provost-guard 


194 






Total 


2,767 


38,024 







Note. — No return received of the troops serving in the Valley District, nor 
of Johnson's division, nor of the Second and Third Military Districts of the De- 
partment of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. Hoke's division is included 
in the above report of Longstreet's corps in place of Kershaw's division, de- 
tached (in the Valley of Virginia). Of the cavalry, 1,249 men are dismounted. 



PETERSBURG, OCTOBER 31, 1864. 

Total Effective. 

Ti,. B+ rt nmfl ( Pickett's division 5,764 

if L2S' \ Weld's division 3 994 

Longstreet. } H oke's division 4^05 

14,263 

Third Corps, j **eth' 8 , di ™ ^ J 

A P TTll 1 Wilcox's division 5,034 

A - r ' nm " ( Mahone's division 4,546 

13,778 

B. R. Johnson's division 6,329 

f Hampton's division 1,435 

Cavalry Corps, J W. H. F. Lee's division . . 2,888 

Hampton. 1 Dearhig's brigade 1,248 

[_ Horse artillery 83 

5,654 

Artillery corps 5,057 

Total effective of all arms, Army of Northern Virginia, 45,081 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 181 



Total effective of all arms, Army of Northern Virginia, 
First Military District, Department of North Carolina 

and Southern Virginia, Wise commanding 

Third Military District, Department of North Carolina 
and Southern Virginia, Whiting commanding. . . . 

Rodes's division 2,316 

Early's division 1,794 

Gordon's division 2,0*73 

Wharton's division 1,538 

Kershaw's division 2,856 

L Artillery 923 



Total Effective. 

45,081 



Early's command 
iu the Valley of * 
Virginia. 



Provost-guard 

Total effective detached commands 

Total effective, Departments of Northern Vir- 
ginia, and North Carolina and Southern Vir- 
ginia 



2,22* 



3,863 



11,500 

205 



17,794 



62,875 



Petersburg, November 10, 1864. 



DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 


Present fob Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


T,. , n ( Pickett's division 


397 
373 

349 


5,986 


First Corps, ] Field , g division 


4,227 


Longstreet. } Hoke , g diyision< _ 


4,956 








1,119 


15,169 


rvi • a n~„nn ( Heth's division , 

Third Corps, j 


333 
375 
368 


4,520 
5,360 
4,795 


A. P. Hill. ) -.r , , .... 

( Mahone s division 






1,076 


14,675 


B. R. Johnson's division 


529 


6,494 






( Hampton's division 


96 

141 

61 

3 


1,224 
3,123 


Cavalry Corps, J W. H. F. Lee's division 


Hampton. | Dearing's brigade 


1,303 


[Horse artillery , 


94 








301 


5,744 


Artillery corps 


249 

203 
21 


5,174 


First Mil. Dist., Dept. N. C. and So. Va., Brigadier-Gen- 
eral H. A. Wise 


2,271 


Provost-guard 


200 






Total 


3,498 


49,727 







No return received of troops serving in the Valley of Virginia since October 
31, 1864. 



182 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 



First Corps, 
Longs treet. 



Third Corps, 
A. P. Hill. 



Petersburg, November 30, 1864. 

Total Effective. 

f Pickett's division 6,176 

J Field's division 4,548 

j Hoke's division 5,2*73 

[Kershaw's division 3,414 

19,411 



JHeth's division 4,957 
Wilcox's division 5,742 
Mahone's division 4,844 



B. R. Johnson's division 

First Military District, Department of North Carolina 
and Southern Virginia, Brigadier-General Wise. . . 

Provost-guard , 

f Hampton's division 1,506 

Cavalry Corps, J W. H. F. Lee's division 3,605 

Hampton. 1 Dearing's brigade 995 

!_ Horse artillery 102 



Artillery corps 

Total effective of all arms, Army Northern Virginia, 

'Early's division 2,345 

Rodes's division 2,789 

Gordon's division 2,662 

Wharton's division 1,859 

Lomax's cavalry 1,846 

^Fitz Lee's cavalry 1,455 



Valley District, 
Early commanding. 



15,543 
6,594 

2,305 
219 



6,208 
6,144 



Total effective in Valley District 

Total effective in Department of Northern Virginia, 
Of Hampton's cavalry, reported above, 1,298 are dismounted. 



56,424 



12,956 



69,380 



Petersburg, December 20, 1864. 



DEPAETMESTT OP NOETHEEN YIEGINIA. 


PEE8ENT FOE DUTY, 


Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 




432 
397 
376 

298 


6,365 




4,576 




5,517 




3,552 








1,503 


20,010 


„ , ~. ( Rodes's division 


193 
133 
179 


3,056 


Second Corps, \ ° division 


2,406 


Gordon. | Goi j on > s divisiou ; ; , ; ; . . . 


2,717 






505 


8,179 




353 
361 

383 


4,544 


^p wT' \ Heth's division. .." .'.".". .' .' 


4,905 


A. P. Hill. | "Wilcox's division 


5,825 








1,097 


15,274 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 183 

Petersburg, December 20, 1864 — Continued. 



DEPARTMENT OF NOETHEEN YIEGENTA. 


Present 


foe Duty. 


Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 




504 


6,692 








145 

158 

3 


2,431 


Cavalry Corps, J w £ P Lee - S division 


3,592 


Hampton. | E ^ Q artillery 


109 








306 


6,132 




266 

94 

22 


5,190 


First Mil. Dist. Dept. N. C. and So. Va., Brigadier-Gen- 
eral H. A. Wise 


520 


Provost-°"uard 


239 






Total 


4,297 


62,236 







Petersburg, January 10, 1865. 





Present foe Duty. 


DEPAETMENT OF NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 


Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


t» , r, ( Pickett's division 


279 
395 
260 


4,704 


First Corps, p . , ,, ,. . . 
t m. j. -s Field s division 


4,569 
3,140 


Longstreet. | Kershaw's division 






934 


12,413 


c j n ( Rodes's division 


203 
136 
161 


3 077 


Second Corps, \ Early , g division> [ ." . I ." .* ; ." ." [ | [ ; . 


2 411 


( Gordon's division 


2^684 






500 


8,172 


m, . n n ( Mahone's division 


312 
353 
362 


4,536 
4,827 
5,827 


Third Corps, „.,, ,. . . 
A P H'll "i H e *h s division 


' ' ' ( Wilcox's division 






1,027 


15,190 


B. R. Johnson's division 


433 


6,608 




n l n ( Harrmton's division 


133 

146 

3 


2,183 

3,190 

104 


Htmp?o°n PS ' \ W - H F. Lee's division 

^ ' ( Horse artillery 








282 


5,477 


Artillerv corps 


256 


5,120 






Total Army of Northern Virginia 


3,432 


52,980 



184 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 



Petersburg, January 10, 1865 — Continued. 



DEPARTMENT OF NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 


Present foe Etjty. 


Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


■xr ii -rv a • i. ( Wharton's division 


110 
42 

Not 


1,914 


Tl ^r K?::::::::.::::::: 


950 
reported. 


V 




152 


2,864 


Brigadier-General j Richmond & Danville Railroad de- 
J. A. Walker. { fenses 


110 
22 


1,472 


Provost-guard 


219 






Total Department of Northern Virginia 


3,716 


57,535 





Note. — Hoke's division transferred to North Carolina ; Conner's brigade, 
Kershaw's division, transferred to South Carolina. Of cavalry reported, 1,799 
are dismounted. 



Petersburg, January 31, 1865. 



DEPAETMENT OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 


Total Effective. 


r . , n ( Pickett's division 

First Corps, * Fiel(rs division 

Longstreet. } Kershaw , s division 


4,684 
4,418 
3,066 


12,168 

7,762 

14,805 
6,248 
4,057 
4,881 




<m j n ( Rodes's division 

Second Corps, ^ Earl /s division 

Gordon. | Gordon's division 


2,914 
2,319 
2,529 




mi.- j n ( Heth's division 

Third Corps, \ WUcox , g ^^ 

A. r. mil. j Mahone's division 


4,319 
5,840 
4,646 




B. R. Johnson's division 


1,112 

775 
Not 




W. H. F. Lee's division, cavalry 




Total effective of all arms, Army of 


49 921 


tt n tv i. • i. ( Wharton's infantry. . . . 
Valley District, \ Am ' 


reported. 

1,887 

1,438 

199 




Ear1 ^ (cavalry 7 ...:::.;::::. 








J. A. Walker — R. & D. Railroad defenses. 
Provost-guard. . .' 








3,524 






Total effective of all arms, Depart- 
ment of Northern Virginia 


53,445 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 185 

Petersburg, February 10, 1865. 



DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 


Present foe Duty. 




Officers. 


Enlisted Men. 


T,. , ~ ( Pickett's division 


806 
334 
227 


4,773 
4 453 


First Corps, \ ^^ d]y[s[on 


Longstreet. | Kershaw > s division 


3,083 






867 


12,309 


c, -, n ( Rodes's division 


183 
148 
119 


2,929 


Second Corps, \ Gordon , g divigion 


2 281 


Gordon. "| Early , g ^^ 


2,151 








450 


7,361 


Third Corps, j S^° ne ' B . ^ ision 

A P TT'ii \ Heth s division 


284 
295 
316 


3,890 
4,190 


a. r. Mill. | Wilcox's division 


5,445 








895 


13,525 


B. R. Johnson's division 


426 


6,527 






W. H. F. Lee's cavalry 


137 
54 


2,664 


Gary's brigade, cavalry 


1,112 








191 


3,776 


Total Army of Northern Virginia 


2,829 


43,498 






Yallev District, j Wharton's infantry 


66 

18 


1,076 


Early. ( Long's artillery 


390 








84 


1,466 


J. A. Walker — R. & D. Railroad defenses 


100 

27 


1,417 


Provost-guard and signal corps 


341 






Total Department of Northern Virginia 


3,040 


46,722 



No report of artillery embraced in this return. 



186 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 



Petersburg, February 28, 1865. 



DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIR- 
GINIA. 



First Corps, 
Longstreet. 



Second Corps, 
Gordon. 



Third Corps, 
A. P. Hill. 



Pickett's division.. 
Field's division. . . . 
Kershaw's division. 



( Gordon's division . . 
•J Rodes's division. . . 
( Early's division. . . . 



Mahone's division . . 
Heth's division. . . . 
Wilcox's division . . 



Officers. 



304 
341 
206 



851 



143 

186 
129 



458 



262 
294 
309 



B. R. Johnson's division. 



Effective infantry 

W. H. F. Lee's di 

Cavalry Corps. -| vision 

Fitz Lee's division. . . 



Effective cavalry. , 
Effective artillery. 



Total effective of all arms, Army of 

Northern Virginia 

Wharton's division, 

infantry 

Long's division, ar- 
tillery 

L o m a x ' s division, 
cavalry 



Valley District, ^ 
Early. 



Total effective 

J.A.Wa!ke, \ **£ 

Unattached commands. . . . 



Railroad de- 



Total effective, detached commands. 

Total effective of all arms, Depart- 
ment of Northern Virginia. 



865 



431 



185 
96 



68 

20 
154 



104 
42 



Enlisted 
Men. 



4,761 
4,436 
2,967 



12,164 



2,309 
3,022 
2,292 



7,623 



3,880 
4,324 
5,383 



13,587 



,505 



3,935 

1,825 



1,112 

368 
1,383 



1,414 

504 



Total. 



42,484 



6,041 
5,399 



5,105 



2,064 



53,924 



5,169 



59,093 



FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN TJ. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 187 

By reference to the returns of the Federal armies of the 
1st of March, 1865, as given in the report of the Secretary of 
War to the Thirty-ninth Congress (vol. v., p. 55), I find that 
General Grant had available at that date, the Army of the 
Potomac under General Meade, one hundred and three thou- 
sand two hundred and seventy-three present for duty ; the 
army in the " Department of Yirginia " under General Ord, 
numbering forty-five thousand nine hundred and eighty-six ; 
and the cavalry force of the Middle Military Division under 
General Sheridan, twelve thousand nine hundred and eighty 
strong : making an effective total of all arms of one hundred 
and sixty-two thousand two hundred and thirty-nine. 

There is no return of the Army of Northern Yirginia 
on file in the Archive-Office, at Washington, of later date 
than that last given. It will be seen that on the 28th of 
February, 1865, General Lee had available thirty-nine thou- 
sand eight hundred and seventy-nine muskets. During the 
month of March the army lost heavily. In the assault made 
by General Gordon's troops on the line of the enemy, on the 
25th, the Confederate loss was between twenty-five hundred 
and three thousand. The loss to the army by desertion, in 
the last thirty days of the siege, was three thousand men ; 
an average of one hundred per day. On the 31st of March, 
General Lee had therefore but thirty-three thousand mus- 
kets, with which to defend a line over thirty miles in length 
— one thousand men to the mile ! 

In the engagement at Five Forks on the 1st of April, 
the divisions of Pickett and Bushrod Johnson were well- 
nigh annihilated by the Federal turning force, under Sheri- 
dan and Warren, which overwhelmed them; the loss sus- 
tained there reached seven thousand men. 1 In the encounters 
at other points on the 31st of March and the 1st of April, 
and in the general assault on the lines made on the 2d of 
April, the loss was very heavy, perhaps six thousand men. 
So that, when General Lee withdrew his army from the 

1 The Federals claim to have taken five thousand prisoners. 



188 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 

lines during the night of the 2d of April, he had not over 
twenty thousand muskets available. The cavalry had also 
suffered heavily, and, of all arms, not over twenty-five thou- 
sand men began the retreat that terminated at Appomattox 
Court-House. 

Speaking in behalf of my former comrades of the Army 
of Northern Virginia, I here rest our case, and declare our 
readiness to accept the judgment of the world, as to the 
genius and skill of the commander, and the valor and endur- 
ance of the men, who fought so nobly and fell so bravely, 
full of honors, though denied success. 

In what I have written, I have endeavored, first, to as- 
sist in making clear some matters touching the histoiy of 
General Lee, heretofore shrouded in obscurity or doubt ; 
secondly, to present a statement of the strength, of the army 
which he commanded, that could be relied upon as accurate. 

In regard to the first branch of my undertaking, I need 
not that others should remind me of the imperfect manner 
of its execution ; but, of the matter, and of the spirit in 
which I addressed myself to the work, I claim that my only 
aim has been historic accuracy. Indeed, I have written as 
if under the supervision of General Lee himself, fully realiz- 
ing that, were that illustrious man now living, he would scorn 
any advantage obtained through injustice to others, or the 
sacrifice of truth : and this conviction has been present to 
my mind as a controlling force through my entire narrative. 

In regard to the second branch of my subject, I feel as- 
sured that the statement of the strength of the Confederate 
army has been presented in such form as to command the 
confidence of all. Startling to some as the disparity in num- 
bers between the two armies on certain occasions may ap- 
pear, it is nevertheless established upon incontrovertible evi- 
dence, and makes pardonable the emotions of pride with 
which the soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia points 
to the achievements of that incomparable body of soldiery, 
under its peerless and immortal leader. Had he lived, I have 



FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 189 

shown that it was his purpose to prepare for the benefit of 
posterity, and as a just tribute to the courage and endurance 
of his men, a true statement of the odds against which thej 
had to contend. What the designs of an inscrutable but all- 
wise Providence prevented him from doing, in this particu- 
lar, I have had the temerity to attempt, and now submit the 
result of my labor to the judgment of my countrymen, in the 
hope that in criticising my work they will not lose sight of 
the purpose by which I have been actuated, or the spirit in 
which I have performed my task. 



ADDEESS 
ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL R. E. LEE, 

Delivered in Richmond, on Wednesday, January 19, 1876, the Anniversary of 
General Lee's Birth, by Captain John Hampden Chamberlayne. 



Fellow-Citizens : I shall not obtrude upon you apologies 
or explanations, as if I had the orator's established fame to 
lose, or looked that future fame to win. You are not come 
to hear of my small hopes or fears. Yet, to you, and to the 
gravity of the occasion, it is due to say that I appear before you 
on sudden order, to my sense of duty hardly less imperative 
than those famous commands under which we have so often 
marched at " early dawn." 

By telegraph, on last Saturday night, this duty was laid up- 
on me, and I come with little of preparation, and less of ability, 
to attempt a theme that might task the powers of Bossuet or 
exhaust an Everett's rhetoric. 

It can scarcely be needful to rehearse before you the facts 
of our commander's life. They have become, from least to 
greatest, parts of history, and an ever-growing number of books 
record that he was born in 1807, at Stratford, in "Westmoreland 
County, of a family ancient and honorable in the mother-country, 
in the Old Dominion, and in the State of Virginia ; that he was 
appointed a cadet at the United States Military Academy in 
1825, and was graduated first in his class, and commissioned 
lieutenant of engineers ; that he served upon the staff of Gen- 
eral Scott through the brilliant campaign from Vera Cruz to 



ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 191 

the city of Mexico, was thrice brevetted for gallant and meri- 
torious conduct, and was declared by General Scott to have 
borne a chief part in the counsels and the battles which ended 
with the triumph of our arms ; that he was promoted lieutenant- 
colonel of cavalry, and served for years upon the Southwestern 
frontier ; that he was in 1861 called to Washington as one of a 
board to revise the army regulations ; and that on the 20th day 
of April, 1861, four days after the withdrawal of Virginia from 
the Union, he resigned his commission in the United States 
Army, and that he became commander-in-chief of Virginia's 
forces, and thereafter accepted the commission of general in the 
army of the Confederate States. 

Still more familiar to you than these facts are the events of 
which you and I had personal knowledge : how Lee organized, 
patiently and skillfully, the raw resources of Virginia ; how he 
directed the coast defenses of the South Atlantic States, and 
how he labored against a thousand difficulties in the mountains 
of West Virginia, serenely accepting without a murmur the 
popular verdict on what ignorant presumption adjudged a fail- 
ure. In June of 1862 he was at length placed in a command to 
meet whose vast responsibility his life had been the preparation, 
and at once his name became forever linked with that Army of 
Northern Virginia which met and mastered army after army, 
baffled McClellan, and destroyed successively Pope, Burnside, 
and Hooker ; which twice invaded the enemy's country, and 
which, when at last against it were thrown all the resources of 
the United States, Grant in its front and Sherman in its rear, 
Europe for their recruiting-ground, and a boundless credit for 
their military chest, still stood for eleven months defiantly at 
bay, concentrated on itself the whole resources of the United 
States, and surrendered at Appomattox eight thousand starving 
men to the combined force of two great armies whose chiefs had 
long despaired to conquer it by skill or daring, and had worn it 
away by weight of numbers and brutal exchange of many lives 
for one. We all know, too, how the famous soldier sheathed 
his sword, and without a word of repining, without a look to 
show the grief that was breaking his heart and sapping the 
springs of his noble life, accepted the duty that came to him, 



192 ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 

and bent to his new task, as guide and teacher of boys, the 
powers which had wielded the strength of armies and almost 
redressed the balances of unequal fate. 

Such are the leading facts, in barest outline, of the great 
life that began sixty-nine years ago to-day. Well known as 
they are, it is wise to recall them when we gather as we have 
gathered here. In these hurrying days men pass swiftly away 
from human sight, the multitude of smaller figures vanishing 
behind the curtain of forgetfulness, the few mighty ones soon 
wrapped in the hazy atmosphere of the heroic heights, enlarged, 
it may be, but ofttimes dim and distorted, always afar off, unfa- 
miliar, not human, but superhuman, demi-gods rather than men ; 
our wonder and our despair, who should be our reverence and 
our inspiration. 

Thus has it already been with him who lies at Mount Ver- 
non. Let it be our care, men of this generation, that it be not 
so in our day with him who lies at Lexington ; let it be our care 
to show him often to those who rise around us to take our place, 
to show him not only in his great deeds and his famous victories, 
but also as citizen and #s man. 

The task is hard to divide what is essentially one, and Lee 
so bore himself in his great office as that the man was never 
lost in the soldier. Never of him could it be said that he was 
like the dyer's hand, subdued to what he worked in : always the 
sweet human quality tempered his stoic virtue, always beneath 
the soldier's breast beat the tender, loving heart. 

Most of us here have seen and known him, if not in his 
splendid youth, fit at once to charm the eye of the Athenian 
multitude and to awe a Roman Senate, yet in his maturer years, 
when time and care had worn his body but to show more glori- 
ous the lofty soul within. Among us and ours his life was led, 
so blameless as might become a saint, so tender as might be- 
come a woman, so simple as might become the little children 
" of whom is the kingdom of heaven." So consistent was that 
life, so devoted to duty, without a glance to right or left, so 
fixed on the golden rule, adopted once and forever, that his 
biographer, even now in a time of passion and distorted truth, 
hesitates what to choose for his highest praise — lingering in 



ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 193 

turn over Lee the son, Lee the husband, Lee the father, Lee the 
friend. Idle, then, it were for me to picture him in all the rela- 
tions he bore to those around him, and worse than idle were I 
to follow what is much the fashion nowadays and make a study 
of Lee the Christian, pry with curious glance into the sacred 
chamber wherein man kneels to his God, or dare to touch the 
awful veil which fools are swift to rend. 

" But," says the critic, "private virtue is not for public use; 
a Torquemada may be gentle in his home, and a Stuart seek to 
enslave his people, yet lead a life of chastity." 

'Tis true, but still our great commander shines flawless and 
perfect, at once in the quiet beams of the household hearth and 
in the fierce light that beats upon the throne of him born to be 
king of men. 

Let one great example show it. None but those who know 
the power of lofty ambition can tell what vast temptation beset 
our leader ; none can know the heroism of the decision in the 
dark days of 1861. He was the favorite soldier of all who fol- 
lowed Scott ; he was the picked and chosen man for high com- 
mand in the armies of the United States. He was besought 
almost with tears by him he reverenced as a second father ; to 
him was tendered the baton of general-in-chief. Who can tell 
what visions trooped upon his sight — of power, that dearest 
boon to the powerful, of fame world-wide, of triumph, not easy 
but certain ? And who can tell but fairer dreams than these 
assailed him ; hope, nay, almost belief, that he and he alone 
might play the noble part of pacificator and redintegrator pa- 
Trice, that he might heal the wounds of civil strife, and be hailed 
by North and South as worthy the oaken garland ? 

He had been more or less than human had not these 
thoughts, or such as these, arisen when he strove through days 
and bitter nights to find his duty. 

He, we must remember, was wedded to no theory ; his mind 
grasped concrete truth rather than abstractions. His horizon 
was bounded by no lines of neighborhood or of States. He 
knew the men of the North, as well as of the South ; he had 
maturely weighed the wealth of the one and the poverty of the 
other. Few knew so well as he, none better, the devotion we 
13 



194 ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 

could offer to any cause, but he knew likewise the stubborn, 
deep-resting strength of the Northern will that we took for a 
passing whim. He had all his life obeyed and respected the 
organized, concentrated form of the Union; and he, the pupil 
of Scott, the follower of Washington, the son of Light-Horse 
Harry, might and should and did pause long. Paused long, to 
decide forever — to decide with never a look backward, with 
never a regret, even when the end had come, darker than his 
fears had pictured. 

Cast away all, to obey the voice of Virginia, his country; to 
defend Virginia, his mother. Scarcely twice since the world 
began has mortal man been called to make such choice. 

Will not history consent, will not mankind -applaud, when 
we still uphold our principles as right, our cause as just, our 
country to be honored, when those principles had for disciple, 
that cause for defender, that country for son, Robert Lee ? 

The day has by no means come to fix with absolute precision 
the rank of Lee among the world's great soldiers. But the day 
will come, and it is ours to gather and preserve and certify the 
facts to be the record before the dread tribunal of time. 

Turning, then, to the soldiership of Lee : from first to last, 
we see his labor and exactness, giving always the power to gain 
from every means its utmost result. Thus he so pursued the 
sciences which underlie the soldier's art that he entered the 
army fully equipped with all that theory could teach, and while 
yet a subaltern was more than once intrusted with tasks of the 
engineers' bureau which had baffled the skill of men far older 
and more experienced. The same qualities were shown when 
he first saw actual war. To us, who look back across the field 
of a gigantic strife, of a struggle where not brigades nor divis- 
ions but great armies were the units, where States were forti- 
fied camps and a continent the battle-ground- — to us that march 
on Mexico seems as small as it is, in fact, far off in time and 
space. But small and great are relative, and the little army of 
Scott which gathered on the sands of Vera Cruz was little in 
much the same sense as that other army, of Cortez, whose foot- 
steps it followed and whose prowess it rivaled. In that cam- 
paign Lee's soldiership first found fit field. It was he whose 



ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 195 

skill gave us the quick foothold of Vera Cruz. At Cerro Gordo 
and Contreras his was no mean part of the plan and its accom- 
plishment. At the city of Mexico it was his soldier's eye and 
soldier's heart which saw and dared what Cortez had seen and 
dared before, to turn the enemy's strongest position, and assault 
as well by the San Cosme as by the Belen gateway, a movement 
greatly hazardous, but, once executed, decisive. In the endless 
roll of wars that campaign of Mexico must always remain to the 
judicious critic masterly in conception and superb in execution. 
But to us it is memorable chiefly as the training-school whose 
pupils were to ply their art on a wider scale to ends more ter- 
rible, and Winfield Scott selected from them all Robert E. Lee 
as the chosen soldier. 

The time was soon to come when he should try conclusions 
with many of that brilliant band, and prove himself the master 
of each in turn — of McClellan, of Burnside, of Hooker, of Pope, 
of Meade, of Grant, of whomsoever could be found to lead them 
by the millions he confronted. When the War of Secession be- 
gan, you all remember how for a time Lee held subordinate 
place, and how, when what seemed chance gave him command 
of the forces defending Richmond from the hundred thousand 
men who could hear, if they would, the bells of our churches" 
and almost the hum of our streets — you all remember how the 
home-staying critic found fault with him, how he was described 
as a closet-soldier and a handler of spade and mattock, rather 
than of gun and bayonet. Sudden and swift was the surprise 
when the great plan disclosed itself, and the guns at the 
Meadow Bridges of the Chickahominy cleared the way for the 
first of those mighty blows which sent McClellan in hopeless 
rout to the shelter of his shipping, thence to hurry as he might 
to the rescue of Pope's bewildered divisions, and to organize 
home-guards in the defenses of Washington. That single cam- 
paign of the Seven Days is itself fame. To amuse an army out- 
numbering his own by fifty thousand ; to watch with a large 
detachment lest that army should make a junction with the 
divisions at Fredericksburg ; to bring Jackson's skill and Jack- 
son's devoted men to his aid ; to cross a marshy and often im- 
practicable stream ; to attack McClellan on his flank and to roll 



196 ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 

up his army like a scroll, while, at each step gained, his enemy 
should be weaker and himself be stronger and in stronger posi- 
tion, yet at the same time to guard lest his enemy should break 
his centre as Napoleon pierced the Russians on Austerlitz field 
— such was the problem. You know, all the world knows, its 
execution. Despite the errors of subordinates ; despite the skill 
of his opponent, a soldier truly great in defense ; despite the 
rawness of many of his troops ; despite the lack in the general 
. officers of the skill necessary to movements so delicate ; and 
J despite the inferiority of his force, Lee succeeded fully in his 
/ main object, relieved Richmond, inflicted on his enemy losses 
materially immense and morally infinite ; in seven days abso- 
lutely undid what McClellan took six months to do, and by a 
single combination threw back his enemy from the hills in sight 
of Richmond to a defensive line in Washington's suburbs. This 
campaign, for its audacity, its wide combination, its insight into 
| the opponent's character, its self-reliance, its vigor of execution, 
and its astonishing results, may be safely compared with the 
best campaigns of the greatest masters in the art of war — with 
Frederick's Leuthen, to which it bears as much likeness as a 
campaign of days can bear to a battle of hours, or with that 
greater feat, the amazing concentration by Washington of con- 
tingents from New York and from North Carolina, of new levies 
from the Virginia Valley, and of a French fleet from the West 
Indies, to besiege and to capture the army of Cornwallis. 

It is argued that Lee was strong only in defense, and was 
averse to taking the offensive. Nothing could be more false. He 
was to prove in the last year of the war his fertility of defensive 
resource and his unrivaled tenacity of resistance. But his genius 
was aggressive. Witness the bold transfer of his army from 
Richmond to the Rapidan, while McClellan's troops still rested 
on the James River. Witness the audacity of detaching Jack- 
son from the Rappahannock line to seize Manassas Junction and 
the road to Washington in Pope's rear. Witness the magnifi- 
cent swoop on Harper's Ferry, of which accident gave to Mc- 
Clellan the knowledge and by which timidity forbade him to 
profit. Witness that crowning glory of his audacity, the change 
of front to attack Hooker, and that march around what Hooker 



ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER. OF GENERAL LEE. 19 7 

called " the best position in America, held by the finest army on 
the planet." Witness his invasion of Pennsylvania, a campaign 
whose only fault was the generous fault of over-confidence in 
an army whose great deeds might, if anything, excuse it — an 
over-confidence, as we ourselves know, felt by every man he 
led, and which made us reckless of all difficulties, ready to think 
that to us nothing was impossible. He was a commander who 
had met no equal ; we were an army who saw in half the guns 
of our train the spoil of the enemy, who bore upon our flags the 
blazon of consistent victory. If he and we confided in our 
daring, and trusted to downright fighting for what strategy 
might have safely won, who shall blame us and which shall 
blame the other ? It was a fault, if fault there were, such as in 
a soldier leans to virtue's side ; it was the fault of Marlborough 
at Malplaquet, of the Great Frederick at Torgau, of Napoleon at 
Borodino. It is the famous fault of the column of Fontenoy, 
and the generous haste that led Hampden to his death. 

Lee chose no defensive of his own will. None knew better 
than he that axiom of the military art which finds the logical 
end of defense in surrender. None knew better than he that 
Fabius had never earned his fame by the policy some attribute 
to him, nor saved his country by retreats, however regular, or 
the skill, however great, to choose positions only to abandon 
them. The defensive was not his chosen field, but he was fated 
to conduct a defensive campaign rivaled by few and surpassed 
by none in history. Of that wonderful work the details are yet 
to be gathered, but the outlines are known the world over. 
The tremendous onset of Lee in the tangled Wilderness upon 
an enemy three times his force, who fancied him retreating; the 
grim wrestle of Spottsylvania ; the terrible repulse of Cold Har- 
bor, from which the veteran commanders of Grant shrank back 
aghast — these great actions will be known so long as war 
shall be studied, and future generations will read with admira- 
tion of that battle-field of seventy miles, where Lee with fifty- 
one thousand men confronted Grant with his one hundred and 
ninety thousand — attacked him wherever he showed uncovered 
front, killed, wounded, and captured, more men than his own 
army numbered ; and, in a campaign of thirty-five days, forced 



198 ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 

the most tenacious soldier of the Union armies to abandon 
utterly his line of attack, to take a new position always open to 
him but never chosen, and to exchange the warfare of the open 
field for the slow and safe approach of the earthwork and the 
siege. 

They will read, too, that in the midst of this campaign Lee 
was bold to spare from his little army force enough to take once 
more the offensive, to traverse once more the familiar Valley, to 
break once more through the gate of the Potomac, and to insult 
with the fires of his bivouacs the capital city of his enemy. 
Reading these things, they will refuse to believe, what we know, 
that men were found here and now to call this marvelous cam- 
paign a retreat. 

The truth is, that Lee took a real defensive, if at all, only 
in the trenches of Petersburg ; was driven to that defensive not 
by one army nor by many armies in succession, but by the com- 
bined force of the armies in his front and in his rear. Vicks- 
burg it was, not Cemetery Hill, which baffled the Army of Nor- 
thern Virginia ; at Nashville and Atlanta, not from the lines of 
Petersburg, came the deadly blows ; and the ragged remnant of 
Appomattox surrendered not to the valor or skill of the men 
they had so often met and overcome, but to the men they had 
never seen, and yielded neither to stubborn Grant nor braggart 
Sheridan, but to the triumphant hosts of Rosecrans, of Thomas, 
and of Sherman. 

It is not hard, then, my friends, to see that history will hold 
Lee to be a great soldier, wise in counsel, patient in prepara- 
tion, swift in decision, terrible in onset, tenacious of hold, sullen 
in retreat, a true son of that Berserker race that rushed from 
the bosom of Europe's darkest age, furious to fight, lovers of 
battle, destined to sweep away the old world and to mould the 
modern. 

Rightly to estimate his power as commander is not and may 
never be possible. There is no second term of comparison. He 
was in a position as novel as were the conditions of a war where 
the railroad existed, but the highway was not ; where telegraphs 
conveyed orders, yet primeval forests still stood to conceal 
armies ; where concentration was possible at a speed unknown 



ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 199 

to war before, but where concentration might easily starve it- 
self before it could strike its enemy. 

Strange as the material, were the moral conditions of Lee's 
command. He was hampered by political considerations ; he 
was trammeled by the supreme importance of one city ; and, 
above all, on him was complete responsibility, but never com- 
mensurate power. To the integrity of his army, to the morale 
of half his force, the successful defense of the South and South- 
west was essential, and on operations in which he had no voice 
turned the issue of his campaigns. 

Of these things account will yet be taken, let us be sure of 
that ; for though in barbarous ages conquered peoples write no 
histories, yet, as the world grows older, history grows more 
and more a judge, less and less a witness and advocate ; more 
and more to every cause that appeal lies open which Francis 
Bacon, of Verulam, made " to future ages and other countries." 

Fit is it that we trust to that great verdict, seeing that 
nothing less than the tribunal of mankind can judge this man, 
who was born not for a period, but for all time ; not for a coun- 
try, but for the world ; not for a people, but for the human 
race. 

Not for him shall the arch of triumph rise ; not for him col- 
umns of victory, telling through monumental bronze the hideous 
tale of tears and blood that grins from the skull-pyramids of 
Dahomey. Not to his honor shall extorted tributes carve the 
shaft or mould the statue ; but this day a grateful people give 
of their poverty gladly, that in pure marble, or time-defying 
bronze, future generations may see the counterfeit presentment 
of this man — the ideal and bright consummate flower of our 
civilization ; not an Alexander, it may be ; nor Napoleon, nor 
Timour, nor Churchill — greater far than they, thank Heaven — 
the brother and the equal of Sidney and of Falkland, of Hamp- 
den and of Washington ! 



THE END. 



LB '13 






Jh 



